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On March 13th, 2020, the University of Essex announced a series of 
measures to prevent the spread of coronavirus amongst students and staff. 
One of these measures was the effective closure of departments, and the 
suspension of any in-person testing involving participants. At this time, I had 
collected half of the data for my third study, intended to be included in this 
thesis. As my first two studies (chapters 2 and 3) focus on financial tasks that 
measure decisions based on description, the third study was designed to be a 
computerized driving task measuring decisions from experience, which would 
further investigate age differences in risk-taking behaviour across task type 
and domain. As per university guidelines, I paused data collection and worked 
from home. Unfortunately, the risks associated with resuming in-person 
testing with older adults remained too high throughout the remainder of my 
degree, and data collection has remained impossible since the start of the 
coronavirus pandemic. As I was not able to complete the study I intended for 
my thesis, I designed another study (discussed in the fourth chapter of this 
thesis), which was conducted online. 
In summary, COVID-19 is a serious health risk and has impacted many lives. 
It has also impacted mine, and my ability to complete my planned third study 
to a degree that it could have made a significant contribution to my thesis, 
and or the field of research. I made changes to continue working with the age 
groups involved in this project in a safe manner, while keeping in line with my 
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Previous research examining age differences in decision-making under risk 
has yielded mixed findings. In some studies, older adults took more risk than 
younger adults, in other studies these findings were the opposite, and in 
some studies, there were no age differences at all. These mixed findings may 
result from a) age differences due to age-related decline in cognitive abilities, 
and or (b) age differences in risk preference. The aim of this thesis is to 
provide insight in adult age differences in risk-taking behaviour, specifically 
concerning the role of cognitive ability and risk preference. The studies 
reported in this thesis examine risk-taking on a financial in-person behavioural 
measure (study 1), a financial computerized behavioural measure with 
multiple levels of complexity (study 2), and risk-taking in a real-life situation 
concerning the COVID-19 pandemic (study 3). The findings of these studies 
highlight the complexity of age differences in risk-taking, and their 
dependence on other factors, such as the type of measurements used for 
risk-taking, cognitive ability and risk preference (studies 1 and 2), and the risk 
domain (studies 1,2 and 3). It has also contributed other factors beyond 
cognitive ability and risk preference, such as the importance of risk 
comprehension (study 1, 2) and risk perception (study 3), and how these 












         We are currently facing an unprecedented situation in which we will soon 
have more older adults than children. By 2050, it is projected that one in four people 
in the United Kingdom will be aged 65 years and over (Office for National Statistics, 
2021). The rise in life expectancy and increase in the proportion of older adults also 
means that many important decisions will be made later in life. These decisions often 
involve a level of risk, such as choosing critical medical treatment (e.g. radiation or 
chemotherapy), each treatment with their own rates of success and severity of side 
effects. In addition, the process of ageing is characterized by changes in personality 
and cognition, and these changes may impact older adult decision-making (Strough 
& Bruine de Bruin, 2020). 
         A common societal belief is that older adults are risk averse and prefer to 
avoid risk at all costs. However, older adults do display some risk-seeking 
behaviours. For example, older adults are a common sight at gambling halls and 
casinos, as well as often purchasing lottery tickets. This common assumption that 
older adults are naturally risk averse may be inaccurate and may prevent the 
availability of support for older adults to make optimal decisions under risk and 
uncertainty. 
         In research on risk-taking behaviour, age differences in risk-taking have 
varied. These mixed findings may be a result of the materials used to measure risk-
taking, the extent to which they reflect people’s underlying preference towards risk, 
and how much they rely on cognitive abilities that naturally decline with age. As 
such, age differences in risk-taking could be caused by either age differences in risk 
preference, or age differences in cognitive abilities. 
         It is important to understand these age-related differences in risk-taking 
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behaviour as the rise in living conditions in developed nations have allowed citizens 
to live longer than ever before, causing many important life decisions, often 
accompanied by risk and uncertainty, to be made in older adulthood. As such, this 
thesis aimed to investigate the role of risk preference and cognitive ability in age 
differences in risk-taking. 
1.2 Age differences in risk-taking 
1.2.1 Significance 
         In the United Kingdom alone, one in four people in the United Kingdom will be 
aged 65 years and over in 2050 (Office for National Statistics, 2021). Because of this 
shift in population age, it is important to examine the mechanisms of older adult 
decision-making, especially decisions that encompass risk. 
         The common assumption that older adults prefer avoiding risk at all cost can 
be harmful. By not acknowledging that older adults may also seek out risk, or are 
exposed to situations involving risk and uncertainty, suitable support for older adults 
may not be available. For example, findings show that lotteries are the kind of 
gambling most frequently played by older adults, followed by casino games 
(Ariyabuddhiphongs, 2012). British past-year gambling stood at 63% in 2010 in the 
over-75 age category (Wardle et al., 2011). The lack of attention given to gambling 
problems among older adults has been highlighted in the literature for over a 
decade, with a review by Matheson et al. (2018) finding only six studies that included 
adults aged 55 years and older when looking at the prevention and treatment of 
gambling problems. Despite this age group being often overlooked in gambling 
research, gambling habits can have severely impacted the quality of life through 
financial, and social harm, and in some cases, may lead to suicide (Landreat et al., 
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2019). Gambling problems among older adults may go undetected because 
healthcare professionals do not expect these issues from an older age group, as 
most prevention and treatment plans are aimed at young and middle-aged adults 
(Matheson et al., 2018). In addition, Han et al. (2017) reported a 250 percent 
increase of marijuana use among American older adults of 65 years and above in 
seven years, from 2006 to 2013. Older adults are currently not automatically 
screened for substance use, as they are not presumed to be consumers of 
recreational drugs (Han et al., 2017). As such, potential drug use problems among 
older adults may go undiscovered. 
         An ageing society does not only affect the individual, but also affects the 
nation’s approach to spending and policies. On a governmental level, ageing impacts 
areas such as pensions, social care, housing, and healthcare (Office of National 
Statistics, 2018). People of working age contribute more in taxes than is returned to 
them in the form of public spending. However, this is the opposite as citizens age, as 
they contribute less in taxes but require more public spending in areas such as 
healthcare and pension (Office of National Statistics, 2018). As such, individuals 
making informed and optimal decisions is not only beneficial to the person 
themselves, but also to the state, as this may limit any additional spending on 
policies or programs. Understanding which changes accompany ageing, and how 
this affects decision-making in areas such as healthcare decisions, investments and 




         Research on ageing and risk-taking has experienced a resurgence, likely due 
to the rising life expectancy in Western societies. So far, findings on age differences 
in risk-taking have varied, as older adults will take more risk in some studies (Chen 
et al., 2014; Denburg et al., 2005; Henninger et al., 2010; Samanez-Larkin et al., 
2010; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011; Schiebener & Brand, 2017; Zamarian et al., 
2008) than in others (Henninger et al., 2010; Koscielniak et al., 2016; Mamerow et 
al., 2016; Rolison et al., 2012). Mata et al. (2011) conducted a meta-analysis on 
studies using behavioural measures of risk-taking and found that older adults’ risk-
taking differed across behavioural tasks. These findings were supported by a review 
by Liebherr et al. (2017). The authors of both works concluded that the conflicting 
findings on age differences in risk-taking were likely due to variations in design 
features of behavioural tasks, such as complexity and domain, and how much these 
tasks relied on cognitive abilities for  comprehension of the task and optimal 
performance. 
         Some behavioural tasks that measure risk-taking are more complex than 
others, with some tasks requiring participants to learn on the task to avoid risk, 
remember prior information or choices, or by applying time pressure on participants’ 
responses. Tasks that encompass these complex features are more likely to rely on 
cognitive abilities such as working memory and processing speed for optimal 
performance, whether that is characterized as taking risk or avoiding it on the task. 
However, many of these cognitive abilities required to make decisions on these tasks 
also decrease with age. The natural decline in abilities such as working memory and 
processing speed may lead to older adults taking more risk due to the cognitive 
demand of the task, instead of their underlying preference towards risk. For example, 
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if a task applies time pressure, an older adult participant with naturally declining 
processing speed will have more difficulty understanding the task and choosing the 
optimal approach within the time given to them compared to younger adults. Thus, 
time constraints may not affect a younger person, but it will affect the likelihood that 
older adults comprehend the task and pick the optimal approach. As such, older 
adults’ adoption of a sub-optimal approach would be considered risk-taking on the 
task, even though it was due to an age-related decline in cognitive abilities, instead 
of their underlying preference towards risk. 
         Though prior studies have examined the relationship between cognitive ability 
and risk-taking behaviour (e.g. Chen et al., 2014; Finucane et al., 2005; Frey et al., 
2015; Henninger et al., 2010; Pachur et al., 2017), the research on how cognitive 
ability affects age differences in risk-taking is limited. As such, it is currently unclear 
whether age differences in risk-taking are due to age differences in risk preference, 
or age differences in cognitive abilities. This thesis aimed to investigate the role of 
cognitive ability and risk preference in age differences in risk-taking behaviour. 
1. 3 Measurements of age differences in risk-taking 
1.3.1 Self-reported risk preference 
         Risk preference, otherwise referred to as risk attitude, can be defined as the 
propensity to engage in behaviours or activities that are rewarding yet involve some 
potential for loss, such as including substance use or criminal activities associated 
with physical and mental harm to individuals (Mata et al., 2018). Risk preference is 
commonly assumed to explain risk-taking behaviour, as risk-taking is an expression 
of one’s preference or attitude towards risk. Accordingly, one’s risk preferences 
reflect tendencies towards or against risk-taking when making decisions, such that a 
risk-averse individual would be willing to sacrifice overall value to avoid selecting the 
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riskier option (Henninger et al., 2010). Though risk preference is relatively stable 
over time (i.e. someone highly risk averse will likely not become highly risk-seeking) 
(Mata et al., 2018; Schildberg-Hörisch, 2018), risk preference may still change as 
people age. Age differences in risk preference across the life span have been 
studied extensively, and older adults have often been found to be more risk averse 
than their younger counterparts concerning risky decision-making (Bonsang & 
Dohmen, 2015; Dohmen et al., 2011; Josef et al., 2016; Mamerow et al., 2016; 
Rolison et al., 2014). 
         Risk preference is commonly captured through people’s responses to 
hypothetical or real-life behaviours. Participants may be asked whether they agree 
with a given statement (“I enjoy taking risks”) or provide the likelihood of them 
engaging in risky activities or behaviours (“Drinking heavily at a social function”). 
Additionally, some measures will provide a hypothetical scenario to respond to, such 
as a medical emergency in which decisions must be made about treatments or ask 
people to report on the frequency they engage in risky behaviour. Most self-report 
measures of risk preference include several items, though some only provide a 
single item (Bonsang & Dohmen, 2015; Dohmen et al., 2011). 
         Though there is evidence of a general risk preference, people’s willingness to 
take risks may also be domain specific. As such, self-report measures can be split 
into measures of general and domain-specific risk preference. An example of a 
measure of general risk preference is the single item used by Dohmen et al. (2011). 
Participants are asked “Are you in general a risk-taking person or do you usually try 
to avoid taking risks?”, and asked to provide an answer on a scale from 0 (0 = 
absolutely not risk taking) to 10 (10 = very risk taking). Dohmen et al. (2011) found 
that older adults reported being less risk-taking compared to younger adults. 
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Mamerow et al. (2016) and Josef et al. (2016) used the same item and report similar 
findings, with other adults reporting lower willingness to take risks, thus being more 
risk averse compared to younger adults. Another measure of general risk with 
multiple items is the General Risk Propensity Scale (GRiPS; Zhang et al., 2019), with 
8 items measuring people's general propensity to take risks. Participants are given 
statements about themselves (“My friends would say I'm a risk taker") and rate on a 
5-point Likert scale to what extent they agree with the statement. 
         An example of a popular domain-specific risk preference measure is the 
Domain Specific Risk Taking (Dospert; Weber et al., 2002). This measure consists of 
5 domains (social, ethical, recreational, health and safety, and financial), each with 
three scales to measure a person’s likelihood to engage in risky behaviour, the 
perceived benefit and perceived risk of the risky behaviour. Participants respond to 
six items for each domain (i.e. “cheating on an exam” for the ethical domain), with 
identical items for each of the three scales (i.e. Likelihood, Expected Benefits, and 
Risk Perception). In the Likelihood scale, participants rated the likelihood that they 
would engage in the given behaviours on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = 
very unlikely, 5 = very likely). In the Expected Benefit scale, participants rated the 
benefits that they perceived in the outlined behaviours on a seven-point Likert scale 
from 1 to 5 (1 = no benefits at all, 5 = great benefits). On the third scale, Risk 
Perception, participants rated the risk they perceived in undertaking the outlined 
behaviours on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all risky, 5 = 
extremely risky). The scale was later adopted into a shortened version (Blais & 
Weber, 2006), which has been used more regularly in ageing research compared to 
its original scale since its development. The Dospert has also been used for 
assessing age differences in risk preference. Findings by Rolison et al. (2014) 
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demonstrated that older adults were more risk averse on the Dospert’s (Blais & 
Weber, 2006) financial, health, recreational, and ethical domains, but there was no 
age-related decline concerning social risk-taking. In Dohmen et al. (2011), the 
authors used 6 single items to measure risk-taking across 6 different domains (i.e. 
driving, financial, recreational, occupational, health, and social). People are asked to 
rate their willingness to take risk for each domain (i.e. “How is your willingness to 
take risks while driving?” for measuring driving risk). They then provide an answer on 
a scale from 0 (“not at all willing to take risks”) to 10 (“very willing to take risks”). Age 
was negatively associated with willingness to take risks in all domains, indicating that 
people become more risk averse as they age. Josef et al. (2016) used these items in 
their longitudinal study and reported similar outcomes. In their study, older age was 
associated with a decline in willingness to take risks across all 6 domains, but at 
different rates. Willingness to take financial and health-related risk showed only a 
small decline until the age of 55, after which the decline increased, whereas 
willingness to take social risks only showed a consistently small decline as people 
aged. 
         Recent findings indicate that risk preference is not solely general or domain-
specific but encompasses both components (Frey et al., 2017). People can have a 
general preference towards risk that encompasses risk overall but may be more or 
less comfortable with risk in different domains, such as health or recreational risk. As 
risk preference is often assumed to underlie risk-taking behaviour, self-report 
measures have occasionally been used together with measures of risk-taking, such 
as behavioural tasks, to connect risk preference to behaviour on a risk-taking task.  
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1.3.2 Risk-taking tasks 
         A common method of measuring risk-taking behaviour is through behavioural 
tasks. It is thought that people’s underlying belief about risk, and their tendency to be 
risk averse or risk-seeking, is reflected in their behaviour on these tasks. In other 
words, people’s risk-taking on behavioural tasks is thought to be related to their 
underlying preference towards risk. Despite the large number of existing behavioural 
tasks, most tasks apply monetary scenarios to gauge people’s risk-taking behaviour. 
Monetary scenarios, such as using a lottery or the choice between a sure and risky 
option, are most popular. Behavioural tasks measuring risk-taking differ in one 
important dimension - whether the risk-taking decisions are description-based 
decisions or experience-based decisions. 
1.3.2.1 Description-based tasks 
         Behavioural tasks that measure decisions based on description include full 
information about probabilities and outcomes, or those are made easy to obtain by 
the participants themselves (Mata et al., 2011). An example of such a situation is 
asking participants whether they believe it is more likely that a coin will be in a black 
or red box when these are displayed on the screen. Participants are not given the 
likelihood of the coin’s presence in a black or red box, but they can easily calculate 
this by assessing the number of red and black boxes on the screen and dividing by 
the total number of boxes. Descriptive tasks differ in how these choice options are 
presented, either by displaying the options’ probabilities or probabilities represented 
by objects instead. 
         In the Cups task (Weller et al., 2007) the sure and risky options and their 
probabilities are conveyed through cups. The task consists of gain and loss domains, 
three types of probability and three monetary amounts that can be earned or lost. 
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Based on the combinations, risky options could either have the same expected value 
as the safe options, or more advantageous or disadvantageous. Participants gamble 
with coins that are presented on the screen, with the task randomly deciding whether 
their choice for the risky option led to a loss or win. If the participant has won money, 
it is added to their earnings. If money has been lost, it is subtracted from their 
earnings. 
         The Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 1999) presents participants 
with a row of 10 boxes, either red or blue. The ratio of red and blue boxes differs per 
trial, but a yellow token will be hidden in one of the 10 boxes. Firstly, participants are 
asked what colour box they expect the token to be hidden in. Secondly, participants 
are asked what proportion of their current earnings they would like to bet on their 
answer. Participants are not given the probability of the token being in a red or blue 
box, but they can calculate the likelihood of the token being in a specific box colour 
based on the ratio of the red and blue boxes on the screen. 
         Lastly, the Columbia Card Task (Figner et al., 2009) also measures 
description-based decisions in order to gauge risk-taking behaviour. The task 
consists of two versions, described as “hot” and “cold”. In both versions, participants 
are given 32 cards, displayed in 4 rows of 8 cards. Among these cards are loss 
cards, of which the frequency depends on the trial. Participants turn these cards and 
increase their earnings with each card they turn over. In the “hot” version, 
participants turn cards and receive feedback after each card. They can decide after 
each card whether they want to stop turning cards over and proceed to the next trial. 
In the “cold” version, participants decide how many cards they want to turn 
simultaneously, without receiving feedback as they have in the “hot” version. That 
also means that they cannot decide to stop turning cards after each card (like in the 
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“hot” version), but simply decide the total number of cards they will turn over 
simultaneously. However, in either version, encountering a loss card ends the trial, 
and the loss amount is subtracted from their earnings. The task has three 
parameters, namely the probability of encountering a loss card (1, 2 or 3 cards), the 
gain amount per card (10, 20 or 30 points), and the loss amount (250, 500 or 750 
points). 
         Description-based tasks have been used to examine age differences and the 
findings have varied. Weller et al. (2011) reported mixed findings on the Cups task 
and attributed these findings to the domains in the Cups Task. They found that older 
adults took less risk in the gain domain of the task, but not in the loss domain, 
suggesting that risk-taking decreased in age in terms of gains, but not for losses. 
They also found that sensitivity to the expected value of the choice options was 
stable through adulthood until about 65 years of age, after which decline in 
performance was observed, with older adults seemingly experiencing difficulty in 
adjusting for changes in expected value of choice options. This is further supported 
in research using the Columbia Card Task (Figner et al., 2009). Despite the “hot” 
(turning over one card at a time and receiving feedback on the outcome, relying 
more on affective processes) and “cold” (1 decision on how many cards to turn, 
relies on predominantly deliberative processes) domains, adjusting decisions in 
relation to expected value decreased in older age (Weller et al., 2019). Henninger et 
al. (2010) found age differences on the Cambridge Gambling Task, with older adults 
more frequently choosing options with low likelihood of winning, indicating that older 
adults' decision-quality was lower and that they were seeking out risk more than 
younger adults. When assessing the relationship between cognitive ability and the 
Cambridge Gambling Task, they found that processing speed and memory were 
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positively correlated with task behaviour, with better memory and processing speed 
leading to higher quality decisions. When cognitive abilities were considered, the 
effect of age disappeared, suggesting that the age differences on the task were 
mediated by age-related decline in cognitive abilities. These findings were similar to 
those of Deakin et al. (2004), who reported that older adults took longer to make 
their decisions, were less likely to pick the optimal choice, gambled with similar 
amounts while the odds of winning differed, took smaller risks and made less 
adjustments. Zamarian et al. (2008) included the Probability Associated Gambling 
task (Sinz et al., 2008) in their study (which has a sure versus risky design), and 
found no age differences in risk-taking on the task, with older adults’ choices as well 
as their estimations of probabilities similar to those of younger adults. 
         Overall, age differences in tasks measuring description-based decisions are 
somewhat varied, with age differences seemingly depending on domain, in terms of 
their direction and size. Across tasks, older adult performance seems to indicate 
underlying processes that impact their risk-taking, such as their sensitivity to 
expected values (Henninger et al., 2010; Weller et al., 2011, 2019) and the potential 
influence of cognitive abilities on age differences in risk-taking behaviour on these 
tasks (Henninger et al., 2010).   
1.3.2.2 Experience-based tasks 
         Tasks that measure decisions based on experience do not supply information 
on probabilities and outcomes, instead relying on participants to learn these 
throughout taking part in the task. For example, participants learn over time how 
often they can click on a button to increase their earnings before confronted with a 
loss that can wipe out most, or all, of their earnings. The probability or the magnitude 
of the loss is not communicated to participants and can only be learned through 
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experience on the task. Similar to tasks that measure decisions based on 
description, tasks measuring experience-based decisions differ in design features, 
including the direction or extent in which participants must learn on the task to 
understand the risk involved. 
         The Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994) is a well-known example of a 
task measuring experience-based decisions. Participants are given 4 decks of cards 
face down (A, B, C, D) and must choose one card at a time, over 100 trials. 
Participants start with a “loan” of $2000 and are told to make a profit. Each card deck 
has cards with rewards as well as penalty cards. Across decks, the win and penalty 
amounts differ, with some decks as more advantageous than others. Decks A and B 
pay double the amount of decks C and D, but the associated penalty amount is 5 
times larger than the penalty of decks C and D. As such, participants learn over time 
that decks C and D are most advantageous as they result in an overall gain in the 
long run, thus learning to avoid risk. 
         Another example is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002), in 
which participants are given a balloon and pump on the screen, alongside a reset 
button, a button to collect earnings and an overview of their earnings in the past trial. 
Each balloon pump earns the participant 5 cents, which is put in a reserve that is not 
visible to them during the trial. With each pump, the total earnings are increased but 
so is the chance of the balloon exploding. The participant can decide at any time to 
stop and collect their earnings. However, if the balloon pops, they lose the monetary 
amount they have accumulated during the current trial. The Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task consists of 30 trials, with balloons diffing in their explosion points. The weakest 
balloon explodes on the first pump, whereas the strongest balloon explodes on the 
128th pump. As such, participants learn over time how far they can pump the balloon, 
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in which learning leads to an increase in risk-taking on the task. 
         Lastly, the Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy task (Kuhnen & 
Knutson, 2005) has been used to measure age differences in risk-taking. The 
Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy task consists of 20 blocks of 10 trials, a 
total of 200 trials overall. In these trials, participants are shown a screen with three 
investment options: two stocks and one bond. In the next screen, participants must 
choose which option to take (the screen shows “choose” above options). After a 
short wait, participants are shown their chosen options and how much it earned 
them, as well as their total earning. After this, the following screen shows them the 
outcomes of all options that were originally shown in the choice screen. After a 
fixation cross, they are given another trial. The bond option always has the same 
value across all trials, which is $1. The two stocks differ, and a “good” and “bad” 
stock are randomly distributed across the two options for each trial. The “good” stock 
has better outcomes on average (i.e. +$10 with 50% probability, $0 with 25% 
probability, and -$10 with 25% probability) than the “bad” stock (i.e. +$10 with 25% 
probability, $0 with 25% probability, and -$10 with 50% probability). In addition, each 
of the screens have a time limit of how long they are shown. The screen showing 
participants their options (2 seconds), the screens in which participants choose and 
the screen with the highlighted choice (combined duration of 4 seconds), the wait 
screen (2 seconds), the outcome screen (4 seconds), the overview of outcomes of 
original options (4 seconds), and screen with fixation cross (2 seconds) differ 
between each other in how long they are shown to participants. 
         Among tasks measuring experience-based decisions, age differences in risk-
taking are mixed. Zamarian et al. (2008) found significant age differences when 
using the Iowa Gambling Task; older adults did show improvement in their choices 
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over time, but made less advantageous decisions than younger adults, as well as 
shifting between advantageous and disadvantageous decks often, suggesting that 
this stems from older adults experiencing difficulty in developing a consistent and 
advantageous strategy. 
         Using the Balloon Analogue Risk Task to investigate age differences in risk-
taking, Rolison et al. (2012) reported that younger adults initially took more risk on 
the task, but experience with the task allowed older adults to later make similar 
evaluations about gains and losses, and took as much risk as younger adults in later 
trials. Other studies reported older adults demonstrating lower performance on the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task because of higher levels of risk aversiveness compared 
to younger adults (Henninger et al., 2010; Koscielniak et al., 2016). 
         Using the Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy task to examine age 
differences in risk-taking, Samanez-Larkin et al. (2010) found that older adults chose 
a risky asset with a negative expected value over a less risky asset with a positive 
expected value more often than younger adults, suggesting age-related difficulties in 
understanding and using expected values in decision-making under risk. Overall, 
across the two studies discussed in the paper, older adults performed worse 
compared to younger adults. In a second study, older adults again made fewer 
rational choices than younger adults on the Behavioral Investment Allocation 
Strategy task. Despite these differences in rational choice, older adults did not differ 
from younger adults in their knowledge of which options were best, since older adults 
did not make more mistakes when identifying the correct stock at the end of a block 
(Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011). 
         Why age differences in risk-taking vary between studies as well as tasks may 
be due to differences in design across tasks measuring decisions from experience. 
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In addition, these differences in design may also cause varying levels of dependency 
on other abilities to be able to perform optimally. 
1.4 Explaining mixed findings on age differences in risk-taking 
         There are many behavioural tasks currently used to assess age differences in 
risk-taking behaviour. Across these tasks, age differences have varied in magnitude 
and direction. Why some find effects of age and others do not (or in opposite 
directions) may be explained by the difference in task demands, and how the 
difference in task demands affect the involvement of both risk preference and 
cognitive ability in age differences. 
1.4.1 Difference in task demands 
         Current behavioural tasks use mostly financial and monetary scenarios to 
measure risk-taking behaviour. However, there are differences in how these 
scenarios are designed, and how complex the designs are. Those that are more 
complicated are also more likely to depend on processes or abilities to be able to 
understand and perform optimally in the task, whether that is to avoid risk or take 
risk. 
         Firstly, whether decisions are made based on experience or description may 
affect age differences in risk-taking. In decisions based on description, participants 
are given full information about possible outcomes or that information is easily 
obtained through calculations. In decisions based on experience, the participants are 
not given information about probabilities, and must rely on experience acquired 
through the task. The latter has been found to yield the largest age differences (Mata 
et al., 2011), which is likely due to the added complexity of having to acquire 
knowledge on outcomes through the task, instead of this being provided prior to, or 
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during the task. 
         However, even within these two distinct types of behavioural tasks, there are 
differences in the complexity of tasks. In tasks offering options to choose from, the 
types of options differ. Some studies offer a sure versus risky option, in which one is 
a guaranteed but smaller gain (e.g. Probability Associated Gambling task, Behavioral 
Investment Allocation Strategy task), and others offer only multiple risky options (e.g. 
Iowa Gambling Task). In the sure versus risky design, there is the option not to take 
risk and instead take the low-risk option, whereas the multiple risky options require 
participants to gamble. As such, more effort needs to be invested in estimating the 
optimal choice between all risky options. In addition, some tasks do not provide a 
choice between options, but require participants to decide on the proportion of 
something they wish to gamble. In the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, participants 
must decide how far they are willing to pump the balloon, and in the Cups Task 
participants must decide how much of their earnings they are willing to gamble. As 
such, the way people are asked to decide, which in turn measures their risk-taking, 
differs between tasks. In tasks where safe options are offered, participants can 
choose to opt out from risk-taking and accept the option that requires less strain to 
evaluate. In tasks that offer multiple risky options, participants need to evaluate the 
options and determine the option most likely to lead to an optimal outcome, which in 
turn is more demanding. 
         A design feature that is likely the most demanding of cognition is learning. 
Learning requirements are more common in tasks measuring experience-based 
decisions, such as the Iowa Gambling Task and Balloon Analogue Risk Task. The 
Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994) is an example of a task that relies heavily 
on the participant’s ability to learn how to maximize their gain on the task, while other 
19 
 
tasks do not incorporate learning as part of the task (Liebherr et al., 2017; Mata et 
al., 2011). The Iowa Gambling Task requires participants to learn the reward and 
penalty structure of the four decks throughout the task to be able to maximize profit. 
If the participant does not learn that the two seemingly less advantageous decks are 
actually advantageous in the long run, they will take more risk and finish the task 
with a deficit. As such, those who experience difficulties in learning will likely take 
longer to understand tasks like the Iowa Gambling Task or complete the task without 
understanding the task’s workings. 
         In addition, though the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002) and 
the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994) are both tasks measuring 
experienced-based decisions, and require participants to learn throughout the task, 
the outcome associated with learning is the opposite. On the Iowa Gambling Task, 
learning shows by choosing the advantageous decks, those with low pay-out amount 
and penalty, more often. However, learning on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task is 
characterized by a larger number of pumps to inflate the balloon (i.e. seeking out 
more risk). 
         Lastly, another feature that adds to the complexity of a task is the use of time 
constraints. In some tasks, participants are required to respond within a certain time 
frame. The Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy task (decisions based on 
experience) and Probability Associated Gambling task (decisions based on 
description) are both tasks that use time constraints in their design. In the Behavioral 
Investment Allocation Strategy task, each screen shown to the participant during the 
trial has a set duration. The two screens likely most important are the choice screen 
and the screen showing the values associated with all options shown in the choice 
screen. The choice screen (including the screen with the highlighted choice) is 
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shown for 4 seconds, and the screen with all options and their outcomes is shown for 
4 seconds. Within those times, participants need to decide which option they will 
choose, and remember the outcomes associated with the options for a future trial. In 
the Probability Associated Gambling task (Sinz et al., 2008), participants are given 
10 seconds to decide whether to go for the gamble with the higher pay-out (and loss) 
or the safe option with guaranteed, but lower, pay-out. The likelihood of obtaining the 
higher pay-out through choosing the gamble is displayed with a ratio of red and blue 
boxes. If no option is selected within that time, the safe option is automatically 
selected. 
         Though the varying demands of tasks may explain differences in risk-taking 
behaviour between younger adults, this may be more so for older adults. Tasks with 
complex designs may inadvertently tap into cognitive abilities to be able to decide 
optimally. However, some cognitive abilities decline with age, such as working 
memory and processing speed, and the involvement of these abilities may affect 
older adults’ performance on behavioural tasks. 
1.4.2 Role of cognitive abilities 
         Many behavioural tasks use features such as time constraints or learning in 
their designs. Aside from these features adding to the complexity of the task, they 
also rely more heavily on cognitive abilities such as memory and processing speed. 
These abilities are known to be sensitive to ageing, and often decline in older age. 
As such, a decline in these abilities may affect older adults’ understanding of and 
performance on these behavioural tasks, and thus their risk-taking behaviour.        
 It is often thought that age-related cognitive decline is of late onset and is 
mostly limited to memory (Salthouse, 2004). However, studies have shown that this 
is not necessarily true. Age-related effects on fluid cognitive abilities such as 
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processing speed, working memory and reasoning have been found to be rather 
large (Park et al., 2002; Salthouse, 2004), and most of these effects can be found 
before the age of 50 (Salthouse, 2004; Salthouse et al., 2003). The decline of these 
abilities often goes unnoticed in daily life as people have the tendency to adapt their 
lives to a level of cognitive strain that they find comfortable. Additionally, many 
situations in daily life do not require functioning at maximum cognitive capacity, 
whereas cognitive tests or tasks do (Salthouse, 2004). Cognitive changes related to 
normal aging can lead to a reduction in decision-quality, our ability to make 
reasonable and effective decisions, or the ability to manipulate and retain 
information, in which processing speed and memory are involved (Henniger, 2010). 
These abilities are often required in behavioural tasks and declines in these abilities 
may cause older adults to behave differently on a task than intended, due to a lack of 
understanding of the task or its process. 
         The distinction between the two types of tasks, those measuring decisions 
from experience or description, also finds its differences in the relationship between 
task performance, age, and cognitive abilities. Mata et al. (2011) report that age 
differences are more common and of larger size in studies using tasks that measure 
decisions from experience. As these tasks do not incorporate explicit information 
about the outcomes and their likelihood, this likely further complicates tasks 
measuring decisions from experience, separate from any other design features. 
Zamarian et al. (2008) used both types of tasks (Iowa Gambling Task and Probability 
Associated Gambling task) in their study and found age differences on the Iowa 
Gambling Task, but not on the Probability Associated Gambling task. The Probability 
Associated Gambling task allows participants to estimate the probabilities of 
outcomes by using the coloured boxes displayed on the screen, whereas the Iowa 
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Gambling Task does not provide information on probabilities and participants learn 
about the likelihood of wins and losses occurring throughout the task instead. As 
such, the Iowa Gambling Task is by comparison a more complex task due to the lack 
of information on its options and outcomes. In addition, measures of cognitive 
abilities (i.e. working memory, psychomotor speed and divided attention) were 
related to older adults’ performance on the both tasks, indicating that age-related 
changes in cognitive abilities such as working memory are likely to affect older 
adults’ risk-taking, especially on the Iowa Gambling Task (Zamarian et al., 2008). 
These findings are not limited to the Iowa Gambling Task and Probability Associated 
Gambling task, age differences in opposite directions have also been found when 
comparing the Cambridge Gambling Task and Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(Henninger et al., 2010), with older adults taking more risk on the Cambridge 
Gambling Task, but less risk on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. Performance on 
both tasks was related to cognitive abilities (i.e. memory and processing speed), 
which were found to decline with age. Mixed findings in age differences in risk-taking 
can be partially explained by the difference between tasks measuring decisions by 
experience or by description, as age differences on tasks based on experience are 
generally larger, likely due to the lack of a priori information about probabilities, and 
their reliance on learning. However, how cognitive abilities affect older adults’ risk-
taking behaviour on these tasks goes beyond task domain. 
         Using a learning paradigm is a common feature in behavioural tasks, 
especially those measuring decisions based on experience. As mentioned above, 
the Iowa Gambling Task is an example of a task that has been found to rely on 
cognitive abilities, including those associated with learning. Many studies have found 
that older adults took more risk on the Iowa Gambling Task by selecting 
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disadvantageous decks more often, resulting in a decrease in their earnings or an 
overall loss at completion of the task.(Denburg et al., 2005; Mata et al., 2011; 
Schiebener & Brand, 2017; Zamarian et al., 2008). Risk-taking on the task is 
characterized by choosing cards from the two decks that initially look appealing but 
are disadvantageous in the long run. Older adults are more likely to shift between 
decks, and often for a longer period than younger adults, indicating that they have 
difficulties in learning what the advantageous decks are. As learning is a large 
component of performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, older adults’ risk-taking on 
the Iowa Gambling Task is likely due to a decline in their ability to learn on the task. 
Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task has been found to be related to attention, 
psychomotor speed, and mental complex calculations (i.e. arithmetical calculations 
without any help from devices or other equipment) (Zamarian et al., 2008). Other 
studies have also found a relationship between older adult task risk-taking on the 
Iowa Gambling Task and cognitive abilities (Denburg et al., 2005; Henninger et al., 
2010; Liebherr et al., 2017; Mata et al., 2011; Zamarian et al., 2008). As such, older 
adults appear to take more risk on the Iowa Gambling Task as a result of difficulties 
in learning, suggested by their inconsistent choices on the task, likely caused by a 
decline in cognitive abilities required to understand the workings of the task and 
avoid risk. 
         The Balloon Analogue Risk Task is another task measuring experience-based 
decisions, that also relies on learning. However, learning on the Balloon Analogue 
Risk Task leads to a different outcome than on the Iowa Gambling Task. Learning on 
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task leads to more risk-taking, as participants become 
more aware of how far a balloon can be pumped before it’s likely to explode. Like on 
the Iowa Gambling Task, older adults generally perform the opposite of what is 
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expected according to the direction of the task’s learning component, with older 
adults taking less risk than younger adults. Older adults were found to display less 
optimal choices by pumping the balloon less and cashing in their earnings earlier, 
which the authors attributed to the effect of learning in the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (Mamerow et al., 2016). Both processing speed and memory have been found 
to predict performance on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, and both abilities are 
known to decline in older age (Henninger et al., 2010). 
         Processing speed is a cognitive ability associated with learning, as it is the 
speed in which someone can perceive and process information to successfully 
complete a task or activity (Salthouse, 1996). However, processing speed is not 
solely a component of learning, and instead can directly affect decision-making and 
other cognitive processes. If the speed of processing is low, the quality of cognitive 
performance is generally decreased, as the relevant processes to complete a task 
are not successfully executed. Behavioural tasks, specifically those that apply time 
constraints, may involuntarily involve processing speed in task performance. As 
processing speed is found to decline in older age, this may impact older adults’ risk-
taking on these tasks, resulting in them displaying behaviour (the direction of which 
depends on the design of the task) not aligned with their preferences towards risk. A 
study by Henninger et al. (2010) included three decision-making tasks (Iowa 
Gambling Task, Cambridge Gambling Task, Balloon Analogue Risk Task) and eight 
psychometric tests measuring cognitive abilities such as processing speed and 
memory. Age differences were found on the Cambridge Gambling Task and Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task, with older adults taking more risk on the Cambridge Gambling 
Task but less on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. Processing speed was related to 
age and task performance and mediated the relationship between age and risk-
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taking on both tasks. The decrease in processing speed appeared to result in a 
decrease in decision quality (i.e. adaptively obtaining and processing relevant 
information to decision-making), which then led to risk-taking (Cambridge Gambling 
Task) and risk averse behaviour (Balloon Analogue Risk Task) on both tasks 
(Henninger et al., 2010). In a study by Finucane et al. (2005), participants were given 
simple and complex versions of tasks (i.e. the complex task versions has 
considerably more options compared to the simple task), as well as cognitive tests. 
Older adults were found to score lower in terms of comprehension of the task and 
choice consistency, as well as having lower processing speed. The authors explain 
that the age difference in comprehension and consistency can partly be explained by 
age-related changes in processing speed, which is put under more strain as choice 
options increase. In Frey et al. (2015), age-related declines in processing speed 
were found to affect their search effort (i.e. sampling from the choice options before 
choosing, without consequence) when the number of options were increased (i.e. in 
tasks with more than 2 options). This suggests that older adults aim to decrease the 
cognitive load by searching less when task demand increases (Frey et al., 2015). 
         As most behavioural tasks employ monetary designs and incentives to 
capture risk-taking behaviour, it is likely that numerical ability may also affect 
participants’ comprehension of the task and their choices. Numeracy encompasses 
the ability to do simple arithmetic operations and compare numerical quantities. 
However, higher numerical abilities also include logical and quantitative reasoning, 
and understanding concepts such as fractions, percentages, probabilities and 
proportions (Reyna et al., 2009). Those with lower numerical ability have been found 
to experience difficulties in judging risks, reading graphs, and are more sensitive to 
framing effects (Peters, 2012; Reyna et al., 2009; Weller et al., 2013). This may be 
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the case even more so for older adults, as past research has found that higher age is 
associated with lower numerical ability (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2015; Delazer et al., 
2013; Frey et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2013; Weller et al., 2013). Hibbard et al. (2001) 
found that more than half of older adults over the age of 65 had difficulties using 
numerical information to compare Medicare plans. As lower numeracy can cause 
difficulties in every-day decisions, it may also affect older adults’ risk-taking on 
behavioural tasks, especially if those tasks are more complex. Pachur et al. (2017) 
aimed to disentangle cognitive and motivational factors from age differences in risk-
taking, using monetary lotteries with two risky options. Age differences in decision 
quality disappeared when cognitive abilities were accounted for. The findings 
indicated that older adults’ poorer decision quality could be explained by their lower 
fluid intelligence and numerical ability. In Chen et al. (2014), older adults made more 
risky choices on the Cups Task than younger adults and had lower numerical ability. 
Numeracy partially mediated the relationship between age and risk-taking, indicating 
that older adults’ lower numerical ability was associated with risk-taking on the Cups 
Task. 
         Lastly, there is evidence that different choice types, as well as number of 
choices, result in varying directions of risk-taking in older age. Older adults appear to 
be more risk averse in tasks that use a sure versus risky design (Best & Charness, 
2015) compared to those using two risky options (Pachur et al., 2017). In addition, 
Frey et al. (2015) specifically looked at age differences in risk-taking as a function 
choice size and cognitive abilities. Older adults performed worse on measures of 
cognitive abilities such as processing speed and working memory, as well as 
numeracy. These abilities were associated with search effort in older adults across 
three studies, with the correlation coefficients increasing in line with the number of 
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options (i.e. number of options were 2, 4 and 8). These findings suggest that as the 
number of options increases, evaluating these options becomes more cognitive 
demanding, resulting in a decrease in search effort in older adults. 
         Though risk-taking is assumed to reflect one’s underlying preference towards 
risk, this relationship may be affected by the extent cognitive abilities are relied upon 
in behavioural tasks. This may be the case even more so for older adults, as many of 
these abilities are sensitive to ageing. As such, risk-taking on these tasks may not 
reflect risk preference, and reflect age differences in cognitive ability instead. 
1.4.3 The role of risk preference 
         Risk preference is presumed to underlie risk-taking, as risk-taking is an 
expression of how comfortable one feels with risk. Often, studies use only 
behavioural tasks to capture risk-taking, or solely self-reported risk preference 
measures. However, when they have been used simultaneously, the findings on their 
relationship have varied. In some cases, risk-taking on the behavioural task and self-
reported preferences are weakly related, or not at all (Crosetto & Filippin, 2016; Frey 
et al., 2017; Josef et al., 2016; Mamerow et al., 2016). 
         In Mamerow et al. (2016) two behavioural tasks were used together with a 
self-report measure of risk preference. The self-reported risk preference scores were 
only weakly correlated with both measures, which was considered to potentially be 
due to self-reports and behavioural tasks measuring distinct facets instead of 
measuring the same construct. Similar findings were present in other studies such as 
Josef et al. (2016), who found significant but small correlations between self-report 
and task behaviour, and Crosetto & Filippin (2016), who reported small or no 
correlations between tasks and self-report measures. These studies are some of the 
few who have examined the relationship between self-reported risk preference and 
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behavioural tasks in a sample that includes older adult subjects. The majority of the 
work on the gap between self-reported risk preference and risk-taking on a 
behavioural task was conducted with samples that often did not include participants 
of higher age. 
         A study by Frey et al. (2017) incorporated an extensive battery of self-report 
measures and behavioural tasks in a laboratory-based experiment with more than a 
thousand participants. Using common behavioural tasks, self-report risk preference 
measures, and participants’ provided frequency of risky behaviours, the authors 
demonstrated that behavioural tasks are not as reliable as self-report measures. 
Results showed that self-report measures were weakly, or not at all, related to 
behavioural tasks, nor were the 8 behavioural tasks related to one another. This has 
been found in other studies in which tasks were not related to self-reported risk 
preference (Anderson & Mellor, 2009; Crosetto & Filippin, 2016; Deck et al., 2013; 
Menkhoff & Sakha, 2017; Szrek et al., 2012). These findings indicate either a 
problem with behavioural tasks, or the measurement of the construct of risk-taking 
as a whole (Frey et al., 2017; Palminteri & Chevallier, 2018). 
         In general, self-reported risk preference measures are considered stable and 
to have good test-retest reliability (Frey et al., 2017; Mata et al., 2018; Palminteri & 
Chevallier, 2018). This is not the same for behavioural tasks. Behavioural tasks have 
been found to have low test-retest reliability, are not capable of predicting behaviour 
over time, and are only weakly, or not at all, related to one another (Attanasi et al., 
2018; Deck et al., 2013; Frey et al., 2017; Mamerow et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2018; 
Palminteri & Chevallier, 2018; Pedroni et al., 2017; Szrek et al., 2012). As such, for 
behavioural tasks to reflect an individual’s underlying risk preference, adjustments 
will need to be made in the current approach concerning behavioural tasks 
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measuring age differences in risk-taking. One of these adjustments is the role of 
cognitive ability in the measurement of age differences in risk-taking behaviour. The 
reliance of some of these tasks on cognitive abilities that decline with age may lead 
to these behavioural tasks measuring the effect of age-related cognitive decline on 
these measures, instead of older adults’ underlying risk preference. 
1.5 Present research 
         Findings on age differences in risk-taking have varied, and one possible 
explanation is that they are due to the inconsistencies between behavioural tasks. 
Some of the more concerning inconsistencies among tasks are the variability in 
complexity and the tasks’ reliance on cognitive ability. Description-based tasks differ 
in their complexity, some highly demanding of cognitive resources (e.g. having 
multiple options or gambling outcomes). This also applies to experience-based 
tasks, of which complex varieties impose on cognitive resources (e.g. the number of 
choice options and the reliability of the given feedback) (Frey et al., 2015). The tasks 
with higher cognitive demand may put more strain on older adults, as many abilities 
associated with decision-making, such as working memory and processing speed, 
naturally decline with age (Liebherr et al., 2017). 
         These existing tasks, though differing in type and complexity, have in common 
that they do not have the means of assessing cognitive ability and risk preference in 
a way to determine which of these factors predominantly leads to risk-taking 
behaviour. Until now, it has been unclear whether the age differences in risk-taking 
behaviour are caused by 1) age differences in risk preference, or 2) age differences 
in cognitive ability. 
         The current project aims to further understanding of adult age differences in 
risk-taking behaviour, and how this may be explained by age differences in cognitive 
30 
 
ability and risk preference. To do so, the project encompasses three studies, all 
approaching this issue from a different perspective. The first study uses a physical 
behavioural task that participants are able to interact with, the second study includes 
a computer-based behavioural task, and the third study investigates the role of risk 














Objective. Previous research examining age differences in risk-taking has yielded 
mixed findings on risk-taking in older age, as older adults took less risk in some 
studies, more in others, and some studies found no age differences at all. These 
mixed findings may result from a) age differences in cognitive abilities as a result of 
cognitive decline, and or b) age differences in risk preference. This study aims to 
investigate the role of cognitive ability and risk preference in age differences in risk-
taking. Method. 50 younger adults and 51 older adults took part in the study. Risk-
taking and risk comprehension were measured by a novel gamble task. Cognitive 
abilities were measured through an objective numeracy scale, Digit Span Backward 
and Digit Symbol Coding. Risk preference was measured through the Domain-
Specific Risk-Taking Scale. The Belief in Luck and Luckiness Scale and a shortened 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X) were also included. Results. 
Correct judgments of the probability to win and lose were associated with higher 
numerical ability, while older age was associated with a larger difference between 
estimated probability and actual probability. Gamble acceptance was associated with 
overestimating win probability and underestimating loss probability. Higher numerical 
ability was associated with a lower likelihood of accepting gambles. Age was not 
associated to gamble acceptance, nor did age differences in self-reported risk 
preference and processing speed predict task behaviour. There were no age 
differences in working memory, numeracy, affect, and belief in luck. Conclusion. 
Risk preference does not appear to explain risk-taking on the task, while higher 
numerical ability is positively associated with risk comprehension, and negatively 
associated with risk-taking, irrespective of age. The study adds to growing evidence 
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on the gap between risk preference and risk-taking behaviour and highlights the 
importance of numeracy skills in evaluating risk in a monetary setting. 
2.2 Introduction 
         People of all ages are faced with decisions that impact areas of their lives, 
such as their health, finances, or emotional wellbeing. Studies focusing on decision-
making across adulthood have recently become more prevalent, due to population 
ageing and the knowledge that these decisions, often involving risk and uncertainty, 
will impact us for more years to come than ever before. For example, serious 
medical procedures often have different options, with varying rates of success and 
severity of side effects. More medical procedures are performed on older adults, and 
they are predicted to make up 20 percent of surgical procedures in 2030 (Fowler et 
al., 2019). These high-risk decisions will become more common as we live longer. In 
addition to the increase of important decisions in later life, ageing is associated with 
emotional and cognitive changes that are likely to affect decision-making. As such, it 
is vital to understand how younger and older adults differ in their approach to risk. 
 Risk preference can be defined as the propensity to engage in activities or 
behaviours that are rewarding but also involve potential losses, such as substantial 
physical or mental damage (Mata et al., 2018). How risk preference is best 
measured is somewhat debated, as there is a lack of consensus of what (type of) 
measure captures people’s risk preference best (Hertwig et al., 2019). Using self-
report measures to gauge risk preference is popular, in part due to the convenience 
of its implementation. In these measures, a person’s risk preference is often 
calculated from their responses to hypothetical situations (“Riding a motorcycle 
without a helmet”) (Blais & Weber, 2006) or through their agreement to given 
statements (“Taking risks makes life more fun”) (Zhang et al., 2019). Although one 
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can have a general risk preference, indicating that an individual is generally more 
inclined to seek out or avoid risk, there is evidence that risk preferences may vary 
across domains such as health, social, and recreational risk (Josef et al., 2016; 
Rolison et al., 2014). Past studies have investigated the differences between 
younger and older adults in terms of risk preference, with findings suggesting that 
people become more risk averse as they get older (Dohmen et al., 2017; Josef et al., 
2016). When examining risk preference across different domains, Rolison et al. 
(2014) found that younger adults reported a higher likelihood of taking risk in the 
domains social, and health and safety compared to older adults. Older adults were 
generally risk avoidant concerning health risks; they reported being less likely to 
undertake a health or safety risk, saw less benefit in the proposed risk, and reported 
higher risk perception than younger adults. These differences across domains are 
supported by other studies, such as Josef et al. (2016), who also reported declines in 
financial, driving, health, social and recreational risk-taking in older age, with differing 
rates of decline.  
         Risk-taking behaviour is often measured through behavioural tasks. Though 
these behavioural tasks aim to gauge someone’s risk-taking behaviour, there are 
differences in methodology across tasks. For instance, behavioural tasks differ in the 
amount of information they provide to participants. Tasks that do not give explicit 
information concerning the consequences of available outcomes, nor about the 
likelihood of these outcomes occurring, are often described as tasks measuring 
decisions based on experience. The Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994) is a 
well-known example of such a task, in which participants are given 4 decks of cards 
face down. Each deck has cards with rewards as well as penalty cards. Across 
decks, the win and penalty amounts differ, with some decks as more advantageous 
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than others. Over time, participants learn that the two decks with lower rewards, but 
also lower penalty amounts, are most advantageous over time. Another example of a 
task measuring decisions based on experience is the  Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(Lejuez et al., 2002) in which participants pump a balloon as often as they want 
without knowing when the balloon will explode. With each pump, the total earnings 
are increased but so is the chance of the balloon exploding. The participant can 
decide at any time to stop and collect their earnings but if the balloon explodes, they 
lose the monetary amount they have accumulated during the trial. Risk-taking on the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task is characterized by the number of pumps in unexploded 
balloons. 
         Behavioural tasks measuring decisions based on description include 
information about the extent of the outcomes and their likelihoods, or they are easily 
calculated (e.g. the proportion of coloured objects indicate the likelihood of a win or 
loss) (Mata et al., 2011). A common design in tasks measuring decisions based on 
description is using a sure thing versus risky option, in which participants are offered 
a sure but less profitable option, and an option or multiple options with a higher pay-
out but lower win probability. Tasks differ in how these options are presented, 
whether represented by objects or directly communicated to the participants. In the 
Cups task (Weller et al., 2007), these options and their probabilities are conveyed 
through cups. The task consists of gain and loss domains, three levels of probability 
and three different amounts to win or lose. Based on the combinations, risky options 
could either be of the same expected value as the riskless options, or more 
advantageous or disadvantageous. Participants would gamble with coins visible to 
them on the screen, with a random process determining whether their choice for the 
risky option led to a gain or loss (and subsequent addition or subtraction of coins 
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from their earnings). The Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 1999) is another 
example of a task measuring decisions based on description, and presents 
participants with a row of 10 boxes, coloured red and blue. The ratio of red and blue 
boxes differs per trial, but one of the 10 boxes will contain a yellow token. 
Participants are first asked what colour box they expect to contain the token. 
Following this, they are asked what proportion of their current score they wish to bet 
on their answer. In the Cambridge Gambling Task, participants are given the total 
number of boxes and can calculate the likelihood of the token being in a specific box 
colour, based on the ratio of the red and blue boxes on the screen (i.e. if there are 
proportionally more red boxes on the screen, it is more likely that a red box will 
contain the yellow token). 
         Behavioural tasks may also differ in their complexity. The complexity of the 
task can depend on a multitude of factors, such as time constraints, the number of 
options to choose from, or learning requirements. In both the Iowa Gambling Task 
and Balloon Analogue Risk Task, learning leads to either risk-taking (Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task) or risk averseness (Iowa Gambling Task). In the Iowa 
Gambling Task, participants learn over time to avoid the initially attractive, yet long-
term disadvantageous decks in favour of the lesser attractive, but long-term 
advantageous decks. However, learning on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task leads to 
more risk-taking, as participants learn over time how often they can pump the 
balloon and increase their earnings, which is also known as inverse learning. These 
varying designs and levels of complexity may affect decision-making, especially in 
older age.  
 Research on age differences in risk-taking behaviour has seen an increase in 
studies in the past decade. Many studies have used behavioural tasks to examine 
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age differences and have found varying results. Concerning decisions based on 
experience, Zamarian et al. (2008) found significant age differences when using the 
Iowa Gambling Task; older adults did show improvement in their choices over time, 
but made less advantageous decisions than younger adults, as well as shifting 
between advantageous and disadvantageous decks often, suggesting that this 
stems from older adults experiencing difficulty in developing a consistent and 
advantageous strategy. Measures of working memory, psychomotor speed and 
attention significantly correlated with different aspects of the Iowa Gambling Task, 
suggesting that older adults’ performance on the task was affected by the cognitive 
strain related to the task. Using the Balloon Analogue Risk Task to investigate age 
differences in risk-taking, Rolison et al. (2012) reported that younger adults initially 
took more risk on the task, but experience with the task allowed older adults to later 
make similar evaluations about gains and losses, and took as much risk as younger 
adults. Other studies reported older adults demonstrating lower performance on the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task as a result of higher levels of risk aversiveness 
compared to younger adults (Henninger et al., 2010; Koscielniak et al., 2016). In 
tasks measuring decisions based on description, Henninger et al. (2010) found age 
differences on the Cambridge Gambling Task, with older adults more frequently 
choosing options with low likelihood of winning, indicating that older adults' decision-
quality was lower and that they were seeking out risk more than younger adults. 
When assessing the relationship between cognitive ability and the Cambridge 
Gambling Task, they found that processing speed and memory were positively 
correlated with task behaviour, with better memory and processing speed leading to 
higher quality decisions. When cognitive abilities were considered, the effect of age 
disappeared, suggesting that the age differences on the task were mediated by age-
38 
 
related decline in cognitive abilities. Zamarian et al. (2008) included the Probability 
Associated Gambling task in their study and found no age differences in 
performance on the task, with older adults estimating probabilities risk like younger 
adults. Also, Weller et al. (2011) reported mixed findings on the Cups task, as a 
product of domain. They found that older adults took less risk in the gain domain of 
the task, but not in the loss domain, suggesting that risk-taking decreased with age 
in terms of gains, but not for losses. They also found that sensitivity to the expected 
value of the choice options was stable through adulthood until about 65 years of age, 
after which decline in performance was observed, with older adults seemingly 
experiencing difficulty in adjusting for changes in expected value of choice options. 
This is further supported in other research with the Cambridge Gambling Task 
(Figner et al., 2009), another task measuring decisions based on description, which 
also involves expected value of outcomes. Despite the “hot” (turning over one card at 
a time and receiving feedback on the outcome, relying more on affective processes) 
and “cold” (1 decision on how many cards to turn, relies on predominantly 
deliberative processes) domains, adjusting decisions under risk in relation to 
expected value decreased in older age (Weller et al., 2019). 
         The conflicting findings may be explained by the complexity of task design, 
both in tasks measuring decisions based on experience and description. Across task 
types, older adults may experience difficulties on tasks with a more complex design, 
likely due to the natural decline in cognitive abilities such as working memory, and 
processing speed. The findings on age differences on behavioural tasks discussed in 
the prior paragraph highlight the influence of cognitive ability on older adults’ task 
performance, and subsequent risk-taking behaviour. In their meta-analysis, Mata et 
al. (2011) discuss how age differences on behavioural tasks are often a product of 
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task characteristics, attributing age-related effects to older adults’ difficulty in learning 
on the task. However, even tasks without a learning component, such as the 
Cambridge Gambling Task, showed that older adults chose less advantageous 
options than younger adults (i.e., showing a preference for the large reward and high 
risk options) (Liebherr et al., 2017). 
         Existing behavioural tasks measuring risk-taking differ in their complexity, and 
thus how much cognitive strain is put on participants. This suggests that older adults’ 
decisions on these tasks may not (solely) originate from their risk preference but may 
be due to age-related decline in cognitive abilities essential to decision-making under 
risk. Overall, this may lead to older adults taking risks on these tasks without 
intending to do so. As such, age differences in risk-taking behaviour could be due to 
either 1) age differences in risk preference, or 2) age differences in cognitive ability 
due to age-related decline. 
 To our knowledge, there has not been a prior study aiming to disentangle 
contributing factors to age differences on a risky decision-making task, with the 
exception of Pachur et al. (2017), who looked at cognitive and motivational roots 
behind age differences in risky decision-making. Though they found that older adults 
had lower cognitive abilities and reported lower negative affect (which was related to 
accepting more risky choices on the task), they did not include self-report measures 
of risk preference in their study. 
2.2.1 The present research 
 The current study aims to investigate to what extent cognitive ability and risk 
preference play a role in age differences in decision-making under risk. This will be 
done by means of a decision-making task that has been designed to assess the role 
of both cognitive ability and risk preference in risk-taking behaviour for the first time. 
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On the task, participants are given a card with the gamble information, including a 
priori probabilities of each outcome, and are asked to mimic the gamble being played 
20 times. To do so, they are given a physical box with 20 compartments to fill with 
three types of coloured balls that represent the three possible outcomes (see Figure 
2). After doing so, they are given the overall outcome of the gamble being played 20 
times, based on their own estimations of the probabilities, and are given the option to 
gamble for real-life consequences. 
         We tested the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1a: cognitive measures would predict comprehension on the task, 
with those who have lower cognitive ability having less comprehension on the task 
(which is characterized by making correct estimations of probability less often and 
having a larger distance between estimation of probability and actual probability).  
 Hypothesis 1b: Older adults were expected to have lower comprehension on 
the behavioural task.  
 Hypothesis 1c: Older adults were expected to have lower scores on measures 
of working memory, processing speed and numeracy, which would explain age 
differences in task behaviour (described in hypothesis 1b).  
Hypothesis 2a: participants’ risk preference would predict behaviour in the 
risk-taking part of the task, with those who scored higher on risk-taking on the risk 
preference measure (and a higher score of belief in luck and luckiness) also be more 
likely to accept gambles in real life.  
 Hypothesis 2b: Older adults were expected to be more risk averse on the 




Hypothesis 2c: older adults were also expected to be more risk averse in their self-
reported risk preference, in line with prior findings. 
In addition to the two hypotheses described above, we also conducted 
exploratory analyses. Similar to findings of Pachur et al. (2017), we expected that 
participants’ affect would be related to their behaviour in the risk-taking part of the 
task. Those reporting higher positive affect were expected to be more likely to accept 
gambles on the study. We also expected older and younger adults to differ in 
positive affect; older participants were expected to report higher positive affect and 
lower negative affect compared to younger adults. This would be similar to the effect 
found by Pachur et al. (2017), in which older adults chose the riskier option more 
often than the younger adults in the gain and mixed domains due to lower negative 




         We recruited 105 participants, of which 4 were excluded due to incomplete 
data. The final analytical sample was 101 participants, of which 50 were younger 
adults and 51 were older adults. The overall age of participants ranged from 18 to 90 
years of age (M age = 47.18, SD = 25.48). Younger adults were recruited via the 
university’s recruitment database for students and for research volunteers. They 
were aged between 18 and 35 years old, with a mean age of 21.98 (SD = 3.15). 
Exactly half of the younger adults were women (50%, followed by men, 50%). Over 
half of the younger adults had A levels as their highest completed education (54%), 
with the majority currently students (84%), and most common income range was 
£10.000 or less (44%). More than a third of younger adults were British (36%, 
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followed by Chinese, 8%). Older adults were recruited via a specific university pool 
and through leafleting in Colchester Borough. The ages of the older adult group 
ranged between 65 and 90 years old, with a mean age of 71.88 (SD = 5.56), and a 
little more than half of participants were women (51%, followed by men, 49%). All 
participants in the older age group were of British nationality. Almost half of 
participants reported an undergraduate degree as the highest completed education 
level (45.1%). Almost all participants were retired (94.1%). Nearly half of participants 
reported a household income of £10.001 to £30.000 (47.1%). Participants in the 
older adult group also completed the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; 
Folstein et al., 1975) at the beginning of the experiment. All participants scored 
above the minimum score of 24, indicating an absence of cognitive impairment.   
2.3.2 Materials and procedure 
         Participants were first given an information sheet and consent form to sign. 
They were told that the study aimed to understand how people make decisions. 
Older adults then completed the MMSE. The MMSE is designed to assess cognitive 
impairment and was used as an exclusion measurement, as our population 
consisted of healthy older adults. All older participants in the study scored above the 
minimum score of 24, indicating no cognitive impairment (the maximum score is 30). 
After completing the MMSE, all participants completed a demographic survey on 
their gender, education level and other information. 
         Participants were then given the Positive Affect Negative Schedule Extended 
(PANAS X; Grühn et al., 2010). The PANAS X is a questionnaire assessing mood 
and affect, specifically focusing on positive and negative affect. The PANAS X is an 
extended version of the original PANAS (Watson & Clark, 1994) and consists of 60 
items. For this study, an abbreviated version of the PANAS X was used, which 
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includes 8 items in total. This version was similar to the abbreviated PANAS X used 
in Pachur et al. (2017). Participants were given 8 words, associated with either 
positive (“happy”)  or negative affect (“upset”), and rated how much this word applied 
to them on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = very slightly or not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = 
moderately, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = extremely). The original positive and negative scales, 
of which these 8 items were taken, showed good internal consistency, with an overall 
Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.86. The score for each scale is the mean across the four 
items. The PANAS X was administered before and after completing the decision-
making task, to measure any changes in affect caused by the decision-making task. 
         Participants then took part in the decision-making task. The decision-making 
task consisted of 10 gambles, given to participants in a random order. Each of these 
gambles had a chance to win, lose, or neither win nor lose. However, the amounts 
associated with the chances to win or lose differed. An example of such a gamble is 
“Win £2 with a chance of 40%, lose £1 with a chance of 40%, neither win nor lose 
with a chance of 20%”. The gambles were modelled after those used in Rolison & 
Pachur (2017) and were selected out of 75 gambles trialled in a pilot study. The 
chosen gambles were selected due to their acceptance rate of around 50 percent 
(indicating that participants were not overly drawn to or put off by the gambles), as 
well as not being clearly advantageous or disadvantageous. The expected value of 
the gambles ranged between -0.8 and 0.95, with an even distribution between 
gambles with positive and negative expected value. Participants were given a card 
with the gamble information (see Figure 1) and were asked to mimic the gamble 
being played 20 times. Without implicitly being told to do so, participants would need 




Figure 1. An example of the type of gamble included in the task, as given to 
participants during the instructions. 
 
         Following this, participants were given a wooden box with 20 compartments to 
visualize the gamble outcomes for each round (see Figure 2). Each compartment in 
the box represented an outcome of playing the gamble and could be physically filled 
with the perceived outcome of that round. Each outcome (win, lose, neither win nor 
loss) was represented with a coloured ball: green balls represented wins, red balls 
represented losses, and yellow balls represented neither wins nor losses. These 
coloured balls were placed in the compartments to which participants thought the 
outcome to be applicable. The importance of the participant’s perception of what the 
chances of each outcome meant was emphasized in the instruction, and they were 
told that the box should resemble the gamble on the card (e.g. the probabilities for 
each outcome of the gamble), when played 20 times. They were also informed that it 
did not matter in what order they put the coloured balls for each gamble outcome as 




Figure 2. Materials provided in the decision-making task.  
Note. The image on the far right displays an example of a completed box with 
outcomes for each 20 rounds that the gamble is (hypothetically) played. 
 
         After the participant filled the box with all 20 outcomes, the monetary earnings 
for each outcome were calculated, based on the outcomes that participant had 
entered in the box. Participants were shown the overall earnings of the gamble, as 
well as the amounts for wins and losses separately and were asked whether they 
wanted to play the gamble once, in real life, with actual consequences. In playing the 
gamble, participants could increase or decrease their participant payment (which 
was £5). Whether they won or lost was determined by the gamble’s chances, and 
randomly selected using a number generator that was associated with the changes 
to win, lose, or neither. Participants were informed that any amount won or lost when 
choosing to play one or more gambles was theirs to take home; wins would be 
added to the participant payment, losses would be subtracted from their payment. 
         After completing the decision-making task, participants reported their affect for 
the second time, using the PANAS X, and then completed the Domain Specific Risk-
Taking Scale (Blais & Weber, 2006), adapted by Rolison et al. (2019). Risk 
preference is measured across three subscales: the likelihood of undertaking risky 
activities, as well as the perceived benefits and perceived risk of these activities 
across domains. The adapted version (Rolison et al., 2019) includes items that are 
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designed to be more suitable for older adults (e.g. instead of “engaging in 
unprotected sex”, the altered version included “taking an unfamiliar medication while 
on holiday abroad”). Only the Financial and Health and Safety subscales were used 
for this study. We were interested in seeing whether we will find age differences on 
the Health and Safety domain similar to prior studies (Josef et al., 2016; Rolison et 
al., 2014, 2019) but only included the Financial domain when relating self-reported 
risk preference to behaviour on the task due to the contextual overlap between the 
two measures. Participants’ responses are measured on a 7-point Likert scale, with -
3 to 3 for Likelihood (-3 = extremely unlikely, 0 = not sure, 3 = extremely likely), and 
0 to 6 for both Benefit (0 = no benefits at all, 6 = great benefits), and Risk Perception 
(0 = not at all risky, 6 = extremely risky). In their study, Rolison et al. (2019) reported 
a combined Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.72, with an alpha of α = .65 for Likelihood, 
and α = .78 for Risk Perception . There is no information on the reliability of the 
Benefit subscale, as this was not included in their study. Scores on this measure 
were calculated by using the arithmetic mean for each scale. For the Likelihood 
scale, a higher score indicates a higher likelihood of taking risk, a higher mean on 
the Benefit scale indicates seeing more benefit in taking that specific risk, while a 
higher mean on the Risk Perception scale indicates perceiving more risk in the 
proposed risky activity.  
         Participants then completed the Belief in Luck and Luckiness scale 
(Thompson & Prendergast, 2013), a 16-item questionnaire on personal beliefs about 
luck. A distinction is made between belief in luck as a concept (“There is no such 
thing as good or bad luck”) and belief in luck as a personal trait (“I consider myself a 
lucky person”). Answers are provided on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Scores of this measure are the arithmetic mean across 
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all items, as well as separate mean scores for the two scales (Belief in luck, belief in 
luckiness). Across the measure, the overall reliability was a Cronbach’s alpha of α = 
0.87, with α = 0.85 for Belief in Luck, and α = 0.88 for Personal Luckiness 
(Thompson & Prendergast, 2013). A higher mean on this measure indicates a 
stronger belief in luck in general or in one’s personal luck. 
         The remaining three measures of the study were cognitive measures, 
assessing numeracy, working memory and processing speed. Participants were first 
given the Objective Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001). The scale consists of 11 
items, intended to measure the ability to understand and solve mathematical 
equations and probabilities. Three additional items from two types of cognitive 
reflection tests (Primi et al., 2016; Toplak et al., 2014) have been added to the scale 
for this study. These three items measure the ability to reflect on a question and to 
resist responding with the first answer that comes to mind. The added items all 
required participants to answer a mathematical question, similar to the Lipkus 
Objective Numeracy Scale. The reliability of the Objective Numeracy Scale, including 
the additional 3 items by Schwartz et al. (1997), was found by Lipkus et al. (2001) to 
be α = 0.78. Weller et al. (2013) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .76, and 
Thomson & Oppenheimer (2016) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .72. 
Participants’ scores consist of a total score of correctly answered items, with a 
maximum of 14. A higher score indicates higher numerical ability.  
         Participants also took part in the Digit Span Backward, a subtest of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (Wechsler, 1997), used to measure working 
memory. Participants are given number sequences and are asked to repeat those 
back to the researcher, but in reverse. Participants get two sequences of the same 
length before moving on to a more difficult level. Of the two sequences, one needs to 
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be repeated correctly to proceed to the next level. If both are repeated wrong, the 
researcher will stop the test and will count the score of the participant, which is the 
sum of correctly repeated sequences. A higher score indicates better working 
memory. 
         Lastly, participants completed the Digit Symbol Coding, a measure of 
processing speed and a subtest of the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997). Participants are 
given a form with combinations of 9 numbers and symbols in the top of the form and 
are asked to copy the symbols underneath the associated numbers as swiftly and 
accurately as possible. To do so, they have 120 seconds. The score on the Digit 
Coding is the total number of correctly matched symbols and numbers, with a higher 
score indicating better processing speed.  
 At the end of the study, participants were debriefed on the aim of the study 
and participants were informed of their final balance (i.e. if they chose to play 
gambles, their payment could be different from the initial base payment). If 
participants lost more than the base payment, they left with a payment of £0 but 
without a further loss. Any money accrued would be added to their base payment.  
 All materials of this study can be found in the appendix. 
2.3.3 Analysis 
 Age differences on self-report measures and cognitive tests were analysed in 
SPSS (version 25). The type of statistical analyses used includes Between-Subject 
MANOVAs for risk preference and Belief in Luck and Luckiness, and independent t-
tests for working memory, processing speed and numerical ability. Performance on 
the task, both comprehension and risk-taking, was analysed in R. For generalized 
linear mixed-effects models, we used the glmer function from the lme4 package 
(version 1-1.26). All generalized linear mixed-effects models were run with the 
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Bobyqa optimizer and 100.000 iterations, as these models were most sensitive to 
non-convergence. Linear mixed-effects models were conducted through the lme 
function of the nlme package (version 3.1-152). 
 
2.4 Results 
 As age differences were expected in both risk preference and cognitive 
measures, we first analysed whether groups differed in their self-report measures 
and cognitive tests.  
Age differences in risk preference, perception of luck, and affect 
         Risk preference. First, a Between-Subject MANOVA was used to examine 
age differences in the Financial, and Health and Safety Likelihood subscales of the 
risk preference measure. Results showed that younger adults reported being more 
likely to undertake financial risk and health and safety-related risk compared to older 
adults (see Table 1). A Between-Subject MANOVA was also used to assess the age 
differences in the Benefit subscales. Younger adults reported perceiving more 
benefits in taking both financial risk and health and safety risk compared to older 
adults. Lastly, a Between-Subject MANOVA between perceived risk of the two 
domains and age group revealed that younger and older adults did not differ in their 
risk perception of financial risk, but older adults rated the health and safety-related 
items as riskier than their younger counterparts (see Table 1). The results are in line 
with hypothesis 2c, as we expected older adults to be more risk averse than their 
younger counterparts. The results indicate that older adults’ lower likelihood of taking 
risk is likely due to valuing the risks as less beneficial, and seeing more risk 
associated with these activities than younger adults.  
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         Luck and Luckiness Scale. Differences between younger and older adults in 
how they felt about luck on the Luck and Luckiness Scale was assessed by means 
of a Between-Subject MANOVA. Younger and older adults differed in their general 
belief of luck, with older adults believing in luck more (see Table 1). However, groups 
did not differ in beliefs on personal luck. 
         PANAS X. A 4 x 2 Repeated Measures ANOVA was used to assess age 
differences on the PANAS X. Mauchly's Test of Sphericity indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(5) = 138.27, p < .001. As such, results 
were interpreted with the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment. The results indicated that 
there was no significant interaction effect of age group and PANAS X (see Table 1). 
Hence, we conducted no follow-up tests. This finding suggests that older adults do 
not report higher positive affect and lower negative affect compared to younger 
adults, which is unlike what we expected as part of our exploratory analysis. 
Age differences in cognition 
         Numeracy. An independent t-test was used to assess whether younger and 
older adults differed in their numerical ability. Results showed that there was no 
significant difference in numerical ability between younger and older adults (see 
Table 1). This is contradictory to our expectations (hypothesis 1c), as we expected 
that older adults would have lower cognitive ability due to age-related cognitive 
decline. 
         Working memory. To investigate age differences in working memory, an 
independent t-test was used to compare the total score on the Digit Span between 
the two age groups. The results showed no significant difference between the total 
scores of younger and older adults on the Digit Span (see Table 1). This is not in line 
with our expectations (hypothesis 1c), as we expected older adults to perform worse 
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on this measure, in line with prior work on age differences in working memory.  
         Processing speed. The scores of younger and older adults on the Digit 
Symbol Coding were compared using an independent t-test. The results showed a 
significant difference between the two groups, with younger adults having a higher 
processing speed than older adults (see Table 1). This finding is in line with our 
expectations (hypothesis 1c), as we expected older adults to have a lower 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Performance on the behavioural task 
 The behavioural task consisted of two elements; comprehension, measured 
through correct estimation of probability and the difference between estimated 
probability and actual probability, and risk-taking, measured through gamble 
acceptance. We will first discuss the results of the comprehension element of the 
task. 
  Comprehension. To measure comprehension on the task, we conducted two 
analyses; the first analysis tested whether people were correct in their probability 
estimation (which includes correctly estimating probability of win, loss, and neither 
win nor loss), the second analysis tested the distance from probability estimation to 
actual probability value. 
 Correct estimation. Overall, younger adults correctly judged the probability 
to win with an average of 6.70 out of ten gambles, compared to an average of 6.84 
out of 10 among older adults. Younger adults correctly judged the probability to lose 
with an average of 6.72 of the 10 gambles, compared to an average of 6.63 among 
older adults. A visual overview of estimations for each gamble by younger and older 





Figure 3. Density plots showing participants’ judgments of the chances to win and 
lose for each of the 10 gambles.  
 To test for predictors of correct probability judgments, a random effects 
logistic regression was conducted. Random intercepts were included for participants 
only, as model fit did not significantly improve with the addition of random intercepts 
for outcome type. In a first model, gender was a significant predictor of correct 
probability judgments, but type of outcome and age group were not. In a second 
model, cognitive measures were included, which revealed that higher numerical 
ability was associated with a higher likelihood of correct judgment. The prior effect of 
gender disappeared. In the third model, personality measures were included, which 
revealed no significant predictors. In a fourth model, emotional measures were 
included, which also revealed no further significant predictors (see Table 2). The 
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second, third and fourth model had convergence issues. For the second model, 
applying the Bobyqa optimizer and increasing the number of iterations to 100.000 
solved the issue of non-convergence. The issue with non-convergence for the third 
and fourth model persisted. For those, several possible solutions were applied (i.e. 
using multiple optimizers, increasing number of iterations, rescaling variables) but 
none successfully addressed the models’ convergence issue. Using the ANOVA 
function to compare models for best fit, model 2 was shown to be the best fitting 
model. Overall, the analysis on correct estimation of probability confirmed the 
hypothesis 1a, in which we expected that numeracy would predict task 
comprehension, but it did not support hypothesis 1b, as there were no age 




Table 2  
Multilevel logistic regression analysis on correct probability judgments. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.70 -5.19** 5.18    -4.39 
Type of outcome    -0.10 -0.10    -0.11    -0.11 
Age group 0.41 -0.11 0.04     0.17 
Male gender    2.15**  0.61 0.32     0.10 
Cognitive measures     
Numeracy  0.73***   0.73***     0.73***  
Digit span    0.11   0.10     0.09 
Digit symbol coding   -0.02  -0.02    -0.02 
Personality     
Financial risk-taking likelihood     0.20     0.22 
Financial expected benefit    -0.15    -0.12 
Financial risk perception     0.43     0.46 
Luckiness belief    -0.59    -0.69 
Luckiness personal    -0.11     0.17 
Emotion     
Positive affect (Pan1)       -0.13 
Negative affect (Pan1)        0.12 
     
Goodness of fit     
-2 log likelihood -774 -758.40 -756.10 -755.10 
-2 log likelihood change †  15.60 2 1 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; † Change in relation to previous model. 
 
         Distance between estimated chance and actual chance. A random effects 
linear regression analysis was conducted on trials on which participants provided an 
incorrect probability judgment. The model included random intercepts for participants 
and type of outcome (whether participants are estimating win or loss chance), as this 
was shown to be a better fit. In the first model, older age was associated with a 
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larger distance between estimation of probability and actual probability, indicating 
that when older adults provided an incorrect estimate of probability, the distance 
between their estimation and the gamble’s probability was larger than those of 
younger adults. Further models did not show any additional significant predictors 
(see Table 3). Using the ANOVA function, model 3 was shown to be the best fitting 
model. The findings show support for hypothesis 1b, as we expected age differences 
in comprehension on the task, which included older adults having a larger difference 
between estimated and actual probability. We did not, however, find any support for 
hypothesis 1a, in which numeracy was expected to predict the difference between 




 Multilevel linear regression analysis on incorrect probability judgments. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.09*** 0.15** 0.18 0.28* 
Type of outcome 0.02* 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
Age group 0.05** 0.05* 0.05* 0.04 
Male gender 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Cognitive measures     
Numeracy  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Digit span  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Digit symbol coding  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Personality     
Financial risk-taking likelihood   -0.02 -0.02 
Financial expected benefit   0.00 0.00 
Financial risk perception   0.01 0.00 
Luckiness belief   -0.04 -0.03 
Luckiness personal   0.01 0.02 
Emotion     
Positive affect (Pan1)    -0.01 
Negative affect (Pan1)    -0.08 
     
Goodness of fit     
-2 log likelihood 557.02 558.75 561.63 563.64 
-2 log likelihood change †  -1.73 -2.88 -2.01 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; † Change in relation to previous 
model. 
 
         Risk-taking. We tested participants’ risk-taking on the task through gamble 
acceptance, which was coded dichotomously. The second hypotheses (2a and 2b) 
are tested in the section of the results described below. 
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         Gamble acceptance. A mixed effects logistic regression analysis was 
conducted on decisions to accept or reject gambles. The analysis included random 
intercepts for participants. In the first model, judging the chance to win as higher than 
its actual win chance, or judging the chance to lose as lower than its actual loss 
chance, was associated with a higher likelihood to accept a gamble. In the second 
model, higher numerical ability was associated with a lower likelihood to accept a 
gamble. In the third model, which included a measure of risk preference and luck 
and luckiness, did not add any additional significant predictors to the model (see 
Table 4). This was equally the case for a fourth model, which included measures of 
affect. Similar to the analysis on correct probability estimations, models 3 and 4 had 
convergence issues. Again, several possible solutions were applied (i.e. using 
multiple optimizers, increasing the number of iterations, rescaling variables) but none 
successfully addressed the models’ convergence issue. Using the ANOVA function 
to compare models for best fit, model 2 was shown to be the best fitting model.  
 The results did not show any evidence for hypothesis 2a (i.e. those who are 
risk averse, or belief less in luck will be less likely to accept gambles), and exhibited 
the opposite of was expected for hypothesis 2b (i.e. older adults taking less risk on 
the task). In addition, there was no evidence for the effect of affect on risk-taking (i.e. 
participants who score higher on positivity are more likely to accept gambles), which 




 Multilevel logistic regression analysis on decisions. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.76** -0.26 -0.64 0.65 
Gain judgment (diff) 6.49*** 6.30*** 6.44** 6.34** 
Loss judgment (diff) -2.95* -2.91* -2.86* -3.09** 
Age group 0.47 0.66 0.75 0.74 
Male gender 0.33 0.59 0.56 0.40 
Cognitive measures     
Numeracy  -0.15* -0.16* -0.15* 
Digit span  0.04 0.06 0.04 
Digit symbol coding  0.01 0.00 0.00 
Personality     
Financial risk-taking likelihood    0.21 0.22 
Financial expected benefit   0.10 0.12 
Financial risk perception    0.06 0.05 
Luckiness belief   -0.06 -0.02 
Luckiness personal   0.20 0.34 
Emotion     
Positive affect (Pan1)    -0.10 
Negative affect (Pan1)    -0.04 
     
Goodness of fit     
-2 log likelihood -605.50 -603 -593.50 -592 
-2 log likelihood change†  2.50 9.50 1.50 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; † Change in relation to previous model. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
                This study aimed to assess the role of cognitive ability and risk 
preference in risk-taking to further understand the role of age in risk-taking 
behaviour. In this study, we used a physical behavioural task, in which participants 
used three types of coloured balls to mimic the gamble’s possible outcomes if it were 
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played 20 times. Participants were then informed of the monetary outcome, based 
on their own estimations, and asked whether they would want to play a gamble with 
real-life consequences. Results showed that only numeracy positively predicted 
whether participants’ correctly estimated gamble chances (i.e. participants were only 
correct if all outcomes were estimated correctly), older age was negatively 
associated with incorrect estimations of chance, while win outcome was positively 
associated with incorrect estimations of chance, and that risk-taking on the task was 
predicted by underestimating losses, overestimating wins and being less numerate. 
Risk preference was not significantly related to behaviour throughout the task. 
Numeracy, working memory and processing speed were hypothesized to be 
positively related to the difference between estimation and actual chance, with 
evidence of age-related decline on all three measures. We did not find evidence that 
cognitive ability was related to participants’ incorrect estimations of probability, nor 
were there age differences on these measures, apart from processing speed (in 
which older adults performed worse compared to younger adults). In terms of 
numeracy, numeracy was related to both correct probability estimation and risk-
taking, but age groups did not differ in numerical ability. The findings on the lack of 
age differences fit with those of others, as age differences on numerical measures 
have varied. In some studies, there were no age differences (Bruine de Bruin et al., 
2017; Eberhardt et al., 2019; Weller et al., 2013) while older adults performed worse 
compared to younger adults in other studies (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2015; Delazer et 
al., 2013). 
         We also did not find any age differences in working memory. Though working 
memory is an ability commonly known to be sensitive to age-related decline, age 
differences may depend on the type of measure used for assessing working memory. 
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The manual for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (Wechsler, 1997) reports that 
the Digit Span Backward is more affected by aging and by impairment (compared to its 
simplified version, Digit Span Forward), with older adults over 70 years old showing 
greater discrepancies, but other studies have found only small differences in working 
memory between age groups (Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005). When comparing Digit 
Span Backward to its simplified version, Digit Span Forward, prior studies found that 
none of the variance between the two versions could be accounted for by age 
(Grégoire & Linden, 1997; Myerson et al., 2003). In addition, performance on other 
working memory measures show more decline as a function of age (Bopp & 
Verhaeghen, 2005; Elliott et al., 2011; Hale et al., 2011), such as spatial tasks 
(Myerson et al., 2003; D. C. Park et al., 2002). In this study, the older adult group 
encompassed participants aged 65 to 90 years old, which may have obscured any 
differences caused by age-related decline, due to the wide range of the group. For 
future research, a possible approach may be to compare subgroups of older adults, as 
there is evidence that oldest-older adults show differences in performance when 
compared to younger-older adults (Elliott et al., 2011). Working memory may not have 
been related to task performance due to participants being able to take as much time 
as needed (which may also explain why processing speed was not related to task 
performance), as well as the physical design feature of the task. It has been found that 
learning after performing actions, referred to as the enactment effect, leads to better 
memory (Engelkamp & Cohen, 1991; Steffens et al., 2015), more so when compared 
to learning based on observation (Charlesworth et al., 2014; Golly-Häring & 
Engelkamp, 2003). In this study, participants were able to make their calculations and 
decisions using a physical task, not having to observe or imagine what the outcomes 
would look like. Instead, they were able to visualize this using the coloured balls and 
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box. As such, working memory may not have related to task performance as those 
with memory deficiencies benefitted from the task’s physical design. 
         We expected age differences on the measures of self-reported risk preference 
and perception of luck and hypothesized that those measures would reflect risk-taking 
behaviour on the task. Though older adults appeared more risk averse than younger 
adults on the self-report measure of risk preference, there was no age difference in 
risk-taking on the behavioural task. In addition, self-reported risk preference did not 
correspond to behaviour on the risk-taking part of the task (or in the other models 
exploring task performance). This is not uncommon in risk research involving 
behavioural tasks (Anderson & Mellor, 2009) though this was something we 
specifically aimed to address in the current study. One explanation may be that self-
reported risk preference and risk-taking (behavioural tasks) are inherently measuring 
different aspects of one’s feelings towards risk; unlike the behavioural task, self-report 
measures involve either reflecting on prior experience with risk, or imagining a 
scenario in which one would be exposed to risk. This process is subjective and thus 
prone to bias, as the participants’ assumption of how they will respond may not 
coincide with their actual behaviour when confronted with risk. There is also evidence 
that risk preference is domain specific (Blais & Weber, 2006, 2006; Josef et al., 2016; 
Rolison et al., 2014), indicating that context may be important when choosing a self-
report risk preference measure in order to find a relationship between risk preference 
and risk-taking on a behavioural task. Unlike self-report measures, the behavioural 
task does measure direct behaviour, but this type of measure is also constrained in 
how much risk it can simulate. Asking participants to imagine a risky scenario is 
ethically sound, whereas recreating a truly risky scenario is not. The imaginary 
scenario used in self-report measures does not have the same ethical boundaries as a 
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risk task does. As such, risk research generally has limitations in measuring natural 
risk-taking, having to rely on (experimental) methods that come as close as possible, 
without putting the participant in actual risk. To bridge the gap between self-reported 
risk preference and behavioural measures, future research could aim to develop two 
types of materials (both a self-report measure of risk preference and a behavioural 
task) of which the domain and circumstance overlap as much as possible. 
         We also expected that older adults would report higher levels of positive affect, 
and that positive affect would be related to higher gamble acceptance. We did not find 
age differences on the PANAS X, nor was affect related to task behaviour. Though 
age group was related to a larger distance from the actual chance, the differences 
between groups were small, suggesting that older adults’ difference in chance 
estimations were not far from those of younger adults. These findings are unlike those 
of prior research. Pachur et al. (2017) found that older adults reported higher positive 
affect and lower negative affect compared to younger adults, as well as affect 
predicting participants’ risky choices (low negative affect was associated with more 
frequently choosing the risky option). However, Pachur et al. (2017) offered 
participants the choice between two lotteries, one of which was the riskier option. In 
the current study, participants were given the choice not to gamble, instead of two 
options that both had a possibility of losing one’s earnings (though one option with 
higher likelihood than the other). Their design also included different domains, such as 
gain, loss, and mixed domains, whereas ours did not. The distinction in design may 
(partly account) for differences in finding concerning the relationship between affect 
and task performance. 
         This study aimed to assess the role of cognitive ability and risk preference in 
age differences in risk-taking, using a novel measure to do so. Like other studies, this 
65 
 
study also had its limitations. Firstly, the included measures were all physical 
measures, some of which required interaction with the researcher. Though this was 
intended to remove the potential difficulty of using computers for the older adult group, 
participants may have provided more socially desirable answers due to the presence 
of the researcher, in their task behaviour or self-reports (Krumpal, 2013). In addition, 
some of the multilevel models included in the analysis had convergence issues. 
Though steps were taken to address this, it was not successful for some. As different 
methods to address non-convergence had been applied, a reason for non-
convergence is likely the number of predictors included for each analysis. Future 
research is advised to minimize the number of predictors in such a model or increase 
the number of observations to prevent convergence issues. Lastly, the older adults 
were recruited through an existing participant pool in the department. These older 
adults had signed up to take part in psychology studies, with most studies being 
memory-oriented, and most had done at least one study prior to the current study. 
Their experience with psychology studies, and especially the cognitive measures often 
used in studies with older adults, may have impacted their performance (i.e. learning 
effects), as well as being a generally highly educated sample. Future studies are 
advised to recruit older adult participants from the community with little to no 
experience in scientific studies, as to make sure that prior experience with cognitive 




Taking chances: the role of cognitive ability and risk preferences in adult age 




 Objective. To further investigate the role of cognitive ability and risk 
preference in age differences in risk-taking behaviour. Method. 53 younger and 48 
older adult participants took part in a two-part risk-taking task designed to capture 
risk comprehension and risk-taking. They completed the complex task first, then 
proceeded with the simplified task. Participants also completed various self-report 
measures on risk preference as well as cognitive tests of numeracy, working 
memory and processing speed. Results. Older adults’ numerical ability was lower 
than younger adults, as was their working memory and processing speed. Age 
differences on risk preferences measures were mixed, as older adults reported more 
risk-seeking on some, reported being risk-averse on others, and some measures 
had no age difference in risk preference. Older adults’ risk comprehension was 
lower, as they estimated gamble probability correctly less often than younger adults 
across both tasks. Numeracy partially mediated the relationship between age and 
risk comprehension on the complex task. Older adults also accepted more gambles 
on both tasks. Despite age differences in risk-taking, both cognitive ability and risk 
preference did not mediate the relationship between age group and risk-taking on 
either task. Conclusion. Age differences in numerical ability explained older adults’ 
lower comprehension of risk on the complex task, but numeracy nor any other 
abilities explained comprehension on the simplified task, or risk-taking overall. The 
gap between risk preference and risk-taking when considering age groups suggests 
that older adults’ risk-taking may be driven by a lack of comprehension, instead of 




 Findings from study 1 revealed that there were no significant age differences 
in correct estimation of chance, nor did older and younger adults differ detectably in 
their acceptance of gambles on the task despite age differences in self-reported risk 
preference and in some cognitive abilities. Those findings add to a growing body of 
research on the misalignment between people’s risk preference and task behaviour 
(Anderson & Mellor, 2009; Crosetto & Filippin, 2016; Deck et al., 2013; Frey et al., 
2017; Menkhoff & Sakha, 2017; Szrek et al., 2012), which seems especially 
prominent in older age (Josef et al., 2016; Mamerow et al., 2016). However, 
limitations of study 1 (i.e. usage of physical measures that required increased 
interaction with the researcher, convergence difficulties in some multilevel models in 
the analysis, and a potentially biased older adult sample) limit the inferences that can 
be drawn from the study’s findings. A way to tackle these prior limitations is to 
conduct a study with a more thorough experimental design in which less interaction 
is required. In addition to improving the study’s design, it is also highly beneficial to 
change the analytical approach to better fit a study of this design. As such, a 
computerized task with 2 task types (i.e. complex and simplified) will be used in the 
second study, to compare task performance when cognitive demand is high or low. 
Additionally, predictors of task performance will be selected from multiple risk 
preference and cognitive measures to only include the best fitting predictors instead 
of including all.  
         This approach would also address a gap in the current research. Currently, 
most research on risk-taking uses a single behavioural measure. If multiple tasks are 
used, differences in task design (e.g. risk domain, choice options, or whether 
decisions are based on experience or description) restrict comparisons of risk-taking 
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across tasks. There are few studies who have used multiple risk-taking tasks 
(Henninger et al., 2010; Hess et al., 2018; Mamerow et al., 2016; Zamarian et al., 
2008). Those who did include multiple tasks compared risk-taking across task types, 
but these tasks often had very different designs and pay-out structures. These 
differences in design or pay-out structure could equally result in differences in task 
performance and risk-taking. For example, the Iowa Gambling Task and the Balloon 
Analogue Risk-Taking Task are known risk-taking tasks that do not provide 
information and rely on participants to learn through experience. However, where 
learning on the Iowa Gambling Task leads to risk-averse choices, learning on the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task leads to taking more risk. As such, the difference in the 
tasks’ reliance on (reverse) learning may explain differences in risk-taking, and 
potentially mask other explanations. 
         Some studies did create different versions of the same task in which the 
design or pay-off structure has remained similar. Hess et al. (2018) included 4 
versions with similar design: an experience-only task, a description-only task, a 
consistent experience task, and an inconsistent experience task. In the experience-
only condition, participants were given only general information, such as the two bets 
having different chances of winning, and probability remaining constant over trials. At 
the end of the trial, participants were given feedback on how successful their bet had 
been and its earnings. In the description-only condition, two additional pieces of 
information were given concerning payoff structures to guide their choices. 
Participants were given the probabilities and were given a rule of thumb that they 
should select option B if its payoff was more than double of option A; otherwise they 
should choose option A. Participants were not given any feedback in the description-
only condition, only at the end of the task were they told how much they had earned. 
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The two remaining conditions, consistent and inconsistent experience, were a 
combination of the first two conditions. Participants in both conditions received the 
same descriptive information as those in the description-only condition and received 
the trial-by-trial feedback received by those in the experience only condition. Ability, 
a composite score resulting from the working memory, processing speed and verbal 
ability measures, was also included. Hess et al. (2018) found that older adults made 
significantly less correct choices in the description-only task than younger adults 
(correct choice was characterized as choosing the option with the highest expected 
value), which seemed to be related to the lack of recall of the decision strategy they 
were given. Participants took more risk in the description-only version, but there 
were no age differences in risk-taking. Numeracy was positively associated with 
better decisions but did not differ between age groups, while ability was only related 
to correct choice on the inconsistent-experience condition. Though this task 
consisted of several versions, and assessed whether cognitive abilities were related 
to task performance, it did not ask participants to give a more clear account of their 
understanding of gamble probabilities and monetary outcomes (i.e. the assumption 
of misunderstanding was made due to participants’ choices for less-optimal options), 
nor was risk-taking on the task compared to participants’ risk preference.  
        Similar to the task used by Hess et al. (2018) The Columbia Card Task (Figner 
et al., 2009) also includes multiple conditions, using a “hot” and “cold” version of the 
task. In the “hot” version, participants are presented with 32 face-down cards and are 
given the chance to turn over one card during each trial. When the card is turned 
over, the participants receive feedback on whether the card’s outcome was a win or 
loss. If a loss card has been turned, the loss is subtracted from the overall earnings 
and ends the task. In the “cold” version of the task, participants are presented with 
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the set-up but are asked how many cards they wish to turn over at once. If their 
selection of cards does not include a loss card, the accrued amount is added to the 
overall earnings. If the selection does have a loss card, the amount is subtracted 
from the overall earnings and the task is ended. In order to maximize earnings, 
participants have to consider the chance of encountering a loss card, as well as win 
and loss amounts, when deciding how many cards to turn over. Though this task 
involves two separate, but similar, task parts, its focus does not lie in measuring the 
role of cognitive ability or risk preference in risk-taking; the task was designed to 
investigate affective versus deliberative processes, and assess how people’s choice 
behaviour changes in response to feedback. Also, Figner et al. (2009) included 
several measures of cognitive ability, such as working memory, to assess whether 
differences in cognitive ability affected task performance but found no effect of 
cognitive ability on risk-taking on either task types. Huang et al. (2013) aimed to 
replicate findings by Figner et al. (2009) but did not find age differences between 
younger and older adults on the task, and as such did not conduct mediation 
analyses to assess whether numeracy, and two types of working memory measures 
mediated the relationship between age and risk-taking on the Columbia Card Task. 
Correlations between measures and task performance showed that only numeracy 
was significantly related to age, but it was not correlated with task performance, nor 
were the working memory measures. In addition, this task also does not allow a 
more precise measurement of probability comprehension, as the same assumption 
underlies the interpretation of misunderstanding of probability and expected value as 
the task used in Hess et al. (2018). 
         In summary, the majority of research on age differences in risk-taking includes 
a single risk-taking task, or multiple tasks that differ in design. If multiple tasks are 
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used, they do not always allow precise measurement of participants’ understanding 
of probability and expected value of the given options. As such, it is difficult to 
assess how age differences in task performance are mediated by cognitive abilities 
such as numeracy or working memory, as comparison is limited due to issues 
concerning similarity in design, or the absence of another task. In addition, many 
studies have not included a measure of self-reported risk preference, making it 
difficult to establish whether risk was taken intentionally, as a result of a person’s 
preference towards risk, or whether risk was taken unintentionally, as a result of 
cognitive strain imposed on the participants by the task. To further investigate the 
role of cognitive ability and risk preference in age differences in risk-taking, we have 
adapted the risk-taking task from study 1 to include two task types: a complex and 
simplified task. The first type, the complex task, is similar to the task in study 1, but 
no longer allows participants to physically use the coloured balls and box. Instead, 
the task is computerized, with the box displayed on the screen and participants 
dragging the coloured balls into the box. This still requires participants to convert 
probabilities into frequencies but with less feedback (e.g. participants are no longer 
able to physically interact with the task parts, such as the coloured balls, nor is there 
a researcher present in the testing area). In the second type, the simplified task, 
participants are presented with a correctly filled box and are asked to count the 
coloured balls and enter the count for each outcome (win, loss, neither win nor loss). 
This process demands minimal cognitive exertion, which should make gamble 
acceptance more reflective of participants’ risk preference, removing the potential 
mediating effect of cognitive ability. The change in task design will allow us to assess 
each task part separately and determine if cognitive ability is related to older adults’ 
performance on the complex task part, while the simplified task (without cognitive 
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demand) is reflective of risk preference, the latter being the general assumption 
among risk-taking tasks. Both task types have also been computerized to lower the 
time spent for each session (as some participants spent close to 3 hours completing 
the first study). To our awareness, there is no existing study that assesses whether 
both cognitive ability and risk preference mediate age differences in task 
performance across two similar tasks with a high and low cognitive demand, that 
directly ask participants to calculate gambles outcomes.  
3.2.1 The present research 
 The current study aims to further investigate to what extent age differences in 
cognitive ability and risk preference can account for age differences in risk-taking 
behaviour. This will be done by using a computerized, two-type risk-taking task, with 
both types of similar design but with high and low cognitive demand. We 
hypothesized the following outcomes: 
 Hypothesis 1: older adults would estimate probability correctly less often in 
the complex task than younger adults, and this difference would be due to age-
related cognitive decline. As the complex task was designed to be more cognitively 
straining, we predicted that older adults’ correct estimations on this task would be 
affected by age-related changes in cognitive ability. 
 Hypothesis 2: age groups would not differ in their correct estimation of 
probability in the simplified task, nor would cognitive ability mediate the relationship 
between age group and correct estimation anymore. The simplified part was 
designed to remove any effect of age-related cognitive decline, and as such, we 
expected that task performance on the simplified task would not be related to 
cognitive ability.  
    Hypothesis 3: older adults would accept more gambles on the complex task, 
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and this age difference in risk-taking was mediated by age-related decline in 
cognitive ability. As the complex task is more cognitively straining, cognitive ability 
was hypothesized to mediate the relationship between age group and gamble 
acceptance, with older adults accepting more gambles as well as having lower 
performance on the cognitive ability measures.  
 Hypothesis 4: older adults would accept less gambles on the simplified task 
compared to younger adults, and this was due to age differences in risk preference. 
As the simplified task has been designed to remove any cognitive strain, behaviour 
on the simplified task should reflect participants’ underlying risk preference. As such, 
older adults were projected to accept less gambles on the task compared to younger 
adults, as we also expect them to report being more risk averse. 
 In addition to the hypotheses above, we also ran exploratory analyses. We 
were interested in seeing whether self-control and impulsivity would mediate the 
relationship between age and risk-taking, as both have been found to be related to 
risk-taking, especially concerning gambling behaviour (Bergen et al., 2012; Clarke, 
2004; Ioannidis et al., 2019; Petry, 2001). As such, we ran identical analyses to 
examine whether impulsiveness and self-control affected risk-taking behaviour on 
the two task types. 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
         We recruited 105 participants, out of which 4 were excluded from the analysis 
(1 participant’s score on our cognitive impairment check indicated (mild) cognitive 
decline, 3 participants had incomplete data). The final analytical sample was 101 and 
consisted of 53 younger adults (60.4% identified as female, M younger = 22.77, SD = 
3.21 years), and 48 older adults (49.8% identified as female, M older = 70.81, SD = 
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4.68 years). A little over a third (34%) of participants in the younger adult group were 
British, followed by American (7.5%). The common education level was A levels or 
equivalent education (37.7%), followed by an undergraduate degree (34%). Most 
younger adult participants were students (86.8%), with an annual income of £10.000 
or less (32.1%). All participants in the older adult group were British nationals. 
Almost a third (29.2%) of older participants had completed a university 
undergraduate degree, and (27.1%) had completed A levels or equivalent education. 
The most common form of employment status was retirement (83.3%), and the most 
common annual income between £10.001 and £30.000 (50%). 
3.3.2 Materials and procedure 
         First, participants were given an information sheet and were asked to sign an 
informed consent form before commencing the study. In the information sheet, 
participants were told that they would be given gambles during the study. If they 
played one or more gambles, half of the amount accrued on the task would be given 
to them, whether this was an overall win or loss. In case of an overall win, they would 
receive half of the money won on the task as well as their flat participation fee of £5. 
If they lost money on the task overall, half of the loss amount would be subtracted 
from their participant payment. If the final loss (i.e. half of the loss amount accrued 
on the task) was larger than their flat participation fee of £5, they would leave with £0 
(i.e. they could not acquire debt). They were told that the study was about decision-
making across the life span, that the study duration averaged about 60 to 90 
minutes, and that most of the activities allowed them to take as much time as they 
required. 
         After signing the consent form, the older adult participants took part in the 
MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975), a screener for cognitive impairment. Participants would 
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be able to take part if they scored 24 or higher, as any score below 24 is considered 
indicative of decline. The most common score on the MMSE was 29 (the maximum 
score on the MMSE is 30). One participant scored below the cut-off score of 24 and 
was excluded from the study. After completing the MMSE, participants were asked to 
complete a demographic questionnaire on their gender, education level, employment 
status, nationality, and income. 
         Following the demographic questionnaire, participants took part in the 
behavioural risk-taking task. Its instructions were presented visually on the computer 
screen and spoken instructions were also available through headphones. The task 
was designed and run using experiment software Inquisit (version 5). The task 
consisted of two types: a complex task, which places higher demand on cognitive 
abilities, and a simplified task, which had been designed to require minimal cognitive 
demand. Twenty gambles were randomized across the complex and simplified task, 
with participants completing 10 gambles for each task type (i.e. one participant may 
complete gamble 1 in the complex task, while the next participant may complete 
gamble 1 in the simplified task). The complex task was given first to avoid any 
learning effects. The gambles’ selection procedure was identical to the procedure 
described in study 1. The included gambles were originally selected from a pilot 
study in which participants were asked to evaluate 75 gambles. The 10 gambles 
used in study 1 were included once more, with 10 additional gambles from the pilot 
study. The additional gambles included in the task had varying expected values but 
were guessed correctly around 50 percent of the time in the pilot study. The gambles 
were modelled after those used in Rolison & Pachur (2017) and consisted of three 
outcomes; a chance to win, a chance to lose, and a chance to neither win nor lose. 
Each outcome had its own amount associated with its probability. In both task types, 
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participants received on-screen instructions and were shown an example of the trial 
screen and gamble. They were then asked to imagine the gamble being played 20 
times and asked to mimic the outcomes that would occur over those 20 times, 
effectively converting probabilities to frequencies. 
         In the complex task, participants were shown an empty box with 20 
compartments on the screen, with a gamble and three types of coloured balls 
displayed next to the box (see Figure 4). The three types of coloured balls 
represented the different outcomes of the gamble: green balls represented wins, red 
balls represented losses, and yellow balls represented neither wins nor losses. 
Participants were instructed to drag and drop the coloured balls into the box 
compartments to mimic the outcomes of the gamble being played 20 times. 
Participants could enter any outcome in any order in the box, and any frequency up 
to 20 per outcome (i.e. each outcome had a maximum of 20 balls each). This 
allowed participants to enter their expected outcome with reasonable restriction. If 
any mistakes were made, the participant could click “reset” to empty the box and 
start over. Participants were not able to submit a partially filled box. If any 
compartments in the box had been left empty when the participants clicked 
“finished”, the task would prompt an error message. After clicking “finished”, 




Figure 4. Example of a trial in the complex task part.  
         In the simplified task type, participants were given a pre-filled box with the 
correct number of balls for each outcome. They were asked to count the number of 
balls for each outcome and to enter the count into the answer cells on the screen. 
After doing so, participants continued to the feedback screen, similar to the trials in 
the complex task.  
 For both task parts, after filling the box with the expected outcomes, the 
participants were shown a feedback screen with the monetary value for each 
outcome (win, loss, neither) as well as the overall value of playing 20 times, on the 
left of the screen (see Figure 5). The values they were shown were based on the 
number of balls the participants put into the box for each outcome, and the amounts 




Figure 5. Example of feedback on the task after having filled in the box and having 
clicked “finished”.  
         Participants were also asked whether they wished to play the gamble in real-
life by accepting the gamble on the screen. The gamble they were asked to mimic 
was shown on the right with buttons to click accept or reject. If participants decided 
to reject the gamble, they were given a new gamble and repeated the procedure for 
another gamble. If participants decided to accept the gamble, they were shown an 
additional screen that gave them the option to increase the amounts to win and lose 
(see Figure 6). Participants could use arrows to increase the win amount by 5 
percent each time they click the arrow. However, the amounts to win and lose could 
not be decreased, only increased. If the win amount was changed, the loss amount 
changed accordingly to maintain the expected value of the gamble. The task 
determined the outcome of playing the gamble based on the objective probabilities to 




Figure 6. Example of participants’ options to increase the win and loss amounts of 
an accepted gamble.  
         After completing the behavioural task, participants were given an online 
survey that included several measures, the first being the Objective Numeracy Scale 
(Lipkus et al., 2001). The Objective Numeracy Scale is a measure of the ability to 
understand and solve mathematical equations and probabilities. The scale consists 
of 11 items, with some items concerning probabilities in forms of percentages and 
fractions, others requiring participants to calculate the answer to a basic 
mathematical problem (e.g. “Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. 
Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 
6)?”). Three additional items from two types of cognitive reflection tests (Primi et al., 
2016; Toplak et al., 2014) have been added to the scale for this study as participants 
generally score rather high on the Objective Numeracy scale alone. These three 
items measure the ability to reflect on a question and to resist responding with the 
first answer that comes to mind. The reliability of the Objective Numeracy Scale was 
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found by Lipkus et al. (2001) to be α = 0.78. Weller et al. (2013) reported a 
Cronbach’s alpha of α = .76, and Thomson & Oppenheimer (2016) found a 
Cronbach’s alpha of α = .72. Participants’ scores are the sum of correct items of all 
14 questions. 
         After completing the numeracy scale, participants were given the Dospert 
(Blais & Weber, 2006), adjusted by Rolison et al. (2019), which aims to assess 
participants’ self-reported likelihood to take risks and perception of risk-taking across 
domains such as financial (“Using your credit card to pay for an item on an unfamiliar 
website”), recreational (“Going camping in the wilderness”), social (“Moving to a city 
far away from your close friends and family”) and health and safety (“Driving a car 
without wearing a seatbelt”). Items are similar or identical to items from the Domain 
Specific Risk-Taking Scale (Blais & Weber, 2006), but several items have been 
adjusted to ensure suitability for a diverse age range. For this study we used the 
Financial Likelihood scale only. Participants rated how likely they were to undertake 
the listed activities on a 7-point Likert Scale from -3 to 3 (-3 = extremely unlikely, 3 = 
extremely likely). Participants’ scores are the mean response across all items, with a 
higher mean indicating a higher likelihood of taking financial risk. In their study, 
Rolison et al. (2019) reported a combined Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.72, with an 
alpha of α = .65 for Likelihood, and α = .78 for Risk Perception, suggesting sufficient 
reliability. 
 Participants were then given a questionnaire created specifically for this 
study. Research on risk is often characterized by limitations on the level of risk a 
participant will experience in an experiment, due to ethical boundaries and the clear 
communication of study outline and participants rights. As such, participants are 
often aware that actual risk is limited and may act accordingly. In addition, most self-
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report measures use hypothetical risk to measure risk preferences and this may 
(partly) explain prior gaps between self-report and behaviour. To reflect this, the 
designed questionnaire includes items in which the decision to hypothetically put 
oneself in a risky environment has already been made. An example of an item is the 
following: “You’re at the casino for a birthday party. Would you take some gambles at 
the slot machines or some other gamble at the casino?” The questionnaire consists 
of 11 items, with responses measured on a 7-point Likert scale from -3 to 3 (-3 = 
extremely unlikely, 3 = extremely likely) Participants’ scores are the arithmetic mean 
across all 11 items. 
         Participants then completed the 11th revision of the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale (BIS11; Patton et al., 1995) The BIS11 consists of 30 statements across 3 
subscales: attentional impulsiveness (measuring focus on tasks, intrusive and racing 
thoughts), motor impulsiveness (measuring consistency of behaviour and lifestyle) 
and non-planning impulsiveness (assessing planning, careful thinking and enjoying 
challenging tasks). Participants rate to what extent the statement applies to them on 
a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 4 (1 = never/rarely, 4 = almost 
always/always). The reliability of the BIS11 was found to range between a 
Cronbach’s alpha of α = .79 and .83, depending on the population of the sample 
(Patton et al., 1995). Participants’ scores are the sum of responses across all 30 
items. We chose to not use the three subscales and instead use the overall score, as 
it has been shown that the overall score is a more reliable measurement of 
impulsiveness (Patton et al., 1995). 
         The Tangney’s Self-control Scale followed the BIS11. Participants completed 
the Self Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004), which was designed to assess 
people’s ability to control their impulses, emotions and thoughts, and their ability to 
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refrain themselves from acting on undesirable tendencies. The scale consists of 36 
statements related to self-control (such as “I don’t keep secrets very well”) within five 
dimensions: general capacity for self-discipline, deliberate/non-impulsive actions, 
healthy habits, work ethics and reliability. For each statement participants choose 
how it applies to them on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). The Self-
Control Scale’s reliability is good, with a Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.89 across two 
studies. Scores on the Self-Control Scale are the sum of responses across all items 
(Tangney et al., 2004). 
         Participants then completed the General Risk Propensity Scale (Zhang et al., 
2019). The General Risk Propensity Scale is a domain-general disposition measure 
of risk-taking behaviour, measuring general propensity to take risks across 
situations. The scale consists of 8 items, an example of such an item is “I am 
attracted, rather than scared, by risk”. Participants are given statements about their 
personal feelings on taking risks, to which they rate on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) how much they agree with the statement. 
The General Risk Propensity Scale showed good reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha 
of α = 0.92 (Zhang et al., 2019). Participants’ scores on this measure are the 
arithmetic mean across the 8 items. 
         The last two measures of the study were cognitive measures. Of the two 
measures, participants completed the Shortened Symmetry Span first. The 
Shortened Symmetry Span (Foster et al., 2015) is a complex span task, designed to 
capture working memory ability. In this study, the shortened version of the Symmetry 
Task was used. In the task, participants are given a distractor block in which they are 
asked to judge whether the figure on the screen is vertically symmetrical. This is 




Figure 7. Distractor and memory blocks of the Shortened Symmetry Span. 
At the end of the trial, participants are asked to number the locations in the grid that 
the red blocks were located, in the order of presentation. The number of symmetry-
location pairs differs per trial, varying between 2 and 5 pairs. Scores on the 
Shortened Symmetry Task are calculated by summing the number of correctly 
recalled locations of squares in the correct order. The Shortened Symmetry Span 
Task was chosen due to its suitability to test higher educated samples compared to 
other complex span tasks (Draheim et al., 2018) as previous studies on these age 
groups showed that the majority of participants were highly educated. The Shortened 
Symmetry Span was run using the behavioural research software program E-Prime 
(version 2.0 Professional). 
         Before completing the study, participants completed the Digit Symbol Coding, 
a measure of processing speed and a subtest of the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997). 
Participants were given a form with combinations of 9 numbers and symbols in the 
top of the form and were asked to copy the symbols underneath the associated 
numbers as swiftly and accurately as possible. To do so, they had 120 seconds. The 
score on the Digit Symbol Coding is the total number of correctly matched symbols 
and numbers, with a higher score indicating better processing speed. 
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         Finally, participants were debriefed and received payment for their 
participation (if their earnings on the decision-making task were more than £0). 
Participants could choose whether to take their payment home or donate it (in part) 
to three selected charities, which they told at the beginning of the study was an 
option. The materials used in this study can be found in the appendix. 
3.3.3 Analysis 
 To assess the reliability of the self-report measures, Cronbach’s alphas were 
computed using the ltm package (version 1.1-1). Due to the nature of the study (i.e. 
duration of sessions differing between 1 and 3 hours) and target group (i.e. older 
adult participants are more difficult to recruit), we had limited power. As such, we 
were unable to run complex analyses to establish the best predictors of 
comprehension and risk-taking (such as structural equation modelling). Instead, we 
used zero-order correlations to choose the best predictors of both risk preference 
and cognitive ability. Zero-order correlations were run using the rstatix package 
(version 0.7.0).  
 To test each hypothesis, we used mediation analyses. We first used simple 
linear regressions to establish relationships between variables (independent, 
dependent, and mediator), and used the mediate function from the Psych package 
(version 2.0.12) to run the multiple mediation models (used to assess the 
contribution of cognitive ability and risk preference to age differences in correct 
estimation and gamble acceptance). Each mediation model was run using a 




3.4.1 Composite variables 
         Correct estimation of probability. Participants’ correct estimation of 
probability was measured for each of the 20 gambles. Correct estimation was coded 
as 1 if all probabilities associated with a gamble (i.e. win, loss, neither win nor loss) 
were estimated correctly. If one or more of the probabilities were not estimated 
correctly, correct was coded as 0. For the analysis, correct was transformed into a 
proportional score of how often participants were correct across the gambles in the 
complex task part, and those in the simplified task part. This provided each 
participant with two (proportion) scores of correct estimation of probability between 0 
and 1. 
         Gamble acceptance. Gamble acceptance on the task was measured for 
each of the 20 gambles and was coded as 1 if the participants chose to accept to 
play the gamble in real life, and 0 if they rejected the gamble. For the analysis, 
gamble acceptance was transformed into a proportional score of how many gambles 
participants accepted in the complex task part, and how many they chose to play in 
the simplified task part, giving each participant two gamble acceptance scores 
between 0 and 1. 
         General Risk Propensity Scale. Participants’ risk preference on the General 
Risk Propensity Scale were measured as the arithmetic mean across its 8 items. The 
scale’s reliability was good, with a Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.92. As such, no 
changes were made to how participants’ scores were calculated on this scale. 
         New Risk Scale. The New Risk Scale was created for this study, in which 
participants’ risk preference was measured as the arithmetic mean across its 10 
items. The scale’s reliability was a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.63. However, the item-total 
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correlation test showed that the removal of item 6 (“You’re travelling to a new city 
shortly and have already booked transportation. While looking for a place to stay you 
find accommodation for a low price that looks too good to be true. Would you book 
your stay there?”) improved the scale’s reliability from α = 0.63 to α = 0.68. As such, 
we removed item 6 and calculated participants’ mean score on the New Risk Scale 
across its remaining 9 items. 
         Adjusted Dospert. Scores on the adjusted Dospert scale were measured 
using six items on the likelihood of taking financial risk. The measure’s reliability was 
found to have a Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.46, which was insufficient. We then used 
an item-total correlation test to establish which item removal would lead to an 
improvement in reliability. Removing the second item (“Using your credit card to pay 
for an item on an unfamiliar website”) was shown to increase the scale’s reliability 
from a Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.46 to α = 0.58. As such, item 2 was removed and 
scores on the adjusted Dospert are measured as the arithmetic mean across the 
remaining 5 items. 
         Objective Numeracy Scale. Numeracy scores were measured as the sum of 
correct answers across 14 numerical problem scenarios. The scale’s reliability was 
sufficient, with a Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.67. Thus, we maintained the original 
calculation of participant scores, the sum of correct items of its 14 items. 
         Tangney Self-Control Scale. Self-Control was measured across 5 
subscales, with 36 items in total. For this study, we measured participants’ self-
reported self-control as the arithmetic mean across all items. The scale’s reliability 
was good, with a Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.87. As such, we did not make any 
changes to the way participants’ scores were calculated. 
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 Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Participants’ self-reported impulsiveness was 
measured across 30 items. For this study, we calculated participants’ scores as the 
arithmetic mean across all items. The scale’s reliability was sufficient, with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.79, allowing us to maintain the approach in calculating 
participants’ scores without any adjustments. 
 3.4.2 Confirmatory tests of hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1:  age differences in correct estimations of probability        
 Complex Task. We hypothesized that older adults would less often estimate 
probability correctly on the complex task type, due to the cognitive strain of the task. 
As such, we expected that age differences in correct estimation on the complex task 
would be mediated by cognitive ability. Overall, we observed that older adult 
participants correctly estimated probability less often, as their proportion of correct 
estimations was lower than those of younger adults (see Figure 8). Older adults were 





Figure 8. Proportion of correct probability estimations in the complex task by 
younger and older adults. 
 The differences between age groups in correct probability estimation are 
further illustrated when looking at the distance from actual probability (see Figure 9). 
Younger adults appeared to estimate the probability to win and lose closer to its 
actual value, with only some estimating above or below the probability value, 
whereas older adults appeared to have more difficulty estimating win and loss values 
in the complex task. The density plots displaying older adult’s estimation show a 
thicker density in both the area around the actual value and further away. The 
estimation of win probability by older adults (bottom left) shows thicker lines near the 
top of the graph, indicating overestimation of win probability, whereas the opposite 
occurs in the estimations of loss probability (bottom right). 
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 Figure 9. Density plots of younger (top) and older adult (bottom) estimations of win 
and loss probability for each gamble on the complex task. 
Note. The actual gamble value is represented by a grey dot in the individual 
distributions. The actual probabilities differ between gambles (i.e. probabilities could 
be 0.15, 0.25, or 0.40). A thicker area around the grey dot indicates that many 
participants estimated the probability to be near its actual value. If the distributions 
are very thin, this indicates that most participants guessed the actual gamble value. 
The length of the distribution indicates the distance of the estimation from the actual 
probability. 
 To find the best predictors for risk preference and cognitive ability in the 
complex task, zero-order correlations were conducted. In the complex task, correct 
estimation of probability correlated most highly with the General Risk Propensity 
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Scale, r = 0.17, followed by the adjusted Dospert, r = -0.11. As such, the General 
Risk Propensity Scale was chosen as the predictor across risk preference measures. 
For measures of cognitive ability, numeracy was most highly correlated with correctly 
estimating probability, r = 0.43, followed by Shortened Symmetry Span, r = 0.39. 
Numeracy was chosen as the cognitive measure included in the analysis of correct 
probability estimation in the complex task. 
 To investigate the contribution of risk preference and cognitive ability to age 
differences in correct estimation of probability, we conducted a mediation analysis. 
Firstly, using a linear regression, correct estimation in the complex task part was 
regressed on age group. The results showed a significant difference between age 
groups in correct probability estimations, B = -0.23, t(99) = -3.15, p = .002, with older 
adults correctly estimating probability less often. Identical analyses were conducted 
to regress correct estimations on scores of the General Risk Propensity Scale, which 
showed no significant relationship between the two variables. When regressing the 
General Risk Propensity scores onto age group, the results showed that older adults 
reported taking significantly less risk, B = -0.48, t(99) = 2.80, p = .006. We then 
regressed correct estimation on numeracy, the second mediator, which showed a 
significantly positive relationship, B = 0.07, t(99) = 4.69, p < .001. Following this, 
numeracy was regressed on age group, which showed that older adults scored 
significantly lower on the numeracy measure, B = -0.97, t(99) = -2.27, p = .025.   
 We then proceeded with testing whether the relationship between age group 
and correct estimation of probability on the complex task was mediated by the 
General Risk Propensity Scale and numeracy, using a mediation model with multiple 
mediators. The indirect effect of age group on correct estimation, through the 
General Risk Propensity Scale was not significant (see Figure 10). However, the 
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indirect effect through numeracy was significant, ab = -0.06, 95% CI[-0.13, -0.01], 
indicating that numeracy partially mediated the relationship between age group and 
correct estimation of probability. 
 
Figure 10. Mediation analysis on estimation of correct probability in the complex 
task, with age group as independent variable, with General Risk Propensity Scale 
and Objective Numeracy Scale as mediators.   
 Simplified task. For the simplified task, we hypothesized that any effects 
found on the complex task part would disappear, as correct estimation of probability 
on the simplified task should not be affected by cognitive strain. In line with our 
expectations, age differences in correct estimation were smaller on the simplified 
task (see Figure 11), as both groups improved in accuracy compared to their 





Figure 11. Proportion of correct probability estimations in the simplified task by 
younger and older adults. 
 However, a similar direction remained, with younger adults correctly 
estimating gamble probabilities correctly slightly more than older adults. When 
looking at the distribution of estimations, a similar pattern emerges (see Figure 12). 
Younger and older adults appear relatively similar in their estimations, both showing 
estimations of win and loss probability close to the actual values. However, the older 
adult group’s estimations are more spread out, with estimations further from the 








Figure 12. Density plots of younger (top) and older adult (bottom) estimations of win 
and loss probability for each gamble on the simplified task.  
Note. The actual gamble value is represented by a grey dot in the individual 
distributions. The actual probabilities differ between gambles (i.e. probabilities could 
be 0.15, 0.25, or 0.40). A thicker area around the grey dot indicates that many 
participants estimated the probability to be near its actual value. If the distributions 
are very thin, this indicates that most participants guessed the actual gamble value. 
The length of the distribution indicates the distance of the estimation from the actual 
probability. 
 For the simplified task type, we again used zero-order correlations for both 
risk preference and cognitive ability measures to find the best predictor of correct 
estimations of probability. Among risk preference measures, the New Risk Scale 
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correlated most highly with correct estimation, r = -0.14, other measures’ coefficients 
were very small (r < 0.1). For cognitive measures, the Shortened Symmetry Span 
was most related to correct probability estimates, r = 0.15, followed by Digit Symbol 
Coding, r = 0.11. As such, the New Risk Scale was chosen to be the risk preference 
measure, and Shortened Symmetry Span to be the cognitive measure to be included 
in the mediation analysis on participants’ correct probability estimation in the 
simplified task. 
 Similar to the mediation process for the complex task part, correct estimation 
in the simplified task was first regressed on age group, and showed a significant 
difference between age groups in correct probability estimations, B = -0.12, t(99) = -
2.05, p = .043, with older adults correctly estimating probability less often. Identical 
analyses were conducted to regress correct on mean scores of the New Risk Scale, 
which showed no significant relationship between correct estimation and risk 
preference. When regressing New Risk scores onto age group, the results showed 
that older adults reported more risk-seeking, B = 0.86, t(99) = 4.69, p < .001. When 
exploring the model’s second mediator, working memory, correct estimation was 
regressed on the Shortened Symmetry Span, which showed no significant 
relationship between working memory and correct probability estimation. Following 
this, Shortened Symmetry Span was regressed on age group, which showed that 
older adults scores significantly lower on the working memory measure, B = -5.41, 
t(99) = -9.45, p < .001. We then tested whether the relationship between age group 
and correct estimation of probability was mediated by the New Risk Scale and 
Shortened Symmetry Span, through a mediation analysis with multiple mediators. 
The indirect effect of age group on correct estimation, through the New Risk Scale 
and Shortened Symmetry Span, was not significant (see Figure 13). Findings 
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indicate that differences between age groups in correctly estimating gamble 
probability on the simplified task were not related to risk preference or cognitive 
ability. These findings are in line with our expectations, as we hypothesized that the 
simplified task part would show no effects of cognitive ability or risk preference. 
 
Figure 13. Mediation analysis on estimation of correct probability in the simplified 
task, with age group as independent variable, with New Risk Scale and Shortened 
Symmetry Span as mediators. 
 Hypothesis 2: age differences in gamble acceptance 
         Complex task. We hypothesized that older adults would accept more 
gambles on the complex task due to the increased strain this task type poses on 
cognitive abilities. As expected, the proportion of accepted gambles was higher for 







Figure 14. Proportion of accepted gambles in the complex task by younger and 
older adults. 
 We first conducted zero-order correlations to find the best predictors amongst 
risk preference and cognitive ability measures. Across the risk preference measures, 
the adjusted Dospert correlated most highly with gamble acceptance, r = 0.20, tied 
with the New Risk Scale, r = 0.20. As the adjusted Dospert would also be the largest 
correlating variable in the simplified task, we decided to include the adjusted Dospert 
as the risk preference measure for this analysis. Across cognitive measures, the 
Shortened Symmetry Span was most related to gamble acceptance, r = 0.28, with 
the other two measures having only negligible coefficients. Thus, the adjusted 
Dospert and Shortened Symmetry Span were chosen to be included in the mediation 
analysis on gamble acceptance in the complex task part. 
 We then proceeded with our planned mediation analysis on age differences in 
gamble acceptance. Firstly, gamble acceptance was regressed on age group to 
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establish age differences in risk-taking, through linear regression. The results 
showed a significant difference between age groups in gamble acceptance, B = 0.24, 
t(99) = 4.28, p < .001, with older adults accepting more gambles than younger 
adults. Gamble acceptance was then regressed on the adjusted Dospert scale, 
which showed a significantly positive effect, B = 0.06, t(99) = 1.99, p = .050. When 
regressing the adjusted Dospert scale onto age group, the results showed no 
significant effect, indicating that older and younger adults did not differ in their self-
reported risk preference towards financial risk. When exploring the model’s cognitive 
mediator, the Shortened Symmetry Span, gamble acceptance was regressed on the 
Shortened Symmetry Span, which showed a significantly negative relationship 
between working memory and gamble acceptance, B = -0.02, t(99) = -2.88, p = .005. 
Then, regressing the Shortened Symmetry Span on age group, using a linear 
regression, findings showed that older adults scored significantly lower on the 
working memory measure compared to younger adults, B = -5.41, t(99) = -9.45, p < 
.001. We then tested whether the relationship between age group and gamble 
acceptance on the complex task was mediated by the adjusted Dospert and 
Shortened Symmetry Span through a multiple mediation model. The indirect effect of 
age group on gamble acceptance, through the adjusted Dospert scale and 
Shortened Symmetry Span, was not significant. Findings indicate that differences 
between age groups in gamble acceptance were not related to cognitive ability (or 




Figure 15. Mediation analysis on gamble acceptance in the complex task, with age 
group as independent variable, with the adjusted Dospert and Shortened Symmetry 
Span as mediators. 
 
          Simplified task. As the simplified task was designed to remove any cognitive 
strain, we expected that gamble acceptance on the simplified task part would solely 
reflect participants’ risk preference. As such, we expected that older adults would 
accept fewer gambles, as they were hypothesized to be more risk averse compared 
to younger adults. Nevertheless, we observed that older adults accepted more 
gambles than younger adults (see Figure 16), though both groups accepted less 
gambles than in the complex task (in which younger adults accepted nearly half of 








Figure 16. Proportion of accepted gambles in the simplified task by younger and 
older adults. 
 To find the best predictors of gamble acceptance amongst the risk preference 
and cognitive ability measures, we conducted zero-order correlations. Across risk 
preference measures, the adjusted Dospert was most highly correlated with gamble 
acceptance, r = 0.18, followed by new risk, r = 0.16. Among cognitive measures, the 
Shortened Symmetry Span was most related to gamble acceptance, r = -0.20, while 
numeracy and Digit Symbol Coding both had negligible coefficients. The adjusted 
Dospert and Shortened Symmetry Span, measuring working memory, were chosen 
to be included in the mediation analysis for the simplified task part. 
 We then proceeded with the mediation analysis. Firstly, gamble acceptance 
was regressed on age group to establish age differences in risk-taking, through 
linear regression. The results showed a significant difference between age groups in 
gamble acceptance, B = 0.18, t(99) = 3.30, p = .001, with older adults accepting 
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more gambles than younger adults. Gamble acceptance was then regressed on the 
adjusted Dospert scale, which did not show a significant relationship between 
gamble acceptance and this measure of risk preference. When regressing the 
adjusted Dospert scale onto age group, the results also showed no significant 
relationship between age group and risk preference. When exploring the model’s 
cognitive mediator, working memory, gamble acceptance was regressed on the 
Shortened Symmetry Span, which showed a significantly negative relationship 
between working memory and gamble acceptance, B = -0.01, t(99) = - 2.01, p = 
.047. Regressing the Shortened Symmetry Span on age group, using a linear 
regression, showed that older adults scored significantly lower on the working 
memory measure compared to younger adults, B = -5.41, t(99) = -9.45, p < .001. We 
then tested whether the relationship between age group and gamble acceptance on 
the simplified task part was mediated by the adjusted Dospert and Shortened 
Symmetry Span, through a multiple mediation model. The indirect effect of age 
group on gamble acceptance, through the adjusted Dospert scale and Shortened 
Symmetry Span, was not significant (see Figure 17). The results suggest that 
differences between age groups in gamble acceptance were not related to age 




Figure 17. Mediation analysis on gamble acceptance in the simplified task, with age 
group as independent variable, with the adjusted Dospert and Shortened Symmetry 
Span as mediators. 
3.4.3 Exploratory analysis 
 The Tangney Self-Control Scale and Barratt Impulsiveness Scale were 
included as additional variables of interest, as both self-control and impulsiveness 
have been found to be associated with risk-taking behaviour, especially concerning 
gambling behaviour. As such, we were interested in seeing whether these variables 
would mediate the relationship between age group and gamble acceptance. 
Complex task 
  On the complex task, a similar approach to prior mediation analyses on 
gamble acceptance was taken. Firstly, a linear regression was run, with age group 
as independent variable and gamble acceptance as dependent variable. The results 
showed a significantly positive relationship between age group and gamble 
acceptance on the complex task, B = 0.24, t(99) = 4.28, p < .001. Following this, 
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gamble acceptance was regressed on self-control, the first mediator, which showed 
no significant effect. When regressing self-control on age group, results showed that 
older adults reported significantly higher self-control than younger adults, B = 11.26, 
t(99) = 3.23, p < .001. When assessing the relationship between impulsiveness, the 
second mediator, and gamble acceptance in the complex task, the linear regression 
showed no significant relationship between the two variables. A similar pattern was 
present when regressing impulsiveness on age group, suggesting that older and 
younger adults did not differ in self-reported impulsiveness. Lastly, we ran a multiple 
mediation model on age group and gamble acceptance, with self-control and 
impulsiveness as mediators. Results showed that the indirect effect of age group on 
gamble acceptance was not significant (see Figure 18). This suggests that age 
differences in risk-taking on the complex task are not mediated by participants’ self-
control or impulsiveness. 
Figure 18. Mediation analysis on estimation of correct chance in the complex task, 





  Similar to the prior mediation analyses on gamble acceptance, we first 
regressed gamble acceptance in the simplified task on age group, which showed 
that older adults accepted significantly more gambles, B = 0.18, t(99) = 3.30, p = 
.001. Following this, gamble acceptance on the simplified task was regressed on 
self-control, the first mediator, which was not significant. The following linear 
regression, in which self-control was regressed on age group, showed that older 
adults reported significantly higher self-control than younger adults, B = 11.26, t(99) 
= 3.23, p < .001. To assess the second mediator’s relationship to the outcome 
variable, gamble acceptance in the simplified task was regressed on impulsiveness. 
This also showed to be non-significant. When assessing whether age groups differed 
in impulsiveness, the linear regression was also not significant, indicating no 
differences in self-reported impulsiveness between younger and older adults. A 
multiple mediation analysis was then used to assess whether the relationship 
between age group and gamble acceptance on the simplified task was mediated by 
self-control and impulsiveness. Using the mediate function from the Psych package, 
we used a bootstrapping approach (number of iterations = 500) to assess indirect 
mediation effects (see Figure 18) of self-control and impulsiveness. The indirect 
effect of age group on gamble acceptance was not significant (see Figure 19). 
Findings indicate that differences between age groups in gamble acceptance were 





Figure 19. Mediation analysis on estimation of correct chance in the simplified task, 
with age group as independent variable, with self-control and impulsiveness as 
mediators. 
3.5 Discussion 
 The main aim of this study was to further investigate the role of cognitive 
ability and risk preference in age differences in risk-taking, similar to study 1. In 
response to the findings of study 1, we designed a novel decision-making task 
consisting of two separate task types; one task that is cognitively straining and 
another with minimal cognitive ability involved. The behavioural task in study 1 had 
10 gambles, for this task we included 20 gambles randomized across the two task 
types. This study also included multiple measures of cognitive ability and risk 
preference that would allow us to assess which would be the best predictor of task 
performance. 
         We hypothesized that older adults would be correct less often on the complex 
task because of the task’s reliance on cognitive abilities that may decrease in older 
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age (hypothesis 1). Older adults were indeed correct less often, and numerical ability 
significantly mediated the relationship of age group and correct estimation. On the 
simplified task, the task version in which participants counted the pre-filled box and 
entered values on the screen, older and younger adults did differ in their risk 
preference (older adults reported more risk-seeking), as well as working memory 
performance being negatively associated with older age, but there was no significant 
mediation by risk preference or cognitive ability on the relationship between age and 
correct estimation (hypothesis 2). 
         When looking at risk-taking behaviour, characterized as gamble acceptance, 
we again looked at the complex and simplified tasks separately. In the complex task, 
we anticipated that the higher demand on cognition would show in older adults taking 
more risk, and that their risk-taking would contrast with their reported risk preference 
(hypothesis 3). We found that older adults’ gamble acceptance and reported risk 
preference did not align, but the disparity was not explained by cognitive ability. 
Participants’ working memory was not related to gamble acceptance, nor did it 
mediate the age difference in gamble acceptance. In the simplified task, we 
expected that risk preference would mediate the relationship between age and risk-
taking, as the task was designed to remove any cognitive strain (hypothesis 4). We 
found that older adults accepted more gambles on the simplified task, but age 
groups did not differ in their self-reported risk preference, and risk preference (or 
cognitive ability) did not mediate the relationship between age and gamble 
acceptance. 
         Overall, most of the findings discussed above were not as hypothesized, but 
many findings did align with prior research. We found that older adults correctly 
estimated probabilities less often compared to younger adults, as well as accepting 
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more gambles. Though other behavioural tasks often do not explicitly require 
participants to estimate the chance of outcomes occurring (i.e. participants are not 
asked to convert chance to frequency), there is a similar pattern in comprehension. 
Mamerow et al. (2016) found that older adults accepted riskier options more often 
than younger adults in unequal trials, despite the lower expected value of the risky 
option, and reported that older adults took more risk than younger adults, which was 
likely due to difficulties in calculating the expected value of available outcomes. 
These findings were similar to the descriptive-only condition in the study by Hess et 
al. (2018), in which older adults were also correct less often. 
       Older and younger adults differed in numerical ability, with older adults having 
lower numerical abilities than younger adults. Consequently, numerical ability 
partially mediated the relationship between age and correct estimation of probability, 
as older adults also estimated probabilities correctly less often than younger adults. 
Numeracy was not found to mediate age differences in gamble acceptance. The 
mediating effect of numeracy was as predicted, as we expected that older and 
younger adult differences in risk comprehension would be explained by age-related 
decline in cognitive abilities. This finding was different from the findings on age 
differences in numeracy in study 1, as no difference between age groups were found 
in study 1. Despite the lack of age differences, numeracy was related to risk 
comprehension on the task in study 1 as well. Prior findings on age differences in 
numeracy have been mixed, with some studies finding a decrease in numerical 
ability in older adults (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2015; Delazer et al., 2013; Weller et al., 
2013), and some studies finding no difference in numerical ability between age 
groups (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2017; Eberhardt et al., 2019; Weller et al., 2013).  
 Why age differences are more often observed in working memory and 
108 
 
processing speed, but less in numerical ability, might be because fluid abilities 
(which encompass working memory and processing speed) are thought to be more 
sensitive to age-related changes (Li et al., 2013). Numeracy is related to general 
intelligence, but any damage or decline of non-numerical intelligence can be 
separate from numerical ability (Peters, 2012). For example, retired financial 
professionals with age-related decline in non-numerical memory maintained similar 
numerical memory to younger adults (Castel, 2007). As such, it might be that the 
mixed results concerning age differences in numeracy simply reflect differences 
between individuals regardless of any age-related decline. This would explain why 
some studies will find age differences in numerical ability, often using the same 
measure, and other studies do not. 
          In addition, older adults had both lower working memory, and 
processing speed, which fits prior literature on both abilities (Henninger et al., 2010; 
Salthouse, 1996; Salthouse & Craick, 2007).  An explanation for why working 
memory and processing speed did not mediate the relationship between age and 
correct estimation or gamble acceptance on the complex task could be because the 
task types in this study do not rely heavily enough on cognitive ability for any effects 
to show. This is not uncommon; the Iowa Gambling Task is an example of a risk-
taking task which is often thought to show age-related differences in performance 
due to age-related decline in cognitive abilities. However, many studies investigating 
this relationship also reported non-significant results, while studies that did find a 
relationship between task performance and cognitive ability reported small effect 
sizes (Toplak et al., 2010). According to Li et al. (2013), working memory is also 
more affected in complex tasks that require active processing. However, the complex 
task type in this study does not require participants to retain and recall large chunks 
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of information. Instead, participants made calculations for each probability they 
estimated, and then moved on to estimating the next outcome probability (while their 
prior calculation is still visible), instead of having to retain and recall information to be 
able to complete trials. Processing speed is another ability in which strain is 
expressed in situations under time pressure and is more affected in complex tasks 
that require active processing (Li et al., 2013). Prior work has found that older adults 
often perform worse under tasks with time pressure (Mata et al., 2011), but the 
current task did not include time pressure, instead allowing participants to take as 
much time as needed. As such, any age differences in processing speed may not 
have affected older adults’ task performance. An approach to address the current 
lack of mediation by processing speed and working memory would be to make the 
task more difficult in terms of time constraints, and by not providing a visual overview 
of prior answers (i.e. once participants have calculated and entered the number of 
balls for one type of outcome, to show a blank screen in which they calculate the 
next outcome, having to remember the outcome they calculated before). 
         Another reason why cognitive abilities do not mediate age differences in risk-
taking might be because of the generally small age differences in description-based 
decisions. A meta-analysis by Mata et al. (2011) found that age differences in task 
performance were generally larger when it involved decisions based on experience 
compared to decisions based on description, with older adults generally taking more 
risk when making experience-based decisions. As participants are often given full 
information when making description-based decisions, age differences on these 
tasks may not be due to differences in cognitive ability, as the cognitive demand is 
lower compared to experience-based decisions, in which learning processes are 
often involved (Hess et al., 2018). 
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         We also found age differences on some measures of risk preference. In the 
analyses involving correct estimation of probability, older adults reported lower 
willingness to take risk compared to younger adults on the General Risk Propensity 
Scale. This is similar to other studies on self-reported risk preference, which have 
been found to elicit risk-averse responses from older adults (Josef et al., 2016; 
Mamerow et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2016; Rolison et al., 2014). We also used the 
adjusted Dospert (Blais & Weber, 2006) by Rolison et al. (2019) and found no age 
differences in risk preference for financial risk-taking. This was the opposite of 
findings by Rolison et al. (2019), as older adults were less willing to take financial 
risk in their study. 
 Risk preference did not mediate the relationship between age and gamble 
acceptance. These findings were not as expected. However, these findings do add 
to a growing body of research that show a gap between self-reported risk preference 
and risk-taking on behavioural tasks when comparing older and younger adults’ 
tendency to take risks. In this study, some of the self-reported risk preference 
measures showed a similar direction to risk-taking on the task, with those reporting 
more risk-seeking also accepting more gambles. However, the General Risk 
Propensity Scale and the New Risk Scale were not related to risk-taking behaviour 
on the task, whereas the adjusted Dospert was. A reason for this might be due to the 
difference in domain between the three measures. The adjusted Dospert had only 
financial items, while the other two scales items more closely related to general risk, 
with more diverse statements or scenarios beyond financial risk. Despite the 
relationship between the adjusted Dospert and risk-taking on the task, older and 
younger adults did not differ in risk preference, while older adults did take more risk 
on the task. Why this is so may be explained by differences in risk comprehension 
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between younger and older adults. On the task, older adults correctly estimated 
gamble probabilities less often than younger adults in both task parts, but this 
difference was most pronounced on the complex task. In the complex task, 
participants had to calculate the probabilities themselves instead of counting the 
frequency of outcomes. When looking at the overall pattern of their estimations (see 
Figure 9), older adult estimations of win probability, when incorrect, were more likely 
to overestimate the chance to win, whereas loss probabilities were more likely to be 
underestimated. When looking at gamble acceptance on the complex task, older 
adults accepted more gambles than younger adults, effectively taking more risk. As 
such, it appears that misunderstanding of gamble probabilities, partially due to age 
differences in numerical ability, may explain why older adults reported being more 
risk averse than younger adults yet taking more risk on the task. Older adults’ self-
reported risk preference may not align with their task behaviour if there is a lack of 
comprehension of the risks involved, especially if the gamble’s expected value is 
overestimated (i.e. by overestimating win probability and underestimating loss 
probability). Older adults may take more risk despite reporting being risk averse, if 
they do not fully understand the risks associated with the gamble, and if the gamble 
appears more profitable compared to its actual value.   
         This study also had its limitations. We used multiple measures of risk 
preference but not all measures demonstrated excellent internal consistency. The 
reliability of the Adjusted Dospert was initially insufficient, and was increased after an 
item was removed, but remained only barely satisfactory. The reliability of most other 
measures was sufficient (apart from the General Risk Propensity Scale, which 
showed good internal consistency). As such, interpreting findings of these measures 
must be done critically. When choosing the best predictor, all measures of risk 
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preference and cognitive ability only had small to medium correlations to both 
outcome variables. Low, or non-existent, correlations between self-report measures 
appear common and indicate a problem when relating self-reported risk preference 
and performance on risk-taking tasks (Frey et al., 2017). In addition, due to an issue 
with the platform the self-report measures were conducted on, the self-report 
measures were not randomized. Lastly, in the simplified task part, participants were 
asked to count the number of coloured balls in the box for each outcome and report 
these. Due to its simplicity (designed to remove any cognitive strain), age differences 
were constricted due to a ceiling effect. Both groups were correct most of the time, 
with a small difference between groups. 
         To summarize, the study aimed to examine the role of cognitive ability and 
risk preference in age differences in risk-taking behaviour. We found that the 
relationship between age group and correct estimation of probability on the complex 
task was partially mediated by numerical ability, but not by risk preference. When 
assessing age differences in risk-taking, neither cognitive ability nor risk preference 
were significant mediators, across both tasks. This may be caused by a lower than 
required level in which cognition is required to complete the task, and due to the 
measurement gap between behavioural tasks and self-report measures. In 
conclusion, the study adds to a growing body of research on age difference in risk-
taking and provides further information on the complexities of relaying self-report 
measures and behavioural measures, as well as the role of cognitive ability in age 
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Aim. This study aimed to investigate age differences in risk-taking concerning the 
coronavirus pandemic, while disentangling the contribution of risk preference, 
objective risk, and numeracy. We tested i) whether older and younger adults differed 
in taking coronavirus-related health risks, ii) whether there are age differences in 
coronavirus risk, risk preference and numerical ability, and iii) whether these age 
differences are related to coronavirus risk-taking behaviour. Method. The study was 
observational, 469 participants reported their risk-taking behaviour measured as 
misalignment with government guidelines and advanced health measures. They also 
reported their risk perception, objective risk, risk preference towards health and 
safety risks, and their numerical ability using a numeracy scale. Results. Our 
findings show that age was significantly related to coronavirus risk-taking, with 
younger adults taking more risk, and that this was partly mediated by numeracy but 
not by objective risk or risk preference. Exploratory analyses suggest that there are 
differences between age groups in risk perception for self and others. Conclusion. 
Findings of this study may help us to better understand why age groups differ in their 
engagement concerning protective behaviours during a pandemic. This research 
contributes to the debate whether age differences in risk-taking occur due to decline 






 The new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19) is a highly infectious disease 
that causes acute respiratory syndrome and has reached most countries around the 
world. On January 30th, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the 
outbreak a public health emergency of international concern. According to European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the global number of deaths on 
September 22nd, 2020, stands at 1,155,235 deaths, of which 44,896 deaths have 
been recorded in the United Kingdom2. The UK government announced a nationwide 
lockdown on March 23rd, and a series of measures to prevent the spread of the 
virus. Staying indoors as much as possible, keeping others at a safe distance, 
exercising outdoors only once a day, and washing hands often with antibacterial 
soap were measures the public was asked to adhere to in order to prevent further 
spreading of the virus and protect the National Health Service. Since then, 
restrictions and lockdown measures have been loosened, but infections are on the 
rise again, and the highest daily cases since May were reported on Monday 21st of 
September 20203.   
 Adherence to the government-mandated preventive measures is believed to 
be critical to curb the spread of the infection but there are individual differences in 
the extent people apply these preventive measures. Some UK citizens have openly 
protested the compulsory use of face masks in shops and public transport, with 
similar protests on mask usage in other countries such as Germany and the United 
States. A survey conducted on UK citizens during the first week of lockdown found 
that 60% of respondents reported following government guidelines completely, and 
 
2 Since April 13th, 2021, the death toll stands at 2,936,916 deaths globally, of which 127,087 deaths 
in the UK (World Health Organisation, 2021). 
3 Since then, two further national lockdowns have been in place, as infections, hospitalizations and 
deaths have continued to increase (when restrictions are loosened). 
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6% reported following guidelines only half the time or less (“Life under lockdown: 
coronavirus in the UK”, 2020). Subsequently, a survey by University College London 
(Covid-19 Social Study, 2020), which includes cross-sectional data from over 10 
weeks, showed that guideline adherence in their sample had decreased from 70% at 
the start of the survey to 50% at the end of May. However, this decline differed 
between age groups: while more than 6 out of 10 older adults reported following 
government guidelines entirely, only 4 out of 10 younger adults said to do the same. 
In studies on behaviour during prior epidemics, researchers found similar results; 
younger adults reported following guidelines less as well as perceiving less risk 
compared to their older counterparts, during the SARS epidemic in Canada in 2003 
(Blendon et al., 2004). Additionally, a study on the 2009 influenza epidemic in The 
Netherlands found that older age was associated with higher intention to adopt 
protective measures (van der Weerd et al., 2011). Since not adhering to guidelines 
exposes the individual, as well as others, to risk, this behaviour can be considered a 
form of health-related risk-taking. 
 It is important to replicate and understand the nature of these age differences 
for theoretical and practical reasons. Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, 
investigating the contribution of risk perception, risk preference and numerical ability 
to age differences in risk-taking adds to a growing body of work on older age and 
risky decision-making. Older adults are generally considered to be more careful, 
especially when it comes to their health and safety. However, prior research on age 
differences and risk-taking has already shown that age-related risk-taking is highly 
dependent on context, such as framing, learning components, and whether materials 
are description- or experience-based (Frey et al., 2017; Liebherr et al., 2017; Mata et 
al., 2011). The current study adds to the existing research as it measures age 
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differences concerning real-life risk during an unprecedented situation in our lifetime. 
Secondly, there are practical reasons to investigate age differences in risk-taking. 
With recent spikes in infections and the possibility of a second wave, it is vital to 
understand what factors play a role in guideline adherence. These findings could 
benefit risk communication during the remainder of the pandemic as well as after, as 
it highlights what areas communication should focus on. For instance, if low 
numerical ability is associated with lower guideline adherence, risk communication 
could be improved by limiting the use of large, complicated numbers or figures. In 
addition, if younger adults report a lower likelihood of following government 
guidelines, communication about the virus can be tailored and sent through channels 
more specific to that age group to convey the risk of coronavirus more clearly. 
 We considered four factors, known to differ between older and younger 
adults, that could account for the observed differences in risk taking between these 
age groups: objective risk for COVID-19 complications, risk perception, risk 
preference and numerical ability. 
 Since the start of the outbreak in December 2019, there have been over 40 
million coronavirus infections, and over a million people worldwide have died4. To 
understand the workings of the virus, and identify who is most vulnerable, possible 
risk factors to COVID-19 are being investigated. Studies on patients with coronavirus 
in China, where the virus was first reported, report a multitude of risk factors. A meta-
analysis by Wang et al. (2020) found that patients with comorbidities such as 
cardiovascular disease, hypertension, diabetes, and chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD) were more likely to experience severe illness as a result of 
 




coronavirus infection. These findings are further supported by Zheng et al. (2020), 
who also found that respiratory illness was common among those with severe 
illness, and those who had died as a result of COVID-19. Studies on populations 
outside China found similar results, reporting that diabetes (Atkins et al., 2020; 
Grasselli et al., 2020; Tenforde et al., 2020; Williamson et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2020), 
cardiovascular disease (Sousa et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2020), and COPD (Atkins et 
al., 2020; Grasselli et al., 2020; Sousa et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2020) were risk factors 
for severe coronavirus complications. 
 In addition to comorbidities, several personal characteristics have been found 
to increase the chance of coronavirus complications. For example, men have a 
higher chance of experiencing severe symptoms or dying as a result of coronavirus 
than women (Atkins et al., 2020; Grasselli et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2020; Zheng et al., 
2020). Ethnicity has also been found to impact the likelihood of complications (Atkins 
et al., 2020; Tenforde et al., 2020; Williamson et al., 2020). Price-Haywood et al. 
(2020) found that most patients who were hospitalized (76.9%) or died (70.6%) due 
to coronavirus complications were Black, despite only making up a little over a third 
of the study’s Louisiana cohort. However, older age appears to be one of the largest 
risk factors of coronavirus complications and mortality (Atkins et al., 2020; Grasselli 
et al., 2020; Price-Haywood et al., 2020; Sousa et al., 2020; Tenforde et al., 2020; 
Williamson et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2020; Zheng et al., 2020), with one study reporting 
people aged 80 or over having a more than 20-fold-increased risk compared to 50–
59-year-olds (Williamson et al., 2020). Those most likely to die from coronavirus are 
those of older age, especially if they are male and have comorbidities (Zheng et al., 
2020).  
In the months since the outbreak of the virus, it has been well-documented that the 
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majority of younger adults experience mild symptoms, with only a small proportion 
needing hospitalization or having died as a result of coronavirus. However, older 
adults (aged 65 and older) make up the majority of hospitalizations and mortalities. 
This distinct difference in risk between age groups may (at least in part) explain 
differences in the adoption of preventive behaviours. It may be that younger adults 
are less inclined to adopt preventive behaviours as their chance of hospitalization or 
mortality are much lower than those of older adults.  
 In addition to objective risk, we also explored people’s subjective perception 
of their risk. While objective risk is an indicator of how likely a negative outcome is to 
occur, people’s perception of their risk can differ from their actual risk. An example of 
such dissonance was found by Katapodi et al. (2004) in their meta-analysis, in which 
younger women reported higher risk perception of breast cancer than older women, 
despite older age being an established risk factor for breast cancer. In the context of 
the current pandemic, risk perception may play a role in the adopting of preventative 
behaviours. Someone could view their risk of coronavirus as high, which then 
increases their likelihood to adhere to guidelines and minimize their chances of 
contracting the virus, despite their low objective risk. A recent study by Bruine de 
Bruin & Bennett (2020) found that those who perceived higher risks concerning 
coronavirus were more likely to adopt protective behaviours. These findings are 
similar to those of prior pandemics; van der Weert (2011) reported that only risk 
perception was associated with the intent to adopt protective measures during the 
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in the Netherlands. 
 Risk perception may also explain differences in health behaviours between 
age groups. Prior research shows that older adults perceived more risk and were 
more cautious than younger adults concerning health-related activities as well as 
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ethical activities (Bonem et al., 2015), and that self-reported risk perception in social, 
financial, and recreational domains increased with age (Rolison, 2019). A study on 
differences in COVID-19 risk perceptions by Bruine de Bruin (2020) found that older 
adults reported perceiving more risk of mortality if infected with COVID-19 but 
reported seeing less risk in getting infected or quarantined. These findings 
demonstrate the effect of people’s subjective perception of risk on risk-taking 
behaviours, regardless of their objective risk. As such, this study will also examine 
people’s perspective of their risk, in addition to objective risk, using exploratory 
analyses to do so. 
 Second, individual preferences towards risk can account for the age 
differences in risk-taking: people become more risk averse as they age. Risk 
preference can be defined as the degree to which an individual appears to avoid or 
seek out risky options or behaviours (Weber et al., 2002). Risk preference goes 
beyond merely risk-taking, which is the likelihood of engaging in risky behaviour, as it 
incorporates other factors such as the person’s perception of risk as well as 
perceived benefit of the risky activity, and describes a more general disposition 
towards risk. Although one can have an overall risk preference, indicating that an 
individual is generally more or less comfortable with risk, there is evidence that risk 
preference also differs across domains such as health, social, and recreational risk 
(Josef et al., 2016; Rolison et al., 2014). Though risk preference is considered a 
stable psychological trait, it may change over time. Past studies have investigated 
the differences between younger and older adults in terms of risk perception, risk 
preference and risk-taking behaviour by means of self-reports or through risk-taking 
in an experimental lab setting. There is evidence that people become more risk 
averse as they age (Dohmen et al., 2017; Josef et al., 2016), though people’s 
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feelings towards risk may vary according to domain. Rolison et al. (2014) found that 
younger adults reported being more likely to take risks in the social domain, as well 
as health and safety, compared to older adults. Older adults were found to be more 
risk avoidant concerning health risks; they reported being less likely to undertake a 
health or safety risk, saw less benefit in these risks and reported higher risk 
perception than younger adults. These differences across domains are supported by 
Josef et al. (2016), who reported declines in financial, driving, health, social and 
recreational risk-taking in older age, with differing rates of decline. As following 
guidelines is key to preventing the spread of the virus, risk preferences could provide 
more information on why people differ in how strict they adhere to guidelines. It may 
be that those who choose not to follow guidelines completely, whether in part or not 
at all, have risk-seeking preferences concerning health. These individual differences 
in behaviour towards coronavirus may be (partly) explained by underlying, more 
stable personality traits concerning risk-taking. 
 Third, people’s numerical ability may explain the age differences in risk-taking. 
At its core, numeracy encompasses the ability to do simple arithmetic operations and 
compare numerical quantities. However, higher numerical abilities also include 
logical and quantitative reasoning, and understanding concepts such as fractions, 
percentages, probabilities and proportions (Reyna et al., 2009). Those with lower 
numerical ability have been found to experience difficulties in judging risks, reading 
graphs, and are more sensitive to framing effects (Peters, 2012; Reyna et al., 2009; 
Weller et al., 2013). When examining the role of numeracy within the context of 
health-related risk, Petrova et al. (2017) found that the effect of numeracy was a 
unique predictor to longer decision delays (i.e. time between symptom onset to 
decision to seek medical care), leading to significant increase in risk for death and 
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serious disability. Participants with low numerical ability were four times more likely 
to delay critically needed medical treatment. Leiter et al. (2018) found that those with 
low numeracy skills made worse patient prognostic estimates (participants were 
given case studies), as well as selecting treatments ill-fitting with patient prognosis 
(e.g. selecting an aggressive treatment for a 90-year old man with 0% chance of 
survival or functional independence). Yamashita et al. (2018) investigated numeracy 
and preventative health behaviours and found that low numerical ability was 
associated with lower likelihood of dental check-ups in older adults. Additionally, 
Peters et al. (2014) found that lower numerical ability was associated with a lower 
willingness to take medication (participants were asked to calculate the likelihood of 
severe side effects prior to this, with information provided to them). 
 At this time, daily counts of infections and deaths are given in newspapers 
and official briefings to inform the public how the virus is spreading and the progress 
of containment. However, simply providing numbers does not equate to 
understanding. A recent survey among UK citizens found that more than half of the 
working-age population has the numeracy level expected of a primary school child 
(Ipsos Mori, 2019). In the past months, news websites and TV programs have been 
providing support in understanding what these numbers mean. In BBC’s Coronavirus 
Special (Thomas, 2020), numbers and graphs were explained to the public, as well 
as other news outlets publishing articles explaining what the coronavirus numbers 
mean and how to interpret them (Blauw, 2020; “COVID-19: Making sense of all the 
numbers”, 2020; Sanderson et al., 2020). The ability to comprehend these numbers 
and apply them to calculate a useful statistic may influence people’s willingness to 
take risks. Some may find these numbers confusing or difficult and may make 
miscalculations, which may cause misconception about the virus’ severity, and may 
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influence behaviour towards limiting the spread of the virus. However, this may vary 
between age groups. Current findings on age differences in numerical ability differ; 
some research has found no age differences in numeracy (Bruine de Bruin et al., 
2017; Eberhardt et al., 2019; Weller et al., 2013), while others have found that older 
age was associated with higher numerical abilities (Ipsos Mori, 2019), or the 
opposite (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2015; Delazer; 2013; Weller et al., 2013). As 
numbers and graphs have been an integral part of risk communication during the 
pandemic, it may prove vital to understand how people’s numerical ability influences 
their health behaviours during this time. 
4.2.1 The present research 
 As older adults are considered one of the groups most at risk for coronavirus, 
while younger adults are generally considered to be most risk-taking, it is important 
to understand how these two age groups differ in their approach to the current 
pandemic. These differences, if present, may stem from a contrast in risk of for 
coronavirus complications, their underlying preference towards risk, or their ability to 
process and transform the numerical information given to them. So far, surveys and 
studies have been conducted to explore how people have behaved during the 
pandemic, and how much they have stuck to guidelines. However, no study has 
investigated what underlying, more stable factors such as risk preference or 
numerical ability may explain age differences in health behaviours during the 
pandemic. 
 This study aimed to investigate how age differences in health-related risk-
taking during the COVID-19 pandemic are related to objective risk, risk preference 
and numerical ability (see Figure 20). This has been addressed by use of an online 
survey that included items on people’s behaviour concerning guidelines, their 
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(objective) risk of severe consequences of COVID-19 infection, and questionnaires 
on risk preference and numeracy. We hypothesized the following outcomes: 
 H1: age. Older adults would report following guidelines more often than 
younger adults, which is reflected in a higher mean in guideline adherence. 
 H1: objective risk. Those at higher risk of coronavirus complications would be 
more likely to adhere to COVID-19 guidelines and implement health measures. 
 H1: risk preference. Those who are more risk averse towards health-related 
risk would be more likely to adhere to COVID-19 guidelines and implement health 
measures compared to those who are risk-seeking. 
 H1: numeracy. Those with higher numerical ability would be more likely to 
adhere to COVID-19 guidelines and implement health measures compared to those 
with lower numerical ability. 
 If H1: age was not confirmed, none of the H2 below would be tested, and we 
would continue continue with exploratory analyses instead. To test any H2, H1: age 
and any H1 matching the H2 had to be confirmed. For example, to test whether the 
effect of age on COVID-19 risk-taking is mediated by objective risk, both H1: age 
and H1: objective risk had to be confirmed to continue with H2: objective risk, as 
those hypotheses concern the relationship between these two variables and COVID-
19 risk-taking.  
 H2: objective risk. COVID-19 objective risk would mediate the relationship 
between age and COVID risk-taking. Older adults would be at higher risk than 
younger adults, which in turn would lead them to take less risk than younger adults. 
 H2: risk preference. Risk preference would mediate the relationship between 
age and COVID-19 risk-taking. Older adults would report being more risk-averse 
towards health risks than younger adults and would take less risk relating to COVID-
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19 due to this. 
 H2: numeracy. Numeracy would mediate the relationship between age and 
COVID-19 risk-taking. Older adults having lower numerical ability than younger 











 We conducted an a-priori power analysis using a simulation-based approach5. 
The direct effect of age group on risk-taking was set to -0.3, with the effects of age 
group on risk preference and numeracy also set to -0.3, and the effect of age group 
on objective risk set to 0.3. These three variables (risk preference, numeracy, and 
objective risk) were assumed to have an effect on risk-taking of 0.3 with the effects 
of objective risk and numeracy in the opposite direction to that of risk preference 
(i.e., y = 0.3 x risk preference - 0.3 x objective risk - 0.3 x numeracy). This allowed us 
to repeatedly simulate a dataset (500 times) for various sample sizes, for us to carry 
out the planned analysis. Based on these assumptions, and with α = .05 and 1- β = 
.95, a sample size of N=400 should suffice to verify all hypotheses.  
 Participants consisted of two age groups; the younger adults were aged 
between 18-35 years, and the older adult group were aged 65 years or older. Groups 
were of equal size, with a target n = 200 for each group. Participant recruitment was 
done via Prolific Academic, with participants being paid £1.42 for taking part, with an 
hourly rate of £5.01 per hour, upon completion of the study. Only participants who i) 
resided in England, ii) fit the age criteria (aged between 18 - 35 years and aged 65 
years or older), and iii) had an approval rate of 90% were eligible to take part. We 
expected a 20% dropout rate (i.e. participants who have more than one measure 
incomplete. Therefore, we collected data from 480 participants (target n = 400, the 
expected dropout rate of 20% is equal to 80 participants) to obtain the analytical 
sample of n = 400.  
 
5 Materials relating to this paper, including the power analysis, can be accessed via the Open Science 
Framework, at https://osf.io/n5y8p/  
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4.3.2 Materials and procedure 
 The materials included in the survey were given in a random order and were 
randomized within materials as well as between. All participants were given the 
same materials. The survey did not allow participants to skip items, and one item 
designed as an attention check was also included. All variables included in the study 
can be found in Table 5. Materials can be found in the appendix or accessed via 
https://osf.io/n5y8p/ 
Table 5 
Variables included in study 






















 Participants were given a link to the survey via Prolific. In the study 
description, participants were told the general aim of the study and its prerequisites. 
Participants were told that they were not eligible to take part if they have been 
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diagnosed with coronavirus. Those confirmed to have, or have had, coronavirus may 
approach the risks differently as it is widely assumed that antibodies will be present 
after recovery (for a period of time), and those cannot be infected again, or infect 
others. For this reason, people who have been confirmed to have (had) coronavirus 
were not included in the study. Participants were also not able to take part if they 
have been officially diagnosed with cognitive impairment, which was also 
communicated in the study description. 
 At the start of the survey, participants were given an information sheet with 
the details of the study, as well as a consent form. After providing consent, 
participants provided demographic information about themselves, including the 
county they reside in, education level, type of employment and annual household 
income. They also answered whether they believe they have, or have had, 
coronavirus, and if they have been officially diagnosed with cognitive impairment. 
These two items were included as screening items, in case participants did not read 
the study description on Prolific clearly. If participants answered yes to either of 
these, they were excluded from the analysis. 
 Following the demographic items, participants completed the Objective risk 
stratification tool (Jankowski et al., 2020) to estimate their objective risk for COVID-
19 complications. The measure is an existing risk assessment measure, designed 
for workplace assessment of healthcare workers. The items concern established risk 
factors for COVID-19, such as ethnicity, age, diabetes, pulmonary illness and 
cardiovascular disease. Answers to items may differ in the weight of their scoring, 
depending on the severity of the outlined illness. For instance, having diabetes type 
1 or 2 without complications is scored as 1, while diabetes type 1 or 2 with 
complications (i.e. acute or chronic health problems, such as eye, foot and kidney 
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problems) results in a score of 2, as diabetes complications increase the risk of 
severe disadvantageous outcomes of COVID-19 infection. Participants’ total score is 
the sum of weights across all items, with higher scores indicating higher risk of 
severe complications resulting from COVID-19 infection.  
 Participants then completed 10 items concerning their behaviour in the current 
pandemic (e.g. “Thoroughly cleaning my hands with hand sanitiser”). Six of the items 
reflect current government guidelines, such as wearing a mask on public transport 
and frequent handwashing, and four items concern common recommendations such 
as utilizing contact-free deliveries (Coronavirus (COVID-19): Accessing food and 
essential supplies, 2020), not touching your face with unwashed hands and the use 
of hand sanitizer (Social distancing: what you need to do, 2020). Though these 
recommendations are not part of official guidelines, the government has often 
communicated their importance to the public, as they help prevent infection of 
coronavirus. Participants were instructed, “The next set of questions will present a 
number of activities and behaviours. You will be asked to report how often you have 
engaged in these behaviours in the last 2 weeks. Your answers will be fully 
anonymous, so please answer honestly.”. They were then asked to rate how often 
they engaged in the outlined behaviours on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 
(1 = Never, 2 = Mostly not, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Mostly yes, 5 = Always). The option 
“not applicable” is also included. Participants’ risk-taking score is the arithmetic mean 
across all items, with scores near 5 indicating higher levels of risk-taking. As this is a 
novel measure, and has been designed for this study, we established its reliability 
using Cronbach’s alpha. If we find that the reliability is unsatisfactory (a Cronbach’s 
alpha below 0.7), we will remove items in iterative ways until we reach satisfactory 




 Participants then expressed their perception of COVID-19 risk by completing 
the COVID-19 Risk Perception Scale (Dryhurst et al., 2020). This 6-item scale is 
measured as an index, covering affective, cognitive, and temporal-spatial 
dimensions to provide a holistic measure of risk perception. The COVID-19 Risk 
Perception Scale includes items concerning participants’ perceived seriousness of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, perceived likelihood of contracting the virus themselves 
over the next 6 months, perceived likelihood of their family and friends catching the 
virus, and their present level of worry about the virus. Three of the six items are 
measured on a 5-point Likert Scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree), the 
other 3 items are measured on a 7-point Likert Scale (2 items: 1 = not at all likely, 7 
= very likely, and 1 item: 1 = not at all worried, 7 = very worried). The pooled 
Cronbach’s alpha across countries was α = .72, the alpha for the United Kingdom 
sample was α = .80. Participants’ risk perception  is calculated by transforming the 
arithmetic mean for the 6 items to a value on a scale from 0 to 1, where higher 
scores nearest to 1 indicate higher risk perception. 
 Participants’ risk preference was measured by the 30-item Dospert (Blais & 
Weber, 2006). This version is shorter than the original Dospert (Weber et al., 2002), 
and applicable to a broader range of ages, cultures, and educational levels. 
Participants responded to six items concerning health and safety (e.g. “Driving a car 
without a seatbelt”), with identical items for each of the three subscales of the 
questionnaire (i.e. likelihood, expected benefits, and risk perceptions). In the 
Likelihood scale, participants rated the likelihood that they would engage in the given 
behaviours on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 to 7 (1 = Extremely unlikely, 7 = 
Extremely likely). In the Benefit scale, participants rated the benefits that they 
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perceived in the outlined behaviours on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 to 7 (1 = 
No benefits at all, 7 = Great benefits). On the third scale, Risk Perception, 
participants rated the risk they perceived in undertaking the outlined behaviours on a 
seven-point Likert scale from 1 to 7 (1 = Not at all risky, 7 = Extremely risky). The 
internal consistency estimates (i.e., Cronbach’s alphas) associated with the 30- item 
Dospert risk-taking scale ranged from α = .71 to α = .86, and those associated with 
the risk-perception scale, from α =.74 to α = .83 (Blais & Weber, 2006). Participants’ 
scores on the risk preference questionnaire were calculated by means of regressing 
the subscales Risk Benefit and Risk Perception on Likelihood for each participant, 
using corresponding scores from each item which provided a (positive or negative) 
coefficient for each participant, in line with the recommended approach on the 
Dospert scoring sheet.  
 Participants’ numerical ability was measured by the Objective Numeracy 
Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001). Participants were given 11 items for which they were 
required to calculate the answer to a mathematical problem (e.g. “Imagine that we 
rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you 
think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?”). Participants were instructed “You 
will be shown 11 numerical questions. Each question will require you to calculate 
your answer. Each question has a few words in front of the answer line to indicate 
what type of answer is required. You may not use a calculator or any other means of 
help, except paper and pen for calculations (if needed)”. The reliability of the 
Objective Numeracy Scale, including the additional 3 items by Schwartz et al. 
(1997), was found by Lipkus et al. (2001) to be α = 0.78. Weller et al. (2013) reported 
a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .76, and Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) found a 
Cronbach’s alpha of α = .72. Participants’ numerical ability score consists of the sum 
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of correct items, ranging from 0 to 11, with scores close to 11 indicating higher 
numerical ability. 
  Lastly, participants were given two items on trust in the UK government’s 
policies on coronavirus and how often they checked numbers on coronavirus deaths. 
These items are descriptive variables and were not included in the planned 
analyses.  
4.3.3 Data processing 
         Participant data was eliminated if they answered “yes” to one or more 
screening questions at the beginning of the survey (i.e. if participants have been 
diagnosed with coronavirus or cognitive impairment). Additionally, participants who 
answered the attention check incorrectly were also excluded. Missing data was 
treated as follows: if a small number of items (i.e. maximum of 2 items) within a 
measure had not been completed, the participant’s score was calculated over the 
remaining items (i.e. instead of an average over 8 items, it would be an average over 
6 items). If more than 2 items of a specific measure had not been completed the 
measure was not included. If more than one measure was incomplete, the 
participant’s data was removed entirely. Reliability of the scales used in the study 
was measured using Cronbach’s alpha. If the reliability was unsatisfactory (an alpha 
below 0.7), we removed the items in iterative ways until we reached satisfactory 
reliability, or we used a single item instead (the item that is shown to be the best 
indicator of this measure). 
4.3.4 Planned analysis 
         We planned to conduct regression analyses as part of a multiple mediation 
analysis. For the primary hypotheses (H1) we used four simple linear regressions 
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with COVID-19 risk-taking as the dependent variable, and age group, COVID-19 
objective risk, risk preference and numeracy as predictors. If there was no effect of 
age group in the primary hypothesis (H1: age), we would stop the planned analysis 
and run exploratory analyses instead. If any of those primary hypotheses were 
confirmed, together with age (i.e. we established a direct relationship or a 
relationship between mediator and dependent variable) we continued analyses to 
establish the required relationship between age and mediators (risk preference, 
objective risk and numeracy), to then test the outlined H2 hypotheses in a multiple 
mediation model. 
4.3.5 Exploratory analyses 
         The overall expectation was that younger and older adults differed in their 
risk-taking, and that this could be explained by age-related differences in objective 
risk, risk preference and numerical ability. However, as age differences were an 
important part of our hypotheses, we proposed exploratory analyses if no age 
differences were found. We were also interested in further exploring why people 
differ in their COVID-19 risk-taking and explored the relationship between risk-taking 
and other possible factors, including additional mediation analyses. One analysis 
assessed the relationship between age and risk-taking, using people’s perception of 
their risk as a mediator. We then further explored this relationship using risk 
perception for self and for others as mediators. Another analysis applied a mediation 







 We recruited 489 participants, out of which 20 did not fulfil the pre-registered 
inclusion criteria (7 participants had incomplete responses, 3 participants reported 
mild cognitive impairment, 6 participants had received a confirmation of coronavirus 
infection, 2 participants failed the attention check, and 2 participants reported an age 
outside of the set limits for younger and older adult age groups. Some participants 
failed multiple exclusion criteria; they are only counted in their initial exclusion 
criteria). The final analytical sample was 469 and consisted of 232 younger adults 
(49.6% identified as female, M younger = 26.52, SD = 5.16 years), and 237 older adults 
(49.8% identified as female, M older = 69.38, SD = 3.85 years). In the younger adult 
group, the majority listed a University undergraduate degree as their highest 
completed education (39.6%; followed by A-levels, 30%), that they were employed 
full time (49.6%; followed by student, 25.4%), and had a household income of 
£30.001 to £50.000 (33.6%; followed by £10.001 to £30.000, 27.6% ). Most younger 
adults reported that they had not been infected with COVID-19 (56%; followed by 
“I’m not sure, but I don’t think so”, 26.7%). In the older adult group, the majority also 
listed a University undergraduate as their highest completed education (29.5%; 
followed by both secondary school and A-levels, 25.7%), that they were currently 
retired (78.1%; followed by employed part-time, 10.1%), and reported a household 
income of £10.001 to £30.000 (43.8%; followed by £30.001 to £50.000, 31.6%). Most 
older adults also reported that they had not been infected with COVID-19 (79.7%; 





 To assess the reliability of the self-report measures, Cronbach’s alphas were 
computed using the ltm package (version 1.1-1), and item total correlations were 
computed using the multilevel package (version 2.6). To choose the best predictors 
of risk preference and cognitive ability, zero-order correlations were run using the 
ggcorrplot package (version 0.1.3). For the mediation analyses, we used simple 
linear regressions to establish relationships between variables and used the mediate 
function from the Psych package (version 2.0.12) to run the mediation analyses. 
Each mediation model was run using a bootstrapping approach, with indirect effects 
computed for 500 bootstrapped samples.  
4.4.3 Composite variables 
Objective risk 
  We measured objective risk by means of a series of health questions, with 
values given in accordance to the severity of the condition’s contribution to COVID-
19 risk. No changes to the planned approach were made.  
Risk preference 
 The reliability of the risk preference scale was a Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.72 
(across all subscales), indicating sufficient reliability. Risk preference scores were 
calculated in line with the provided scoring manual, in which the effect of risk 
perception and benefit were used to predict likelihood using linear regression. Risk 
preference is then defined as the regression coefficient for risk perception in this 
model. A negative coefficient indicates a risk averse preference, whereas a positive 
coefficient indicates a risk seeking preference, with a larger value (both positive or 




 We planned to sum the number of correct answers to 11 numerical problems 
However, the scale’s reliability was not sufficient, Cronbach’s alpha of α = 0.68. As 
this was below our stated cut-off, we first removed items in iterative ways, which did 
not improve the reliability of the scale. We then used an item-total correlation test to 
establish which of the 11 items was the best suited item of the scale. The third item 
of the scale correlated most highly with the total score and has been used as an 
indicator of numeracy for the planned analysis.  
Risk-taking 
 The scale’s reliability was satisfactory, with an alpha of α = 0.73. As such, 
risk-taking was measured as planned, through 10 items on preventative behaviours 
related to COVID-19.  
4.4.4 Deviation from preregistration 
 Our Stage 1 registered report with preregistered hypotheses and methods can 
be found at https://osf.io/n5y8p/. Here, we report three minor deviations from our 




Overview of deviations from preregistration in attention checks, COVID-19 risk-taking 
and objective risk. 




We preregistered 2 attention checks in 
the study. Unfortunately, one of the 
attention checks was accidentally 
removed (as it was included with a 
replaced measure) in the last revision 
round.  
 
COVID-19 risk-taking We originally included the item “meeting 
in groups larger than 6 people” but 
changed this to “meeting indoors with 
people who are not in your household or 
bubble”, due to the second lockdown in 
November 2020. This change was 
approved by the editor on November 
10th, 2020.  
 
Objective risk The objective measure of risk required 
to ask about participants sex at birth. 
However, our item measured their 
gender. To mitigate this confusion, we 
cross-checked our measured variable 
with our set requirements for 
participation in the Prolific Academic 





4.4.5 Confirmatory tests of hypotheses 
Age differences in COVID-19 risk-taking (Hypothesis 1a) 
 We hypothesized that older adults would be less inclined to take risks than 
younger adults. Overall, we observed that our participants were not risk-taking, since 
their mean score was close to the lowest possible value of 1 (see Table 7). 
Nevertheless, we observed that younger people reported that they took more risks 
than older adults (see Table 7). Examining the differences at the individual item 
level, we can see that these were notable for each item with the exception of two 
items with flooring effects (masks wearing in the shops and public transport) and 
touching the face item (see Figure 21). To test our hypothesis, we used a simple 
linear regression, which revealed that age group significantly negatively predicted 
risk-taking, B = -0.17, t(467)= -3.77, p < .001. Thus, we confirmed our hypothesis 
that older adults took less risk than younger adults. 
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics on risk-taking, objective risk and risk-preference in younger and 
older adults. 
Measures Mean and standard deviation 
 Overall Younger adults Older adults 
COVID-19 risk-taking 1.92(0.49) 2.01 (0.51) 1.84 (0.46) 
Objective risk 2.54 (2.05) 1.04 (0.94) 4.00 (1.76) 





Figure 21. The distribution of all 10 items of the COVID-19 risk-taking scale, with 
separate distributions for older and younger adults. 
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Objective risk and risk-taking (Hypothesis 1b) 
 We hypothesized that participants with higher scores in objective risk of 
experiencing severe illness would be less likely to take coronavirus-related risk than 
those with lower objective risk. As expected, the mean objective risk was lower for 
younger adults than older adults (see Table 7). Objective risk was correlated most 
highly with age group, other correlations were of negligible effect size (see Table 8). 
To test our hypothesis, we used a simple linear regression, which revealed that 
objective risk significantly negatively predicted risk-taking, B = -0.03, t(467) = -2.36, p 
= .019. Thus, we confirmed our hypothesis that those with higher objective risk took 
less risky behaviour than those with lower objective risk.  
Table 8. Zero-order correlations between COVID19 risk-taking, age group, objective 
risk, numeracy, and risk preference. 




     
      
2. Age group r = -0.17     
 p < .001     
3. Objective risk r = -0.1 r = 0.72    
 p = .019 p < .001    
4. Risk preference  r = -0.01 r = 0.05 r = 0.05   
 p = .864 p = .284 p = .331   
5. Numeracy r = 0.21 r = -0.13 r = -0.05 r = -0.05  
 p < .001 p = .007 p = .382 p = .268  
Note. N = 469; all correlations are Pearson product-moment correlations, except of 
the point-biserial correlations with numeracy. 
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Risk preference and risk-taking (Hypothesis 1c) 
 We hypothesized that those reporting a risk-seeking preference towards 
health and safety risk would be more likely to take coronavirus-related risk, versus a 
person with a risk averse preference towards health and safety risk. Overall, we 
observed that both younger and older adults reported being relatively risk-averse, as 
both group means were negative (see Table 7). Correlations of risk preference with 
other variables were very small (see Table 8). To test our hypothesis, we used a 
simple linear regression, which showed that risk preference did not significantly 
predict risk-taking, B = -0.01, t(439) = -0.17, p = .865. Thus, we disconfirmed our 
hypothesis about the positive relationship between risk-seeking preference and risk-
taking.  
Numeracy and risk-taking (Hypothesis 1d) 
 We hypothesized that those with lower numerical ability would be more likely 
to take coronavirus-related risk. Most participants answered the item correctly, with 
62% of participants having given the correct answer. Younger adults were correct 
more often, with 69% compared to 57% of older adults. There was a small 
correlation between the numeracy item and risk-taking, other correlations were of 
minor size (see Table 8). To test our hypothesis, we used a simple linear regression, 
which showed that numeracy positively predicted risk-taking, B = 0.22, t(467) = 4.69, 
p < .001. Participants with higher numerical abilities reported taking more risk (i.e. 
adopting fewer preventative measures) than those with lower numerical abilities (see 
Figure 22). The findings did not confirm our hypothesis, as we expected a significant 
relationship between numeracy and risk-taking but in the opposite direction. For 
better comparison with the results of other literature, we ran identical analysis with 
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the full 11-item scale. We found that the analysis yielded a similar outcome for this 
hypothesis, B = 0.05, t(467) = 4.26, p < .001. 
 
Figure 22. The relationships between COVID-19 risk-taking and age group, 
objective risk, risk preference, and numeracy.  
Note. Both the distribution of age group and numeracy are displayed as box plots as 
these are dichotomous variables. Each boxplot has a line indicating the median risk-
taking score, and a diamond shape representing the mean risk-taking score for that 
age group, or numeracy response. Objective risk and risk preference are displayed 
as scatterplots, with risk-taking on the y axis, and objective risk or risk preference 
scores on the x axis. Each scatterplot also includes a regression line indicating the 




Age differences in objective risk and risk-taking (Hypothesis 2a) 
 We hypothesized that older people would be at higher risk of coronavirus 
complications, resulting in older adults taking less coronavirus related risk than 
younger adults. The mean objective risk was lower for younger adults than older 
adults (see Table 7). We first tested our hypothesis of a relationship between age 
group and objective risk, using linear regression, which revealed that age group 
significantly predicted objective risk, B = 2.95, t(467) = 22.50, p < .001. We then 
tested whether the relationship between age group and risk-taking was mediated by 
objective risk through multiple linear regression, which also included numeracy as a 
mediator (Hypothesis 2c). The results showed that objective risk no longer 
significantly predicted risk-taking. We tested the significance of this indirect effect 
using a mediation model with objective risk and numeracy as mediators (see Figure 
23). The results of the analysis indicated that the indirect effect of age group on 
coronavirus risk-taking through objective risk was not significant, thus not confirming 





Figure 23. Mediation analysis on COVID-19 risk-taking, with age group as 
independent variable, objective risk and numeracy as mediators.  
Note. The a path coefficient from independent variable to mediator, b path coefficient 
from mediator to dependent variable, ab path coefficient from independent variable 
to dependent variable via mediator (indirect effect), c’ path coefficient from 
independent variable to dependent variable (direct effect), c path coefficient from 
independent variable to dependent variable (total effect). The reported confidence 
intervals represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
Age differences in numeracy and risk-taking (Hypothesis 2c) 
 We hypothesized that numeracy would mediate the relationship between age 
and COVID-19 risk-taking, expecting lower numerical ability in older adults. To test 
whether there were age differences in numeracy, we used a simple linear 
regression, which revealed that older age significantly negatively predicted 
numeracy, B = -0.12, t(467) = -2.70, p = .007. We then tested our hypothesis that 
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numeracy would mediate the relationship between age group and risk-taking by 
using a multiple linear regression, which showed that numeracy significantly 
predicted risk-taking. We then tested the significance of this indirect effect using a 
mediation model with objective risk and numeracy as mediators (see Figure 23). The 
analysis demonstrated a significant indirect effect of age group on coronavirus risk-
taking through numeracy, ab numeracy = -0.02, 95% CI[-0.05, -0.01], indicating partial 
mediation. The findings confirmed our hypothesis.  
 Again, for better comparison with the literature, we also re-ran the same 
analyses with the full 11-item scale. We found no age difference in numeracy, nor 
did numeracy mediate the relationship between age group and coronavirus risk-
taking in the mediation model. 
4.3.6 Exploratory analyses 
 In this section, we conducted three sets of exploratory analyses that were not 
listed as in the planned analysis. First, we focused on subjective risk perception. We 
were interested in how risk perception is linked with the adoption of preventative 
measures, and whether this differed between age groups, numerical ability, and 
types of risk perception (i.e. for self and others). Second, we explored the role of the 
measured variables played in predicting two types of COVID-19 risk-taking 
indicators: enforced and unenforced indicators. Some indicators of risk-taking were 
enforced (i.e. fines or warnings were given to citizens for failing to adhere to 
preventative behaviours), such as meeting indoors and wearing a facemask, while 
others were merely recommended such as using hand sanitizer. Third, we included 
two questions on whether people often checked COVID-19 numbers, such as 
hospitalizations and deaths, and whether they were dissatisfied with the UK 
government’s coronavirus approach.  
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Mediation model with numeracy and risk-taking, with risk perception as a 
mediator. 
 First, COVID risk-taking was regressed on numeracy and risk perception 
separately, using a simple linear regression for both. Numeracy was found to 
positively predict risk-taking, B = 0.22, t(467) = 4.69,  p < .001, while higher risk 
perception led to less risk-taking, B = -1.10, t(467) = -9.18, p < .001. Using a simple 
linear regression, risk perception was then regressed on numeracy. Results showed 
that numeracy did not significantly predict risk perception, B = -0.00, t(467) = -0.21, p 
= .84. The mediation model with numeracy, risk-taking, and risk perception did not 
have a significant indirect effect, ab = 0.00, 95% CI[-0.03, 0.04], suggesting that risk 
perception did not mediate the relationship between numeracy and risk-taking. 
Mediation model with age group and risk-taking, with risk perception as a 
mediator. 
 We reran the mediation model tested in the planned analysis section but 
replaced objective risk with subjectively perceived risk to account for the significant 
relationship between age and risk-taking, B = -0.17, t(467), p < .001. Even though 
higher risk perception significantly negatively predicted risk-taking, B = -1.10, t(467) 
= -9.18, p < .001, age group did not significantly predict risk perception, B = -0.02, 
t(467) = -1.35, p = .180. We then ran a mediation model to test the significance of 
this indirect effect. The results of the mediation model suggest that there is no 
significant indirect effect of age group on risk-taking through risk perception, ab = 
0.02, 95% CI[-0.01, 0.06]. 
Perception of risk for self and risk for others 
 The risk perception scale included questions that assessed COVID-19 
perception more generally (e.g. “Getting sick with the coronavirus/COVID-19 can be 
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serious”), as well as questions that focused on personal risk of COVID-19 and the 
risk of others. Older and younger adults may not differ when accounting for all items, 
but they may differ in personal risk and others’ risk. We therefore calculated means 
for personal and others’ risk (Figure 24). Relationships between each type of risk 
perception and risk-taking differed according to age group (Figure 25). The plots 
again show visual differences between older and younger adults in terms of risk 
perception and risk-taking. Due to this, we decided to run two additional analyses 
using perception of personal risk, perception of others’ risk, and COVID-19 risk-
taking. 
  
Figure 24. Age differences in risk perception overall decomposed in perception of 
own risk and perception of others’ risk.  
Note. From left to right: overall risk perception, risk for self, and risk for others. The 
lines in the middle of the boxplots indicate the median risk perception, the diamond 




Figure 25. Three scatter plots on risk-taking and its relationship with risk perception 
and age group.  
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 Mediation model with age group and risk-taking, with risk perception of 
self as a mediator. A simple linear regression on age group and risk-taking showed 
a significant difference in risk-taking across the two age groups, B = -0.17, t(467), p 
< .001, with older adults reporting less risk-taking. We then used a simple linear 
regression, regression risk-taking onto perception of personal risk. The results 
suggested that perception of risk for self significantly negatively predicted risk-taking, 
B = -0.43, t(467) = -4.33 p < .001. We then regressed risk perception for self on age 
group, and found age differences in risk perception, B = -0.07, t(467) = -3.36, p < 
.001, with older adults reported a lower perception of personal risk. Following this, 
we ran a multiple mediation analysis with age group and risk perception for self as 
predictors of risk-taking. Both age group, B = -0.20, t(467) = -4.60, p < .001, and 
personal risk perception, B = -0.50, t(467) = -5.08, p < .001, remained significant 
predictors of risk-taking. We then checked for significant mediation effects using a 
bootstrapping approach, with age group, risk-taking and risk perception of self. 
Results suggested a significant indirect effect, ab = 0.03, 95% CI[0.01, 0.06], 
indicating that risk perception for self partially mediated the relationship between age 
group and coronavirus-related risk-taking. 
 Mediation model with age group and risk-taking, with risk perception of 
others as a mediator. We first regressed risk-taking on both age group and on 
perception of others’ risk, using a simple linear regression, as part of the first step of 
the mediation analysis. Both age group, B = -0.17, t(467)= -3.77, p < .001, and 
perception of others’ risk, B = -0.63, t(467) = -5.88, p < .001, significantly negatively 
predicted risk-taking. We then used a simple linear regression to regress perception 
of others’ risk on age group. The results indicated that age group negatively 
predicted perception of others’ risk, B = -0.07, t(467) = -3.94, p < .001. We then 
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proceeded to the mediation analysis. First, we used a multiple linear regression with 
age group and perception of others’ risk as predictors of risk-taking, and found that 
both age group, B = -0.22, t(467) = -5.12, p < .001, and perception of others’ risk, B 
= -0.72, t(467) = -6.86, p < .001, were significant. We then tested for mediation 
effects using a mediation model with risk perception of others as a mediator for the 
relationship between age group and risk-taking. The model’s indirect effect was 
significant, ab = 0.05, 95% CI[0.02, 0.09], suggesting that risk perception for others 
partly mediates the relationship between age group and coronavirus risk-taking. 
Enforced and unenforced preventative measures 
 In our planned analysis, we found that objective risk was related to adopting 
more preventive measures (i.e. taking less coronavirus-related risk). However, some 
of the preventative measures included in this study are more enforced (e.g. wearing 
facemask on the bus, meeting indoors) and some are simply unenforced 
recommendations (e.g. cleaning thoroughly, using hand sanitizer). There may be a 
difference between these two types of measures. To further explore this, we ran two 
additional analyses on enforced and unenforced preventative measures. 
 Mediation model with age group, risk-taking of enforced guidelines, and 
objective risk as a mediator. We first regressed this subset of risk-taking items 
onto age group and objective risk separately, as we have done in prior analyses. 
Results of two simple linear analyses that suggest both age group, B= -0.21, t(467) = 
-5.12, p < .001, and objective risk, B= -0.04, t(467) = -3.81, p < .001, are negatively 
related to coronavirus-related risk-taking, when only including enforced measures. 
Following this, we used a simple linear analysis to investigate age differences in 
objective risk. Age group significantly positively predicted objective risk, B= 2.95, 
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t(467) = 22.5, p < .001. We then ran a multiple linear regression, which showed the 
effect of objective risk on risk-taking disappearing, while age group was still 
significantly related to risk-taking with only enforced measures, B= -0.20, t(467) = -
3.38, p < .001. Using a bootstrapping approach to test for mediating effects, the 
results suggest that the indirect effect of age group on risk-taking (only enforced 
measures) through objective risk is not significant, ab = -0.01, 95% CI[-0.09, 0.07]. 
 Mediation model with age group, risk-taking of non-enforced guidelines, 
and objective risk as a mediator. We then looked at non-enforced measures (e.g. 
handwashing, thoroughly cleaning common surfaces). Using two simple linear 
regressions, we regressed risk-taking (only non-enforced guidelines) onto age group 
and objective risk separately. Results suggested that only age was negatively related 
to risk-taking in non-enforced measures, B= -0.17, t(467) = -3.02, p = .003. This 
suggests that there is no difference between those at lower and higher risk in their 
adoption of non-enforced preventative measures, but that older adults are more 
likely to adopt these measures than younger adults. 
Coronavirus numbers and dissatisfaction with UK coronavirus approach 
 Lastly, we examined how often people reported checking coronavirus 
numbers (i.e. numbers of infection, hospitalisation and deaths relating to 
coronavirus) and dissatisfaction with UK COVID-19 policies. Checking coronavirus 
numbers was presented as a statement, with values closer to 1 indicating a higher 
level of agreement (see Figure 26). An independent sample-test on checking 
coronavirus numbers showed age differences between groups, t(464.79) = 3.32, p < 
.001, with older adults more often reporting that they regularly checked numbers (M 
older = 2.98) compared to younger adults (M younger = 3.53). When looking at 
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dissatisfaction with the UK’s coronavirus approach, an independent sample-test with 
age group and coronavirus approach showed age differences between groups, 
t(457.93) = 4.37, p < .001, with younger adults reporting higher dissatisfaction with 
the UK government’s coronavirus approach (M younger = 4.94) than older adults (M 
older = 4.33). 
  
Figure 26. Dissatisfaction over UK COVID-19 policies (left) and regularly checking 
COVID numbers (right), separated by age group.  
Note. On the x axis, participants’ choice options are displayed, the y axis displays 
the number of participants who chose the specific options. For dissatisfaction over 
UK COVID-19 policies (left), the options ranged from 1 (“Extremely satisfied”) to 7 
(“Extremely dissatisfied”). For regularly checking COVID numbers (right), the options 
ranged from 1 (“Strongly agree”) to 7(“Strongly disagree”).  
 Overall, the results suggest that age group, objective risk and numerical ability 
were all significant predictors of coronavirus-related risk-taking. When included 
together in a mediation model, the effect of objective risk disappeared, but numeracy 
partially mediated the relationship between age group and risk-taking. In the 
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exploratory analyses, we found that people’s risk perception of COVID-19 was not 
related to their numerical skills, and that though risk perception was significantly 
related to risk-taking, overall risk perception did not differ between the age groups. 
However, when only looking at items that reflected personal risk or risk for others, 
age groups did differ, with younger adults reported perceiving more risk for 
themselves as well as others, compared to older adults. We also found that those at 
higher objective risk were more likely to adopt the enforced preventative measures 
(e.g. wearing a facemask) but this effect disappeared once objective risk and age 
group were both included in the model. However, objective risk was not associated 
with unenforced recommended behaviours such as handwashing or using hand 
sanitizer, unlike enforced preventative behaviours. 
4.5 Discussion 
 The current COVID-19 pandemic has been a major health risk, claiming 
2,936,916 lives worldwide, 127,087 of those lives in the United Kingdom at the time 
of writing this discussion (April 2021). It is essential to understand the underlying 
mechanisms of the adoption of protective behaviours to prevent further illness and 
mortality. We tested the assumption that younger adults take more risk than older 
adults, while testing three possible explanations for such a difference: differences in 
objective risk, risk preference and numeracy. The adoption of preventative measures 
differed between older and younger adults, with younger adults adopting 
preventative measures less often. While numeracy partly mediated the relationship 
between age group and risk-taking, objective risk and risk perception did not. In the 
exploratory section, we also looked at differences in enforced behaviours (e.g. mask 
wearing), and recommendations (e.g. using hand sanitizer). Though both groups 
reported adopting the unenforced behaviours less often, older adults adopted them 
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more frequently than younger adults. The same observation was true of the enforced 
behaviours, where older adults adopted those measures more frequently. This is in 
line with other findings on the adoption of preventative measures across age groups, 
in which younger adults were less likely to implement preventative measures 
(Atchison et al., 2021; Bruine de Bruin & Bennett, 2020; Coroiu et al., 2020; Fancourt 
et al., 2020; Machida et al., 2020; Park et al., 2020; Roozenbeek et al., 2020).  
 Why these age groups differ in the coronavirus-related risk they take could be 
due to the difference in risk of coronavirus complications. That younger adults are 
less at risk of coronavirus complications has often been communicated through the 
media (Bazelon, 2020) and government briefings. In the UK, the NHS only lists those 
aged 70 or older at moderate risk (National Health Service, 2021). In addition, 
mortality rates provided by the UK government suggest that the proportion of 
coronavirus-related deaths of people aged between 15 and 44 years accounts for 1 
percent of deaths, while the mortality of those aged 65 or older are close to three 
quarters of total as deaths. The large differences of risk in terms of hospitalization 
and death as a result of coronavirus infection may lead to younger adults taking 
more risk by not adopting preventative measures as often, as it is less likely that they 
will experience serious health-related consequences. 
 Another possible reason for this finding may be differences in financial status 
and work environments. Financial concerns, such the loss of current job security or 
income, are an often-reported concern for younger adults (Fancourt et al., 2020; 
Park et al., 2020). In the current study, half of those aged between 18 and 35 
reported working full-time. The UK government has asked citizens to work from 
home when possible but has equally allowed companies to decide whether 
employees are needed on location. Unlike the older age group, who largely reported 
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being retired, it may be that the younger adult group are not able to consistently 
avoid crowded spaces, such as offices, public transport, schools, or supermarkets, 
and are unable to consistently socially distance with at least 1 meter between 
themselves and others at all times. However, it is important to note that age 
differences in risk-taking were small, and both groups reported relatively low risk-
taking. 
 Risk preference showed no relationship to adopting preventative measures in 
the study. The Dospert (Blais & Weber, 2006) is a measure of risk preference in 
which people are asked whether they would engage in risky activities, as well as the 
benefit and risk they see in those activities. Items in the questionnaire are 
hypothetical situations, such as taking a ride in a taxi without a seatbelt. Though the 
negative consequences of those hypothetical situations can be severe, they are 
more everyday situations, in contrast to the current coronavirus pandemic. In 
addition, the coronavirus-related preventative measures in this study were 
communicated by the government and many of these measures are enforced, such 
as wearing a face mask on public transport. It may be that the risk preference items 
are too distinct from the non-hypothetical risk posed by coronavirus to explain 
preventative behaviours during the pandemic. For future research, it could be 
beneficial to include a risk preference measure that more closely resembles the 
decisions or behaviours people experience during an international health crisis such 
as COVID-19. 
 Objective risk was found to be significantly related to COVID-19 risk-taking, 
which was in line with our expectations. However, when closer examining enforced 
guidelines (such as mask wearing) and recommendations (such as using hand 
sanitizer) we found that those at higher objective risk were more inclined to adopt 
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measures that were enforced guidelines, but not measures that were 
recommendations. The recommendation items were also hygiene-related, such as 
cleaning common surfaces with disinfectant and washing hands for at least 20 
seconds. Prior research has found that hygiene-related measures were adopted 
least of all preventative measures (Machida et al., 2020), which seems to be the 
case in this study as well, overall and when considering objective risk. Other studies, 
such as the COVID-19 Social Study (Fancourt et al., 2020), reported that those at 
higher objective risk did not adopt preventative measures more often than those at 
low risk of coronavirus-related complications (Roozenbeek et al., 2020; Sobkow et 
al., 2020). Further research is needed to investigate why those at higher risk do not 
appear to adopt unenforced preventative measures more often than those at low 
risk. 
 Numerical abilities were a significant predictor of COVID-19 related risk-
taking, with those having higher numerical ability taking more coronavirus risk. This 
finding was the opposite of what we expected, as prior research has found that low 
numeracy was related to poorer health outcomes and decisions (Leiter et al., 2018; 
Peters et al., 2014; Petrova et al., 2017; Yamashita et al., 2018). When looking at 
numeracy and COVID-19 health behaviours specifically, other studies found that 
numeracy was not significantly related to adopting preventative measures 
(Roozenbeek et al., 2020; Sobkow et al., 2020). We also found that older adults had 
lower numeracy. This finding is not surprising, as there have been other studies in 
which older adults had lower numerical abilities (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2015; 
Delazer; 2013; Låg et al., 2014; Weller et al., 2013). 
 Risk perception was a significant predictor of adopting preventative measures, 
which is in line with previous findings (Bruine de Bruin, 2020; Dryhurst et al., 2020). 
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Despite older adults taking less risk (i.e. they adopted more preventative measures), 
there were no age differences in COVID-19 risk perception. However, when only 
examining items on personal risk and risk of others, younger adults reported 
perceiving more risk for both themselves and for others such as family and friends. 
As such, it is likely that other factors, beyond those included in this study, are 
involved in why younger adults adopted preventative measures less despite their 
high perception of risk. As stated previously, this may be due to differences in 
circumstances associated with this age group such as work environment or their 
well-being. According to the Office of National Statistics (2020), younger adults 
reported that they felt lonely more often than those aged 60 years and over, as well 
as reporting that COVID-19 had affected their work through reductions in hours 
worked and concerns about health and safety at work. A quarter of those young 
adults reported concerns on the impact of COVID-19 on their well-being. Other 
studies found similar findings, including older adults reporting less concern about 
their finances and mental well-being compared to younger adults (Bruine de Bruin, 
2020; Fancourt et al., 2020; Li & Wang, 2020). Despite the high perception of risk for 
themselves and others, it may be that younger adults’ perception of other stressors, 
such as their mental well-being or finances, drives these age differences in 
coronavirus-related risk-taking, despite younger adults’ higher risk perception for 
themselves and others. 
 The exploratory analyses highlight several interesting findings, such as the 
effect of age group on risk perception and COVID-19 protective behaviours. Initially, 
risk perception did not seem to differ between age groups. However, when exploring 
perception of personal risk and risk for others, younger adults appeared to perceive 
more risk for themselves and for others, compared to other adults. In addition, when 
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separating COVID-19 preventative measures by enforced measures and unenforced 
recommendations, those at higher risk of coronavirus complications seemingly 
adopted enforced behaviours more often, but not unenforced recommendations such 
as handwashing. Future studies should explore which other variables underlie age 
differences in COVID-related risk-taking, and why those at higher risk of COVID-19 
consequences are similar in adopting unenforced recommendations to those at 
objectively lower risk of COVID-19 complications. 
Limitations 
 Of course, this study is not without its limitations. Firstly, adoption of 
preventative behaviours was self-reported, real-life behaviour may differ from 
participants’ self-reported behaviour due to social-desirability bias. Secondly, some 
of the items were designed with generalizability in mind, such as “avoiding crowded 
spaces'', as being too specific could make it difficult to answer or the item would be 
not applicable. This also had its limitations. For instance, it is not possible to 
determine whether participants indicated that they are not avoiding crowded spaces 
due to a lack of concern, or whether that is due to a lack of possibility to do so (e.g. 
public transport to work). Lastly, although we found significant relationships that 
explained differences in adopting preventative measures, it is likely that additional 
factors exist beyond those included in the study, and we suggest that future research 
explores these further. 
Conclusion 
 We aimed to further the understanding of whether age differences in COVID-
19 risk-taking, characterized by the adoption of preventative measures, are related to 
risk preference, numeracy, objective risk, and COVID-19 risk perception. As COVID-
19 is predicted to be present for the foreseeable future, we will have to rely on 
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preventative measures such as social distancing to keep ourselves and others safe. 
Understanding what factors play a role in adopting preventative measures, and 
whether these mechanisms differ across age groups is crucial to prevent further 
illness and mortality.  
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 Across adulthood, people face increasingly more impactful and high-risk 
decisions, such as medical interventions. Decisions on medical treatment and 
interventions are often made in older age, as older adults are more likely to have 
multiple chronic conditions and health-related accidents. These kinds of decisions 
are often complex, offering multiple treatments with varying outcomes and side 
effects. As such, understanding how ageing affects risky decision-making is 
essential. 
 Generally, older adults are widely assumed to be risk-averse and therefore 
prefer to avoid any risk-taking. However, research on age differences in risk-taking 
has mixed findings. In some studies, older adults took more risk, in other studies 
they took less risk, and some studies found no age differences in risk-taking at all. 
The conflicting findings may be explained by the measures used to assess risk-
taking across adulthood, and to what extent cognitive abilities are involved in 
decision-making on these measures. Self-report measures are often used to gauge a 
person’s risk preference, asking participants to imagine a hypothetical scenario of 
risk or respond to a given statement on risk or on themselves. Alternatively, 
behavioural tasks are used to measure risk-taking behaviour, and risk-taking 
behaviour is assumed to reflect a person’s underlying preference towards risk (i.e. 
whether they are risk averse or risk-seeking individuals). Behavioural tasks often 
measure risk-taking through lotteries, sure versus risky options, or other financial 
incentivized scenarios of risk. These behavioural tasks often rely more heavily on 
cognitive abilities, as people must be able to compare options, learn on the task to 
be able to avoid or take more risk, or calculate expected values of outcomes. Some 
cognitive abilities required to make optimal decisions on these tasks are known to be 
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sensitive to age-related decline. As such, age-related decline of cognitive abilities 
may interfere with older adults’ decision-making on behavioural tasks and may lead 
to unintentional risk-taking. As such, age differences in risk-taking may not be due to 
age differences in their underlying risk preference but could be due to age 
differences in cognitive ability instead. 
 The studies reported in this thesis have explored the role of cognitive ability 
and risk preference in age differences in risk-taking behaviour across different 
scenarios and with various methods. The first two studies have investigated risk-
taking on behavioural tasks with financial incentives, similar to existing behavioural 
tasks, but were adjusted to specifically investigate the role of cognitive ability and 
risk preference. Initially, in response to the findings of the first two studies, a third 
study was designed that examined age differences in road risk, with an adapted 
driving task. Unfortunately, the coronavirus pandemic led to the closure of testing 
facilities and working with older adults at the time would put them at unnecessary 
risk. However, this situation also provided a unique opportunity to investigate age 
differences concerning real-life risk during an unprecedented situation in our lifetime. 
As such, we adapted to the circumstances and conducted an online study on how 
younger and older adults differed in risk-taking during the pandemic, measured by 
their misalignment to preventative health behaviours that were communicated by the 
UK government.  
 By drawing on a range of methods and scenarios, the studies have identified 
factors that may explain age differences in risk-taking. The findings of the three 
studies highlight how the measurement of risk-taking across adulthood is complex 
and depends on many factors, including the type of measurement, its reliance on 
cognitive ability, and the importance of design features including risk domain. These 
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findings could be applied to future research on the topic in the measurement of risk-
taking, informing the financial sector on how older adults make financial decisions, 
and inform health campaigns on preventative behaviours of age differences in 
adoption of behaviours and its determinants. 
5.2 Summary of findings 
5.2.1 Age differences in risk-taking 
         Across three chapters, 3 studies have examined risk-taking differences 
between younger and older adults. In Chapter 2, participants were given a physical 
behavioural task in which they were asked to convert gamble probabilities to 
frequencies over the course of 20 hypothetical times that this gamble would be 
played. If participants estimated the outcomes correctly, the task would give the 
expected value of the gamble over being played 20 times, designed to help 
participants decide whether the gamble would be worth playing in real life. If 
outcomes were estimated incorrectly, the task’s feedback would represent the 
expected value based on the frequencies of outcomes provided by the participant 
instead. Contrary to expectations, there were no age differences, as older and 
younger adults did not differ in their risk-taking on the task. Both age groups 
accepted a similar number of gambles. 
         In response to the findings of Chapter 2, the study in Chapter 3 used an 
adjusted design of the task in Chapter 2, having been computerized and expanded 
to two task types instead of one. The two task types, a complex and simplified task 
type, allowed for comparison of how cognitive demand would affect task 
performance and the role of cognitive ability and risk preference across the two task 
types. It was predicted that older adults’ comprehension on the complex task would 
be affected by the age-related decrease in cognitive abilities, and that this effect 
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would cause them to take more risk on the complex task. However, the absence of 
cognitive demand on the simplified task was expected to exclude any effects of 
cognitive ability and therefore risk-taking would reflect participants’ risk preference. 
Expectations on risk-taking across the task types were partially confirmed, as older 
adults took more risk on the complex task (as well as having lower comprehension), 
but unlike expected, this pattern persisted in the simplified task version.          
 In the third study, discussed in Chapter 4, we looked at age differences in 
risk-taking during the current COVID-19 pandemic. In this study, participants were 
asked about their behaviour in the past 2 weeks, and how often they had adopted 
the preventative measures that were either enforced or highly recommended by the 
UK government. Behaviours included keeping at least 1 metre distance from others, 
wearing a facemask on public transport, and regularly washing hands with water and 
soap for at least 20 seconds. We expected that older adults would be less likely to 
take risk (adopting preventative behaviours more often), as prior research showed 
that older adults reported being less likely to take health risks. In line with 
expectations, older and younger adults differed in how much health risk they took, 
with older adults adopting preventative measures more often. 
         In summary, two of the three studies reported age differences in risk-taking. 
These mixed findings (i.e. no age differences in one study and age differences in 
opposite directions) likely resulted from variations in design and risk domain across 
the three studies. In the studies discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the design of the 
tasks was similar, but had slight differences. In the first study, the task consisted of 
10 gambles and was a physical task, whereas the task in study 2 had two types (i.e. 
complex and simplified task), included 20 gambles, and was computerized. Despite 
the differences between tasks, a large component of why study 2 did show age 
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differences in risk-taking whereas study 1 did not, was likely due to the difference in 
older adult participants who took part in the study. In the first study, older adult 
participants were largely recruited through an existing participant pool, and many 
had taken part in Psychological studies on ageing before. In comparison, almost all 
participants in the second study had been recruited from the local community, 
through the distribution of flyers and online advertisement, and most had never taken 
part in a study before. If older adults were signed up to the participant pool, only 
those who had limited to no experience with Psychological studies were approached. 
As such, the sample of the second study was more representative of the older adult 
population, and without any (possible) confounding effect of prior knowledge of the 
measures, learning or bias involved. 
 Despite age differences varying between Chapters 2 and 3, another pattern 
did emerge. Though there were no age differences in risk-taking in the first study, 
risk-taking on the task in study 1 was directly associated with overestimating wins 
and underestimating losses. Yet, older and younger adults were similar in their 
correct estimations of probability, as well as their risk-taking. In study 2, older adults 
were correct less often compared to younger adults, indicating more difficulty in 
converting probability to frequency, and they also took more risk. The distribution of 
older adults’ estimations showed an inclination to overestimate wins and 
underestimate losses once more. On these types of tasks, it can be said that risk-
taking is associated with overestimating the value of the associated gambles, and 
this pattern remained when age differences in risk-taking did occur, with older adults’ 
estimations showing the same pattern. 
         In the third study, older adults reported taking less risk than younger adults, 
which was characterized by them adopting more preventative measures to avoid 
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coronavirus infection. Differences between older and younger adults in terms of their 
adoption of preventative measures had been found in prior research, both in similar 
situations of health risk before the coronavirus pandemic (Blendon et al., 2004; van 
der Weerd et al., 2011) as well as during (Atchison et al., 2021; Bruine de Bruin, 
2020; Coroiu et al., 2020; Fancourt et al., 2020; Machida et al., 2020; Park et al., 
2020; Roozenbeek et al., 2020). Unlike in the first two studies, the risk (i.e. becoming 
sick with coronavirus) had been clearly communicated to older adults, as they had 
been strongly advised to stay indoors during the period in which the study was 
conducted. In addition, this type of risk-taking was in a different domain than in the 
first two, as study 1 and 2 looked at financial risk-taking, whereas study 3 looked at 
health-related risk-taking behaviours. Prior research has found that older adults 
generally are more risk averse concerning health risk (Dohmen et al., 2011; Josef et 
al., 2016; Rolison et al., 2014), likely due to the increased likelihood of complications 
associated with ageing. 
         Though findings of the three studies show a clear image of how differences in 
risk-taking between adult age groups depend on a number of factors, such as 
domain and comprehension, the studies involved also had some limitations that may 
limit any inferences drawn from their findings. As discussed prior in this section, the 
participants in study 1 had experience in psychological tasks, especially those 
concerning the measurement of cognitive abilities, and as such may have been more 
experienced with the task and other tests, leading to different results than if an 
inexperienced sample had been used. In the second study, performance on the 
simplified task encountered a ceiling effect, preventing any further differences 
between age groups to appear. In the third study, participants reported on their 
behaviour in the past two weeks. As adoption of preventative measures was 
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expected and often communicated by the UK government and international health 
organisations, participants may have given desirable answers in terms of their 
behaviour. The issue posed in study 1 concerning a potential biased sample had 
been addressed in study 2 and can generally be avoided by recruiting participants 
from the local community that have no prior experience with Psychological studies. 
The ceiling effect found in study 2 could be addressed by using a different paradigm 
for a simplified task, in which participants are more able to show their understanding 
of gamble probabilities while maintaining a design that requires minimal cognitive 
strain. Lastly, the potential presence of socially desirable answers in study 3 can be 
difficult to address, as the topic of adopting these behaviours may be sensitive. 
However, keeping the study’s aims as vague as possible, making sure that 
participants are aware that their entries are anonymous (by stating this clearly in the 
information sheet and consent form) and are not asked for any identifying 
information, and providing statements to (dis)agree with instead of questions are 
helpful design features that minimize social-desirability bias. In addition, one can 
decide to include a social desirability scale to establish how likely participants are to 
provide a desirable answer and as possible exclusion tool. 
         Overall, the findings on risk-taking across the three studies highlight the 
importance of risk domain, as older adults may feel differently about taking risk in 
one area compared to another (e.g. financial risk compared to health risk). It also 
underlines the importance of using a sample that is as representative of the 
population as possible, and limiting prior experience with Psychological studies, 
5.2.2 The role of cognitive ability 
         To investigate the role of cognitive ability in age differences in risk-taking, 
multiple measures of cognitive ability were included in the design of the studies 
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discussed in this thesis. Chapter 2 and 3 included three measures of cognitive 
ability: numeracy, working memory and processing speed. These three abilities were 
chosen as they are often considered to be related to task performance and have 
been measured in past research. In Chapter 4, only numeracy was included due to 
the study having to be conducted online and as numeracy appeared to be most 
relevant concerning risk-taking during the coronavirus pandemic. 
Numeracy 
         Due to the numerical information provided in all studies, numeracy was 
included as a measure of cognitive ability. In the first two studies, numeracy was 
included due to the mathematical design of the task. In Chapter 2, numeracy was 
used to measure whether older and younger adults differed in numerical ability and 
whether it explained differences in estimations of probability and gamble acceptance, 
especially concerning age differences. It was hypothesized that older adults would 
have worse numerical ability than younger adults, and that this would result in being 
correct less often and having larger distances from the actual probability. Results 
showed that there were no age differences in numeracy. However, numeracy was 
related to task behaviour, as it was negatively associated with correct estimations 
and predicted risk-taking on the task.  
         In Chapter 3, the design of the prior task was adjusted to create two task 
types that would allow better comparison of the role of cognitive ability and risk 
preference under different circumstances. In line with expectations, the results 
indicated that older adults’ numerical ability was worse than those of younger adults, 
and older adults took more risk in both task types. As expected, numeracy partially 
mediated the relationship between age and correct estimation on the complex task. 
         In Chapter 4, numeracy was used due to the numerical information often 
169 
 
presented to UK citizens to discuss the development of coronavirus (i.e. common 
use of graphs and figures, proportional chance of infection, hospitalization and 
death, and the R number). Older adults were found to have lower numerical ability 
than younger adults, numeracy was positively related to risk-taking, and numeracy 
partially mediated the relationship between age group and risk-taking. These findings 
were partially in line with prior expectations, as age differences were hypothesized, 
but the direction of the relationship between numeracy and risk-taking was the 
opposite of what was predicted. Similar to Chapter 3, the findings indicate that 
though there are differences in numeracy across age groups and those with higher 
numerical abilities take more risk, another variable likely also explains why older and 
younger adults differ in risk-taking. 
         Overall, the three studies have found mixed findings on numeracy, both in 
terms of age differences and its relationship to correct probability estimations and 
risk-taking. In Chapters 2 and 4, numeracy was directly related to risk-taking (this 
was not the case in Chapter 3, though it did predict how often people correctly 
estimated gamble probabilities). However, the direction of the effect was the 
opposite in Chapters 2 and 4; in Chapter 2, higher numerical ability led to less risk-
taking, whereas higher numerical ability led to more risk-taking in Chapter 4. Similar 
to age differences in risk-taking, these differences are likely due to variations in 
design and domain. Firstly, the behavioural task used in study 1 included gambles 
with varying expected values. Higher numerical ability was associated with better 
estimations of probability, and better estimations will have meant that participants 
were better informed of the gamble’s expected value, which will likely have impacted 
their risk-taking (i.e. overestimating win probability and underestimating loss 
probability were associated with taking more risk). Higher numerical ability in study 1 
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will likely have led to better estimations of which gamble would be profitable, thereby 
being able to separate profitable and non-profitable gambles. Despite numerical 
information being communicated in study 3, this may not have the direct link to risk-
taking as it does in study 1, where the task relied on using numerical abilities to 
convert probability into frequencies correctly, thus informing the participant about the 
gamble’s risk. Secondly, the domains between studies differed, with the first study 
assessing financial risk-taking and the third study assessing health-related risk-
taking. Numerical abilities likely serve a different purpose for the different types of 
decisions people make in those situations. In a financial setting, better numerical 
skills improve the understanding of the given information, and therefore the risks 
involved. When considering health-risk, numeracy may improve understanding of 
numerical information and provided figures, but it may not explain risk-taking directly 
(as evidenced by the non-significant indirect path of age differences in coronavirus 
risk-taking via numeracy). 
         When assessing age differences in numeracy, there were no differences 
between younger and older adults in study 1, whereas older adults did show lower 
numerical ability in the second and third study. The difference in age effects between 
the first two studies may be caused by the difference in the sample of both studies, 
as the first study’s sample consisted of participants with more experience in 
psychological testing measures. When study 2 did include members from the 
community with no prior experience, age differences in numeracy did emerge. This 
pattern fits with the findings of study 3, in which older adults’ numerical ability was 
lower than that of younger adults. In these studies, as well as prior research, age 
differences in numeracy are mixed and may depend on other factors, such as the 




         Working memory and its relation to age differences in risk-taking was 
assessed in Chapter 2 and 3. In Chapter 2, working memory was measured using a 
subscale of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (WAIS III; Wechsler, 1997), the 
Digit Span Backward. Unlike hypothesized, older and younger adults performed 
similarly, indicating that there were no differences in working memory. Results 
showed that working memory also was not associated with risk-taking behaviour on 
the task, which was not as expected. 
         In Chapter 3, working memory was assessed using the Shortened Symmetry 
Span, a computerized test. In line with expectations, older adults did perform worse 
on the span task, showing signs of age-related decline in working memory. In the 
study, older adults were expected to have age-related decline in working memory, 
which would then lead to increased risk-taking on the task. However, working 
memory was found not to be related to risk-taking on the behavioural task, despite 
older adults also taking more risk, nor did it mediate the relationship between age 
and risk-taking behaviour. 
         As to why age differences in working memory were found in Chapter 3, but 
not in Chapter 2, this is likely due to the difference in materials used to measure 
working memory. The Digit Span Backward is more sensitive to age-related decline 
compared to its simpler version, Digit Span Forward, but performance on other 
working memory measures show more decline as a function of age (Bopp & 
Verhaeghen, 2005; Elliott et al., 2011; Hale et al., 2011), such as spatial tasks 
(Myerson et al., 2003; Park et al., 2002). In addition, working memory tasks can be 
sensitive to the education level of participants. In response to the findings in Chapter 
2, the Shortened Symmetry Task was chosen as a working memory measure for 
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Chapter 3, as the test is suitable for higher educated samples and more difficult due 
to the addition of distractor blocks (Draheim et al., 2018; Foster et al., 2015). 
         In both studies, working memory was not related to risk-taking behaviour. This 
is equally similar (Figner et al., 2009) and dissimilar (Zamarian et al., 2008) to the 
findings of other studies, as findings on the relationship between working memory 
and risk-taking are mixed. In the current study, cognitive ability may not have been 
related to risk-taking as the designed task may not have imposed enough strain on 
working memory for any effect to show. Li et al. (2013) found that working memory is 
more affected in complex tasks that require active processing. Both tasks in Chapter 
2 and 3 (the task in Chapter 3 consisted of two types) in this study did not require 
participants to retain and recall large chunks of information. Instead, participants 
made calculations for each probability they estimated, and then moved on to 
estimating the next outcome probability (while their prior calculation is still visible), 
instead of having to retain and recall information to be able to complete trials. 
Information on the gamble was freely available throughout the trial, and they were 
given feedback to facilitate decision-making. As such, working memory may not have 
been involved to such an extent that it affected performance on the behavioural task. 
         Overall, the findings on working memory in Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that age 
differences in working memory are likely a product of which measure is used to 
assess working memory. When investigating the relationship between working 
memory and risk-taking on behavioural tasks, future research is encouraged to use a 
task that relies more heavily on key aspects of working memory (i.e. having to 
manipulate information, or retain and recall information on the gamble to make an 




         Like working memory, the effect of processing speed on age differences in 
risk-taking was investigated in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2, processing speed 
was assessed using the Digit Symbol Coding, a subtest of the WAIS III. In line with 
expectations, older adults performed worse on the Digit Symbol Coding, indicating a 
slower processing speed compared to younger adults. However, processing speed 
was not related to risk-taking on the behavioural task, which was unexpected. 
         In Chapter 3, the same measure as in Chapter 2 was used to assess 
processing speed. In this study, correlations were used to establish the best 
predictor of risk-taking out of all included cognitive measures. The correlation 
between processing speed and risk-taking was small, and as such, working memory 
was chosen as a predictor of risk-taking of both task types instead. In a pattern 
similar to that of the study in Chapter 2, processing speed was not related to risk-
taking behaviour in Chapter 3. 
         Processing speed is another ability that is more affected in complex tasks that 
require active processing (Li et al., 2013). Past studies have found that older adults 
often perform worse under tasks with time pressure (Mata et al., 2011) due to the 
age-related decline in processing speed. However, Chapters 2 and 3 did not include 
tasks that featured response time measurements or a deadline for participants to 
decide within, instead allowing participants to take as much time as needed. As 
such, any age differences in processing speed may not have affected older adults’ 
task performance in Chapters 2 and 3. 
         Overall, the findings on processing speed in Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that 
older adults do show age-related decline in processing speed. However, age 
differences in this ability did not seem to affect task performance, which is likely due 
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to the task’s lower-than-required reliance on processing speed. As such, the findings 
indicate that though this ability decreases in age, its effect on risk-taking depends on 
the design of the behavioural measure. Future research should focus on including a 
task with higher demands on processing speed, through the use of deadlines or 
judgment based on participants’ response time, to assess if processing speed does 
affect age differences in risk-taking on a behavioural task with higher reliance on this 
ability. 
5.2.3. The role of risk preference 
         Across the three studies, measures of risk preference were included to 
establish whether risk-taking behaviour did reflect risk preferences, and whether age 
groups differed in their preference towards risk. 
         In Chapter 2, we included the financial and health and safety domains of the 
Dospert (Blais & Weber, 2006), adjusted by Rolison et al. (2019). As expected, the 
results in Chapter 2 indicated that younger adults rated themselves as more likely to 
take risks, seeing more benefit in the risky activities and perceiving less risk in health 
and safety risk than older adults. There were no age differences in the perception of 
financial risk. This finding is similar to those of prior research, especially concerning 
health and safety risk (Dohmen et al., 2011; Josef et al., 2016; Mamerow et al., 
2016; Rolison et al., 2014). Despite age differences in risk preference, further 
analyses on risk-taking behaviour showed that risk preference was not a predictor of 
participants’ risk-taking. Why risk preference and risk-taking were not related could 
be due to the relatively low risk posed by the behavioural task compared to the risk 
preference measure. Whereas the Dospert asked participants about investing or 
gambling a specific amount of their pay, and therefore larger sums could be lost if 
the investment went badly, the task allowed participants to gamble with smaller 
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amounts as well as knowing their losses would be capped. As such, it’s likely that 
gambling on the task did not invoke the same response as their imagined scenario of 
losing a large portion of their pay or savings. 
         In study 2, we used multiple measures of risk preference to establish the best 
predictor of risk-taking among them, including the adjusted Dospert, General Risk 
Propensity Scale, and a risk preference measure specifically made for study 2. Older 
and younger adults differed in their risk preference across the three measures; there 
were no age differences on the adjusted Dospert, whereas older adults reporting 
being risk averse on the General Risk Propensity Scale, but risk-seeking on the 
measure designed for the study (which involved taking risks when already placed 
in  an environment where risk was present, such as a casino). Why there were age 
differences on some measures of risk preference but not others, is likely due to the 
difference in domains being measured. There has been evidence that risk 
preference can be conceptualized as a general construct, that can encompass both 
domain-specific (i.e. recreational risk) as well as general preferences towards risk 
(Frey et al., 2017; Hertwig et al., 2019; Weber et al., 2002). However, differences in 
some specific domains may still be present, as these differ psychologically in 
perceptions of associated risks and benefits by participants (Charness et al., 2013; 
Frey et al., 2017; Weber et al., 2002). Participants differed in their appraisal of the 
risks posed in the three risk preference measures in study 2, and the measures each 
touch on a different aspect of risk. The General Risk Propensity Scale asked 
participants to rate the extent to which they agreed with statements about 
themselves, whereas the financial domain of the adjusted Dospert specifically asked 
about financial risk only and suggested risky activities instead of using personal 
statements. The measure designed for the study was slightly different, and asked 
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people about the likelihood that they’d take a risk after being put in a situation where 
the risk was already present (e.g. attending a birthday party at a casino). As such, 
it’s likely that age differences, or lack thereof, differed between measures, as well as 
their direction. Of the three risk preference measures in study 2, the adjusted 
Dospert was found to be most highly correlated with risk-taking and was therefore 
included in the analysis. However, it was not significantly related to risk-taking on the 
behavioural task. Similar to study 1, participants’ reported risk preference may not 
have been related to their risk-taking behaviour due to differences in the self-report 
measure, in which larger amounts could be lost with higher impact to participants’ 
wellbeing, than the risk posed in the study, of which participants were informed had 
limited impact. 
         In the last study, discussed in Chapter 4, we used the health and safety 
domain of the Dospert (Blais & Weber, 2006) to measure whether people’s risk 
preference towards health and safety risk would be related to coronavirus-related 
risk-taking. We found that this was not the case, as the Dospert failed to predict risk-
taking. The correlation between age and risk preference was very small and not 
significant, indicating that younger and older adults did not differ in their preferences 
towards health and safety risk. In the case of study 3, the topic was highly 
uncommon, as most citizens had not experienced a health crisis of this scale before. 
Younger and older adults differed in their risk-taking during the pandemic, but the 
difference between groups was rather small, and the relatively low group means 
indicated that both age groups mostly adopted preventative measures. In addition, 
many of the preventative behaviours were clearly communicated as essential or 
highly recommended by the UK government, and some were enforced (i.e. people 
would be fined if they were caught not adhering to the communicated guidelines, 
177 
 
such as not receiving visitors indoors). This may explain why the relative difference 
between age groups was small, and why self-reported risk preference did not reflect 
risk-taking behaviour during the coronavirus pandemic. 
         Overall, the results of all three studies did not show a relationship between 
risk preference and risk-taking, despite age difference in some measures. This is not 
as hypothesized, but it is not specific to this study. Prior research has found that self-
reported risk preference does not necessarily align with risk-taking on behavioural 
tasks (Frey et al., 2017; Mamerow et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2018). Several studies 
have reported that self-reported risk preference measures are generally reliable and 
are able to capture individual risk preferences in general and across domains (Frey 
et al., 2017; Hertwig et al., 2019). This is not the same for behavioural tasks. Frey et 
al. (2017) ran a large study involving 1507 participants, who completed an extensive 
battery of self-report measures and behavioural tasks. Results showed that self-
report measures were not related to behavioural tasks, nor were the 8 behavioural 
tasks related to one another. Behavioural tasks differ in their complexity and thus 
their demand on cognitive ability, which cognitive abilities are involved, and what 
strategies participants need to apply for optimal task performance. These large 
differences in task design may cause a lack of cohesion among behavioural tasks 
but may also create difficulty in relating behavioural tasks to self-reported risk 
preference, as the design of the two types of measurements are distinct from one 
another. Whereas self-report measures apply a common method across 
questionnaires (i.e. using hypothetical situations, statements), the elicitation methods 
of behavioural tasks are not as uniform. As such, behavioural tasks may measure 
participants’ temporary approach to risk (as a reflection of the circumstance of the 
task or environment), while self-report measures rely on people’s experience to 
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estimate risk preference, which has shown to be a more stable approach (Hertwig et 
al., 2019; Mata et al., 2018). 
        Another potential reason why the behaviour on types of measures do not align 
might be the importance of the circumstances and environments in which these 
measures are conducted. It may be that people’s risk-taking on a behavioural task 
reflects the circumstance in which they are completing the task, instead of their risk 
preference. Studies on risk-taking using behavioural tasks are generally conducted 
in a specific environment, in which the limitations of risk are clearly communicated to 
participants (i.e. participants are aware of how much of their earnings they can lose, 
as well as knowing that any discomfort surrounding the risk or study allows them to 
stop taking part without consequences). As such, the experience of risk may be 
limited. In contrast, when using a self-report measure of risk preference, participants 
are usually given a hypothetical situation or a statement, in which they are asked to 
imagine or recall a risky situation. This imagined or recalled scenario is distinct from 
the environment or circumstances in which the self-report is provided. As such, the 
circumstances around how preferences and behaviours are measured may have 
more impact on behavioural tasks than on self-report measures. 
         Also, when taking a closer look at behavioural tasks to capture risk-taking 
behaviour, most tasks apply monetary scenarios such as safe versus risky options, 
playing cards or pumping a balloon to increase earnings. As the majority of 
behavioural tasks measure risk-taking in a financial setting only, an approach to the 
current problem could be to use tasks that assess risk-taking in a different domain, 
as the gap between self-reported risk preference and risk-taking on tasks may be 
specific to the task domain. In addition, financial tasks are often incentivized, while 
self-report risk preference measures are not. Charness et al. (2013) argue that for a 
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risk preference measure to be associated with risk-taking, the risk preference 
measure should also be incentivized to ensure that the underlying risk preference 
and risk-taking behaviour are as similar as possible. As such, perhaps the self-
reported risk preference measure should be equally specific, and apply directly to the 
scenario that the risk-taking task measures (i.e. if the task measures gambling 
behaviour, the self-report risk preference measure should equally measure risk 
preference towards gambling). 
5.2.4. The role of other factors associated with risk-taking 
         All three chapters in the thesis aimed to investigate the role of both cognitive 
ability and risk preference in age differences in risk-taking. However, other factors 
associated with age and risk-taking emerged from these studies. In this section, 
some of these factors will be discussed. 
         In Chapters 2 and 3, behavioural tasks were used to assess age differences 
in risk-taking. In these tasks, participants were asked to estimate probabilities 
correctly and decide whether they wanted to gamble once in real-life. As well as 
cognitive measures and risk preference measures, other factors were included in the 
analysis. In study 1, though there were no age differences in correct estimations of 
probability, when incorrect, older adults’ distance from the actual probability was 
larger. This indicates that when incorrect, older adults made larger mistakes. Age 
was not related to risk-taking, but overestimating win probability and underestimating 
loss probability was associated with taking more risk. This pattern in estimations of 
probability was similar in study 2. Unlike the first study, study 2 did find age 
differences in both correct estimation and gamble acceptance, with older adults 
being correct less often and taking more risk. When looking at older adults’ 
estimations on the complex task (see Figure 9 in Chapter 3), the estimations of loss 
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probability showed a tendency to underestimate, whereas the opposite happened 
when estimating win probability. On the simplified task, this occurrence was less 
prevalent, but the pattern was still visible. Older adults’ miscomprehension of 
probabilities and expected value have been found in prior studies, and were found to 
be associated with their increased risk-taking on behavioural tasks (Mamerow et al., 
2016; Weller et al., 2011). As cognitive ability and risk preference were found not to 
be related to risk-taking, the pattern across the two studies suggests that 
overestimating a gamble’s expected value is likely to be associated with increased 
risk-taking, whether in general (study 1) or in combination with age (study 2).  
         In study 3, health-related risk-taking during the coronavirus pandemic was 
measured by the lack of adopting preventative behaviours. As well as numeracy and 
self-reported risk preference, a measure on coronavirus risk perception was also 
included. In the exploratory section of Chapter 4, risk perception was negatively 
related to risk-taking, but age groups did not differ in risk perception. However, when 
the items of the risk perception scale were separated by perception of risk for others 
and perception of risk for self (items on general perception of coronavirus, neither for 
others nor self, were purposely excluded), age differences did appear. Younger 
adults reported perceiving more risk for themselves and for others compared to older 
adults. Both the perception of risk for self and perception of risk for others mediated 
the relationship between age and risk-taking during the coronavirus pandemic. 
         These findings indicate two gaps between perception and behaviour of both 
age groups. The first gap is the disconnect between older adults’ objectively higher 
risk of hospitalization and death resulting from COVID-19 infection, yet the lower 
perception of risk for themselves. This disconnect has been found by other studies 
(Bruine de Bruin, 2020; Guastafierro et al., 2021), who also reported older adults’ 
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lower risk perception of coronavirus. In the study by Guastafierro et al. (2021), older 
adults reported perceiving less risk concerning coronavirus compared to illnesses 
such as the flu or cancer. This may be due to how much the prevention of such an 
illness can be personally controlled. During the pandemic, older adults were advised 
to shield by staying at home, others were advised to stay away from older friends or 
relatives, and adjustments to services were made to prioritize the safety of older 
adults (e.g. shopping hours solely for the elderly, delivery slots specifically for 
vulnerable citizens). As such, feelings of coronavirus risk being controllable (i.e. by 
staying home and adhering to guidelines) may in turn have affected risk perception. 
In addition, older age is often associated with optimism and a decrease in worrying 
(Chowdhury et al., 2014; Hanoch et al., 2019; Jiménez et al., 2017), with older adults 
being less likely to update their belief when presented with undesirable information 
that affects their future (Chowdhury et al., 2014). 
         The second gap concerns the misalignment between younger adults’ higher 
risk-taking, yet higher perception of risk for themselves and for others. Despite 
perceiving more risk, younger adults may report adopting preventative behaviours 
less often due to other reasons. Unlike the older age group, who were mostly retired, 
it may be that the younger adult group was not able to consistently avoid crowded 
spaces, such as offices, public transport or supermarkets, and are thus unable to 
consistently socially distance with at least 1 meter between themselves and others at 
all times. In addition, younger adults have reported higher rates of loneliness (Office 
of National Statistics, 2020), mental illness, concerns about finances (Bruine de 
Bruin, 2020; Fancourt et al., 2020; Li & Wang, 2020, Park et al., 2020), and higher 
job losses. As such, adopting preventative behaviours may also have negative 
consequences attached, leading younger adults to not consistently adopt 
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preventative behaviours to avoid losses in other areas of their lives, such as their 
well-being or financial security. Though age differences in risk-taking were found, the 
difference in risk-taking between age groups was rather small. Older adults did avoid 
risk more than younger adults, but both group means were low, indicating that 
adherence in both groups was generally good. This, combined with younger adults’ 
higher risk perception for themselves and others somewhat dispel the assumption of 
younger adults having little risk perception and being a driving factor in the increase 
in cases due to their lack of adherence to guidelines, as often reported in the news 
during the first year of the pandemic (Mercer, 2020; Polakovic, 2020; Rosney, 2020; 
Whiteside, 2020).   
5.3 Future research 
         There are several areas of future research that may build on the findings 
discussed in this thesis. For example, comparisons between the findings of Chapters 
2 and 3 highlight the importance of recruiting a representative sample for the older 
adult population. Psychological research in general has conducted studies with 
existing participants pools, such as university students, but using an existing 
participant pool for older adult research may impact results, as many measures used 
in older adult research may be sensitive to learning effects if participants have 
encountered these measures before. Thus, it is recommended not to rely on existing 
participant pools to examine age differences in risk-taking, risk preference and 
cognitive ability, and instead recruit community members who are not personally 
familiar with Psychological research. 
         The findings of Chapter 3, in which all cognitive abilities were related to age 
and (some) to behaviour on the two tasks, but did not mediate age differences in risk 
comprehension or risk-taking, indicate that cognitive abilities are involved, yet do not 
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explain age differences in risk-taking. Future studies designing a behavioural task 
with the aim of assessing the role of cognitive ability should include design features 
that rely more heavily on cognitive abilities to capture any mediating effects. For 
instance, if wanting to assess the role of working memory, participants could be 
shown the probabilities associated with a gamble in the very beginning before 
commencing the calculation of probabilities, but not throughout the trial (as done in 
the tasks in Chapters 2 and 3). Another option would be to remove any feedback 
after completing probability estimations, and have participants rely on their 
estimations given for all outcomes. 
         The results of study 4 indicate once more how risk-taking differences between 
age groups are largely determined by factors other than risk preference or cognitive 
ability. Younger and older adults are likely to experience the risk differently due to 
the circumstances associated with their age, which is indicated by the gap between 
their perception of risk for themselves and others and their risk-taking behaviour. As 
risk-taking (characterized by not adopting preventative measures) during a 
worldwide pandemic is a highly unusual situation, future research is advised to 
include other measures more specific to the circumstances around the pandemic 
(e.g. isolation, job losses, the move to online learning) that may explain these age 
differences in risk-taking during COVID-19. Based on this chapter and prior 
research, those materials could include measures of optimism, fear of dying, trust in 
the government, or measurements on financial concerns and mental health. 
         Overall, the findings on age differences in risk-taking across this thesis are 
mixed. As such, there is a lot of opportunity/space to explore this area further. For 
future research, two general approaches to studying this phenomenon are 
recommended. Firstly, most to all behavioural tasks measure risk-taking solely in the 
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financial domain. Participants are expected to understand or calculate (directly or 
indirectly) probabilities and expected values to take or avoid risk. As such, risk-taking 
is a reflection of people’s ability to understand and work with financial information, 
while it is known that people may differ in risk-taking across domains. Where self-
report measures of risk preference reflect this and have many options for general or 
domain-specific risk-taking, behavioural tasks are still largely only in the financial 
domain. As such, future research is recommended to apply behavioural tasks that 
measure risk-taking in other domains, such as social risk-taking or safety risk (such 
as driving), to measure age differences in risk-taking behaviour. Lastly, research on 
age differences in risk-taking often measures age differences by testing younger and 
older adults, either treating them as binary variables or continuous, but longitudinal 
data on ageing and risk-taking is scarce. Thus, currently information on how ageing 
affects one’s risk-taking behaviour on an individual level is unavailable but would be 
very beneficial to the area of research. Future research would be advised to consider 
using a longitudinal design to assess how ageing affects risk-taking and assess the 
role of cognitive ability and risk preference in these age-related changes. 
5.4 Final comments 
         To date, there has been little research dedicated to understanding the role of 
both cognitive ability and risk preference in age differences in risk-taking. As such, 
the findings in this thesis provide a worthwhile contribution to this area of research. 
         The present work demonstrates that age differences in risk-taking are 
complicated and dependent on many factors, such as the type of measurements 
used for risk-taking, cognitive ability and risk preference, and the risk domain. Older 
adults’ working memory performance differed across measures, and differences in 
numeracy were found in study 2 but not in study 1 (despite using the same measure 
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for both). This pattern was similar for risk preference, as age differences did or did 
not appear depending on the type of measure used, domain, and across studies. 
These findings align with those of prior research, further highlighting the reasons 
behind these mixed findings and the dependency of age differences on the design of 
task, test, and self-report measures. 
         Despite studies not consistently finding the same effect in terms of cognitive 
ability or risk preference, this thesis found other factors associated with age or risk-
taking. On the financial tasks in Chapters 2 and 3, overestimating wins and 
underestimating losses was associated either directly with risk-taking (when there 
was no age difference), or with the increased risk-taking of older adults. As such, risk 
comprehension, whether generally or age-related, seems to drive risk-taking 
behaviour on the financial behavioural task. 
         In Chapter 4, initially older and younger adults appeared to perceive 
coronavirus risk similarly, but separating items showed that younger adults perceived 
more risk for others and themselves, despite reporting higher risk-taking. This finding 
indicates that age differences in risk-taking are not due to younger adults’ lower risk 
perception but are likely due to other factors such as well-being and financial 
circumstance. 
         In conclusion, the current work adds to the growing body of research on age 
differences in risk-taking, highlighting how age differences are dependent on other 
factors, instead of older and younger adults inherently differing in their risk-taking 
propensity. It has also contributed other factors beyond cognitive ability and risk 
preference, such as the importance of risk perception, and how these affect younger 
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Participant instructions for the physical decision-making task (Chapter 2) 
In this task you will be given gambles that we will ask you to evaluate. All the 
gambles have a chance of winning money, a chance of losing money and a chance 
of neither winning nor losing. Here is an example of one of the gambles you will be 
offered: 
“Imagine you are offered the following gamble: You win £1 with a chance of 25%, 
you lose £1 with a chance of 15%. Your chance of breaking even, neither winning 
nor losing, is 60%.” 
 This means that every time you play the gamble, you either win, lose, or neither win 
nor lose. The gamble does not change, and the odds and amounts remain the same 
whether you play the gamble 1 time or 100 times. Imagine it’s like playing a fruit 
machine in the casino. The first time you play, you might win money, while the 
second time you play you might lose money.  
We’ll ask you to mimic the gamble using a wooden box. The box has 20 
compartments, and the compartments each represent an outcome of playing the 
gamble (i.e., win, lose, neither win nor lose). We want to know your perception of 
what the chances of each outcome mean.  
Place the balls in the compartments to mimic the chances of each outcome 
described in the gambles, so that, after 20 selections, the outcome mimics the 
instructions on the card. There are three types of coloured balls that represent each 
possible outcome; the green balls are wins, red are losses and yellow are neither 
winning nor losing.  
After you have finished placing the balls in the boxes and I have told you how much 
you believe you would have earned or lost had you experienced those outcomes I 
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will ask you to decide whether you wish to accept to play the gamble once with real 
consequences. If you accept to play the gamble, my computer will decide whether 
you have won or lost.  
At the end of the study, if you have won money overall then you will leave with your 
winnings. If by the end of the study, you haven’t won any money overall you will 




PANAS X (Chapter 2) 
 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now. Use the following scale to record 
your answers: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
 
 
1. ______ enthusiastic 
 
2. ______ nervous 
 
3. ______ excited 
 
4. ______ upset 
 
5. ______ happy  
 
6. ______ sad  
 
7. ______ content 
 




Adjusted Dospert scales (Likelihood, Benefit and Risk Perception), each 












Luck and Luckiness Scale (Chapter 2) 
 





   Strongly  
Agree 
 











2. I try hard to be nice 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I mostly have bad luck 1 2 3 4 5 
4. There is no such thing as good or 
bad luck 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. It’s hard to be nice 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I’m not lucky 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Good and bad luck really do exist 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I generally have good luck 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I’m nice if I try 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Luck doesn’t affect what happens                    
to me 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I consider myself a lucky person 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Belief in luck is completely sensible 1 2 3 4 5 
13. It’s nice to try hard 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Bad luck happens to me often 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Luck only exists in peoples’ minds 1 2 3 4 5 




Objective Numeracy Scale with 3 additional items (Chapters 2 and 3) 
You will be shown 15 numerical questions. Each question will require you to 
calculate your answer. Each question has a few words in front of the answer line to 
indicate what type of answer is required. You may not use a calculator or any other 
means of help, except paper and pen for calculations (if needed).  
 
 
1. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how 
many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)? 
Rolls out of 1,000 ____________________ 
 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chance of winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people each 
buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS? 
Persons out of 1,000 ____________________ 
 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
% ____________________ 
 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
1 in 100  1 in 1,000  1 in 10 
 
5. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
1% 10%  5% 
 
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B’s risk is 
double that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
% ____________________ 
 
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B’s 





8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to 
get the disease out of 100 people? 
Persons out of 100 ____________________ 
 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to 
get the disease out of 1,000 people? 
Persons out of 1,000 ____________________ 
 
10. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as 
having what chance of getting the disease: 
% ____________________ 
 
11. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, how many 
of them are expected to get infected? 
Persons out of 10,000 ____________________ 
 
 
12. If three elves can wrap three toys in 1 hour, how many elves are needed to wrap 
six toys in 2 hours? 
Needed elves ____________________  
 
13. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How 
many students are there in the class? 
 
Amount of students in class ____________________  
 
14. In an athletics team, tall members are three times more likely to win a medal than 
short members. This year the team has won 60 medals so far. How many of these 
have been won by short athletes? 
 
















































New Risk Scale (Chapter 3) 
 
You will now see a series of items, consisting of situations. For each of the following 
items, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the described activity 
or behaviour if you were to find yourself in that situation. 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Extremely 
unlikely 
  Not sure   Extremely 
likely 
       
 
1. You're at the casino for a birthday party. Would you take some gambles at the slot 
machines or some other gamble at the casino? 
 
2. You are watching a football game with friends when they suggest a wager. The 
amount is the small size bill in your wallet.  
Would you take part? 
 
3. Your friends have taken you to the dog racing to spend an evening. Would you 
place a bet whilst at the tracks? 
 
4. You have been saving money for expensive home repairs. Your partner asked for 
a birthday present that is rather expensive, but you refused due to the cost. They 
then asked for a different gift that is cheaper but still rather pricey. Would you buy 
this gift? 
 
5. You have signed up for a research study in which you can gamble to increase 
your payment. You could also lose your payment if you gamble. The payment is 
£10. Would you gamble during the study? 
 
6. You’re travelling to a new city shortly and have already booked transportation. 
While booking for a place to stay you find accommodation for a low price that looks 
too good to be true. Would you book your stay there? 
 
7. A friend has taken you to the horse racing track.  
 Would you place a bet at the races? 
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8. A good friend, not always reliable, lost their job and had to ask you for financial 
support. The first amount they asked for was too much for you to spare, but they said 
they found a way to cover most of their bills but still need a smaller amount.  
Would you lend them the money? 
 
9. A stranger approaches you at the train station asking for your help to buy a train 
ticket to go home because they have been mugged. 
 You don’t have the amount they’re asking for in cash, but you have half of what they 
asked. Would you give them at least a quarter of the money asked? 
 
10. You are spending your evening at a charity event, when they call out that they 
are having a raffle. A bundle of 5 is being sold for £5.  




Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Chapter 3) 
 
Using the scale provided, please indicate how much each of the following statements 
reflects how you typically are. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Rarely/never Occasionally Often Almost 
always/always 
 
1. I plan tasks carefully 
 
2. I do things without thinking 
 
3. I make up my mind quickly 
 
4. I am happy-go-lucky 
 
5. I don’t “pay attention” 
 
6. I have “racing thoughts” 
 
7. I plan trips well ahead of time 
 
8. I am self controlled 
 
9. I concentrate easily 
 
10. I save regularly 
 
11. I “squirm” at plays or lectures 
 
12. I am a careful thinker 
 
13. I plan for job security 
 
14. I say things without thinking 
 
15. I like to think about complex problems 
 
16. I change jobs 
 
17. I act on “impulse” 
 
18. I get easily bored when solving thought problems 
 
19. I act on the spur of the moment 
 




21. I change residences 
 
22. I buy things on impulse 
 
23. I can only think about one thing at a time 
 
24. I change hobbies 
 
25. I spend more or charge more than I earn 
 
26. I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking 
 
27. I am more interested in the present than the future 
 
28. I am restless at the theatre 
 
29. I like puzzles 
 
30. I am future oriented. 
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Self-Control Scale (Chapter 3) 
 
Using the scale provided, please indicate how much each of the following statements 
reflects how you typically are. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 




1. I am good at resisting temptation.  
 
2. I have a hard time breaking bad habits.  
 
3. I am lazy.  
 
4. I say inappropriate things.  
 
5. I never allow myself to lose control.  
 
6. I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun.  
 
7. People can count on me to keep on schedule.  
 
8. Getting up in the morning is hard for me.   
 
9. I have trouble saying no.  
 
10. I change my mind fairly often.  
 
11. I blurt out whatever is on my mind.  
 
12. People would describe me as impulsive.  
 
13. I refuse things that are bad for me.  
 
14. I spend too much money.  
 
15. I keep everything neat.  
 
16. I am self-indulgent at times.  
 
17. I wish I had more self-discipline.  
 
18. I am reliable.  
 
19. I get carried away by my feelings.  
 




21. I don’t keep secrets very well.  
 
22. People would say that I have iron self- discipline.  
 
23. I have worked or studied all night at the last minute.  
 
24. I’m not easily discouraged.  
 
25. I’d be better off if I stopped to think before acting.  
 
26. I engage in healthy practices.  
 
27. I eat healthy foods.  
 
28. Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done.  
 
29. I have trouble concentrating. 
  
30. I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals.  
 
31. Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I 
           know it is wrong 
 
32. I often act without thinking through all the alternatives.  
 
33. I lose my temper too easily.  
 
34. I often interrupt people.  
 
35. I sometimes drink or use drugs to excess. 
  





General Risk Propensity Scale (Chapter 3) 
 
For each of the following statements, please use the scale indicate the degree to 
which you agree or disagree with the statement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree    Strongly 
disagree 
 
1. Taking risks makes life more fun 
 
2. My friends would say I am a risk taker 
 
3. I enjoy taking risks in most aspects of my life 
 
4. I would take a risk even if it meant I might get hurt 
 
5. Taking risks is an important part of my life  
 
6. I commonly make risky decisions  
 
7. I am a believer of taking chances 
 
8. I am attracted, rather than scared, by risk 
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Power analysis (Chapter 4) 
 
Data Simulation 
We will write a function to generate some synthetic data for a sample size of 𝑛. 
We will assume three cts variables, 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑥. All are distributed 𝑁(0,1). All three 
have a medium effect on 𝑦 (i.e., ‘g_fx_a’, 0.3). 
We will assume that 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑥 are correlated, with some 𝑟. 
importantly, there is also a two-level grouping factor, which impacts 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑥. The effect 
size of 𝑔 on the other variables is g_fx_a/b/x 
The effect of 𝑔 on 𝑦 is g_fx_y and set to -0.3. 
gen_synth_data <- function(n, r = 0.1) { 
   
  g_fx_a = -0.3 
  g_fx_b =  0.3 
  g_fx_x = -0.3 
   
  a_fx_y = 0.3 
  b_fx_y = -0.3 
  x_fx_y = -0.3 
  g_fx_y = -0.3 
   
  coefs <- list( 
    g = g_fx_y, 
    a = a_fx_y, 
    b = b_fx_y, 
    x = x_fx_y, 
    ab  = 0, 
    sigma = 1) 
   
   X <- rnorm_multi( 
     n = n,  
     vars = 3, 
     mu = c(0, 0, 0), 
     sd = c(1, 1 ,1), 
     r = r, 
     varnames = c("a", "b", "x")) 
    
   g <- rep(c("group o", "group y"), each=n/2) 
    
   d <- tibble( 
     g = g, 
     a = X$a, b = X$b, x = X$x) %>% 
     mutate( 
       g = as_factor(g), 
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       a = if_else(g == "group o", a + g_fx_a/2, a - g_fx_a), 
       b = if_else(g == "group o", b + g_fx_b/2, b - g_fx_b), 
       x = if_else(g == "group o", x + g_fx_x/2, x - g_fx_x), 
     y = rnorm(n,  
               coefs$g * (g == "group o") + 
               coefs$a * a +  
                 coefs$b * b +  
                 coefs$x * x, 
               coefs$sigma)) 
       
  return(d) 
  } 
Check Simulation Looks Sensible 
Generating synthetic data. 
d <- gen_synth_data(1000, 0) %>% glimpse() 
## Rows: 1,000 
## Columns: 5 
## $ g <fct> group o, group o, group o, group o, group o, group o, group o, gr... 
## $ a <dbl> -1.146, -0.692, -0.473, 0.847, -1.224, 0.649, 0.859, 0.197, 1.517... 
## $ b <dbl> 0.2729, -1.2199, 0.5778, -1.1763, 1.1042, 1.2348, 1.9209, -0.4438... 
## $ x <dbl> -2.611234, -0.482501, 0.698284, -1.721335, 0.471132, 0.874867, 1.... 
## $ y <dbl> 1.13907, 0.50851, -1.22882, 0.02135, -2.64889, 0.00611, -0.10290,... 
cor.test(d$a, d$b) 
##  
##  Pearson's product-moment correlation 
##  
## data:  d$a and d$b 
## t = -0.7, df = 998, p-value = 0.5 
## alternative hypothesis: true correlation is not equal to 0 
## 95 percent confidence interval: 
##  -0.0837  0.0402 
## sample estimates: 
##     cor  
## -0.0218 
Plots to check a (risk attitude), b (risk perception) and x (numeracy). 














H1: g (the effect of age on risk-taking) 
boxplot(y ~ g, data=d)
 
summary(lm(y ~ g, data = d)) 
##  
## Call: 
## lm(formula = y ~ g, data = d) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##    Min     1Q Median     3Q    Max  
## -3.513 -0.749 -0.032  0.725  3.575  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept)  -0.3807     0.0495   -7.69  3.6e-14 *** 
## ggroup y      0.4796     0.0701    6.85  1.3e-11 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 1.11 on 998 degrees of freedom 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.0449, Adjusted R-squared:  0.0439  
## F-statistic: 46.9 on 1 and 998 DF,  p-value: 1.31e-11 
So our original main effect of 𝑔 is: 
gh1_beta <- summary(lm(y ~ g, data = d))$coefficients[2,1] 
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H1: a (The effect of risk attitude on risk-taking) 
ggplot(d, aes(x=a, y=y)) + 
    geom_point(shape=1)  +     
    geom_smooth(method=lm, colour = "#D55E00" ) 
## `geom_smooth()` using formula 'y ~ x' 
 
summary(lm(y ~ a, data = d)) 
##  
## Call: 
## lm(formula = y ~ a, data = d) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##    Min     1Q Median     3Q    Max  
## -3.446 -0.730 -0.037  0.664  3.369  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept)  -0.1557     0.0345   -4.52    7e-06 *** 
## a             0.3191     0.0350    9.13   <2e-16 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 1.09 on 998 degrees of freedom 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.0771, Adjusted R-squared:  0.0761  
## F-statistic: 83.3 on 1 and 998 DF,  p-value: <2e-16 
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H1: b (the effect of risk perception on risk-taking) 
ggplot(d, aes(x=b, y=y)) + 
    geom_point(shape=1)  +     
    geom_smooth(method=lm) 
## `geom_smooth()` using formula 'y ~ x' 
 
summary(lm(y ~ b, data = d)) 
##  
## Call: 
## lm(formula = y ~ b, data = d) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##    Min     1Q Median     3Q    Max  
## -3.706 -0.715 -0.025  0.688  3.233  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept)  -0.1669     0.0347   -4.81  1.8e-06 *** 
## b            -0.2904     0.0337   -8.61  < 2e-16 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 1.09 on 998 degrees of freedom 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.0691, Adjusted R-squared:  0.0681  
## F-statistic: 74.1 on 1 and 998 DF,  p-value: <2e-16 
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H1: x (the effect of numeracy on risk-taking) 
ggplot(d, aes(x=x, y=y)) + 
    geom_point(shape=1)  +     
    geom_smooth(method=lm, colour = "#FF0033") 
## `geom_smooth()` using formula 'y ~ x' 
 
summary(lm(y ~ x, data = d)) 
##  
## Call: 
## lm(formula = y ~ x, data = d) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##    Min     1Q Median     3Q    Max  
## -3.549 -0.687 -0.054  0.704  3.720  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept)  -0.1288     0.0350   -3.68  0.00025 *** 
## x            -0.2338     0.0331   -7.06  3.2e-12 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 1.11 on 998 degrees of freedom 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.0475, Adjusted R-squared:  0.0466  
## F-statistic: 49.8 on 1 and 998 DF,  p-value: 3.17e-12 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
In H2, we are applying multiple mediation. In this follow-up from H1, all variables 
expected to mediate the relationship between age and risk-taking are included 
(i.e. risk attitude, risk perception and numeracy). 
summary(lm(y ~ g + a + b + x, data = d)) 
##  
## Call: 
## lm(formula = y ~ g + a + b + x, data = d) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##    Min     1Q Median     3Q    Max  
## -2.818 -0.677 -0.023  0.657  2.788  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept)  -0.3480     0.0458   -7.60  7.0e-14 *** 
## ggroup y      0.3737     0.0687    5.44  6.6e-08 *** 
## a             0.2881     0.0329    8.76  < 2e-16 *** 
## b            -0.2450     0.0319   -7.67  4.1e-14 *** 
## x            -0.2913     0.0308   -9.46  < 2e-16 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 1 on 995 degrees of freedom 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.222,  Adjusted R-squared:  0.219  
## F-statistic:   71 on 4 and 995 DF,  p-value: <2e-16 
check_for_fx <- function(n, r=0.2, alpha = 0.05) { 
  d<- gen_synth_data(n, r) 
  # check that H1 is true 
  # i.e., the p-value < alpha 
  h1g <- summary(lm(y ~ g, data = d))$coefficients[2,4] < alpha 
  b1_g <- summary(lm(y ~ g, data = d))$coefficients[2,1] 
  h1a <- summary(lm(y ~ a, data = d))$coefficients[2,4] < alpha 
  h1b <- summary(lm(y ~ b, data = d))$coefficients[2,4] < alpha 
  h1x <- summary(lm(y ~ x, data = d))$coefficients[2,4] < alpha 
  # Now check the H2, checking that the new variable is sig and the effect of g has d
ecreased 
  m3 <- summary(lm(y ~ g + a + b + x, data = d))$coefficients 
  h3a <- m3[3, 4] < alpha 
  h3b <- m3[4, 4] < alpha 
  h3x <- m3[5, 4] < alpha 
  h3g <- m3[2, 1] < b1_g 
  d_out <- tibble( 
    h = c("h1g", "h1a", "h1b", "h1x", "h3g", "h3a", "h3b", "h3x"), 
    n = n, 
    r = r, 
    p = c(h1g, h1a, h1b, h1x, h3g , h3a, h3b, h3x)) 
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  d_out <- add_row(d_out, h = "all",n= n, r = r, p = mean(d_out$p)==1) 
  return(d_out) 
} 
Now let us do this lots of times for different values of n. 
iter <- 500 
n_min <- 10 
n_max <- 250 
sims <- map_dfr(rep(seq(50, 500, 20), 500), check_for_fx, r = 0.1) 
sims %>% group_by(h, n, r) %>% 
  summarise(power = mean(p)) %>% 
  mutate(r = as.factor(r)) %>% 
  ggplot(aes(x = n, y = power, colour = h, group = h)) + 
  geom_point() + geom_smooth(se = FALSE) + 
  scale_y_continuous(breaks = c(0, 0.95, 1), limits = c(0, 1)) 
## `geom_smooth()` using method = 'loess' and formula 'y ~ x' 









COVID-19 risk-taking (Chapter 4) 
 
The next set of questions will present a number of activities and behaviours. You will 
be asked to report how often you have engaged in these behaviours in the last 2 
weeks. 
Your answers will be fully anonymous, so please answer honestly. 
 
 
Always Mostly yes Sometimes Mostly not Never Not applicable 
 
 
1. Thoroughly cleaning my hands with hand sanitizer. 
 
2. Touching my face with unwashed hands. 
 
3. Regularly washing my hands with soap and water for at least 20 seconds. 
 




5. Regularly cleaning common surfaces with disinfectant. 
 
6. Wearing a face mask when I am inside shops. 
 
7. Wearing a facemask when I am on public transport. 
 
8. Meeting indoors with people who are not in your household or bubble. 
 
9. Keeping at least a 1 metre distance from others when outside my home. 
 
10. Relying solely on contact-free deliveries for essentials and other shopping. 
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COVID-19 Risk perception (Chapter 4) 
 
How worried are you personally about the following issues at present?  
- Coronavirus/COVID-19 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
worried 




How likely do you think it is that you will be directly and personally affected by the 
following in the next 6 months? 
 - Catching the coronavirus/COVID-19 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
likely 




How likely do you think it is that your friends and family in the country you are 
currently living in will be directly affected by the following in the next 6 months?  
- Catching the coronavirus/COVID-19 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
likely 




How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
- The coronavirus/COVID-19 will NOT affect very many people in the country I’m 
currently living in 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 




How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
- I will probably get sick with the coronavirus/ COVID-19 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 






How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
- Getting sick with the coronavirus/COVID-19 can be serious 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 





Dospert Likelihood, Risk Perceptions and Benefit scales (Chapter 4) 
 
 
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (Adult) Scale – Risk Taking 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would 
engage in the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that 
situation.  Provide a rating from Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely, using the 
following scale: 
 

















1. Drinking heavily at a social function.        
2. Engaging in unprotected sex.       
3. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt.       
4. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet.  
5. Sunbathing without sunscreen.   
6. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.   
 
 
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (Adult) Scale – Risk Perceptions 
 
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the 
outcome or consequences will be and for which there is the possibility of negative 
consequences. However, riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we 
are interested in your gut level assessment of how risky each situation or 
behavior is. 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each 
situation. Provide a rating from Not at all Risky to Extremely Risky, using the 
following scale: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 













1. Drinking heavily at a social function.   
2. Engaging in unprotected sex.   
3. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt.  
4. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet.  
5. Sunbathing without sunscreen.   
6. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.   
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Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (Adult) Scale – Expected Benefits 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the benefits you would obtain 
from each situation.  Provide a rating from 1 to 7, using the following scale: 
  
  




  Moderate 
benefits 
  Great 
benefits 
 
1. Drinking heavily at a social function.   
2. Engaging in unprotected sex.   
3. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt.  
4. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet.  
5. Sunbathing without sunscreen.   
6. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.  
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Objective Numeracy Scale (Chapter 4) 
You will be shown 15 numerical questions. Each question will require you to 
calculate your answer. Each question has a few words behind the answer line to 
indicate what type of answer is required. You cannot use a calculator or any other 
means of help, but you can use paper and pen for calculations. 
 
1. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how 
many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)? 
Rolls out of 1,000 ____________________ 
 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chance of winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people each 
buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS? 
Persons out of 1,000 ____________________ 
 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
% ____________________ 
 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
1 in 100  1 in 1,000  1 in 10 
 
5. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
1% 10%  5% 
 
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B’s risk is 
double that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
% ____________________ 
 
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B’s 





8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to 
get the disease out of 100 people? 
Persons out of 100 ____________________ 
 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to 
get the disease out of 1,000 people? 
Persons out of 1,000 ____________________ 
 
10. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as 
having what chance of getting the disease: 
% ____________________ 
 
11. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, how many 
of them are expected to get infected? 





Descriptive items (Chapter 4) 
 
 










































   
 
 
 
